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Preface
In the last decade, especially in the context of dramatic ad-
vances in the sciences of both genes and brains, the stream
of ultra-Darwinist and biologically determinist claims has
become a torrent. First the Human Genome Program and
then the Decade of the Brain have not merely offered vastly
greater knowledge of aspects of human biology, but they
have also held out the promise of further technological
power to manipulate both genes and minds in the interests
of individual health and greater social tranquility.
Techniques of intervention barely imaginable a decade
ago, at best the stuff of science fiction, now rate stock mar-
ket quotations and turn academic researchers into entre-
preneurial millionaires. To judge from headlines in daily
newspapers, or the titles of academic papers in major sci-
entific journals, the issues of a decade ago have been set-
tled. Vulgar sociobiology may be out, but what I have called
“neurogenetic determinism” is strongly entrenched. There
are genes available to account for every aspect of our lives,
from personal success to existential despair: genes for
health and illness, genes for criminality, violence, and “ab-
normal” sexual orientation – even for “compulsive shop-
ping.” And genes too to explain, as ever, the social inequal-
ities that divide our lives along lines of class, gender, race,
ethnicity; and where there are genes, genetic and pharma-
cological engineering hold hopes for salvation that social
engineering and politics have abandoned.
The challenge to the opponents of biological determin-
ism is that while we may have been effective in our critique
of its reductionist claims, we have not offered a coherent
alternative framework within which to interpret living pro-
cesses. We may reply that we have been too busy attempt-
ing to rebut the determinists, but sooner or later it becomes
necessary to spell out more coherently our contrasting bi-
ological case. Lifelines (Rose 1997) originated as an at-
tempt to meet that challenge, first, to try to convey what it
means to “think like a biologist” about the nature of living
processes, second, to analyse both the strengths and limi-
tations of the reductionist tradition which dominates much
of biology, and, third, to offer a perspective on biology
which transcends genetic reductionism, by placing the or-
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ganism, rather than the gene, at the centre of life – this is
the perspective that I call homeodynamic. To stress my pos-
itive case, it has also in places been necessary to set it
against the counter-case made at its rhetorical strongest. To
do so, I have had to choose appropriate foils. The two au-
thors who have most clearly served me in this way are the
sociobiologist Richard Dawkins, whose several books speak
with a single ultra-Darwinist voice, and the philosopher
Daniel Dennett, whose Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (Den-
nett 1995) carries ultra-Darwinism to the furthest reaches
of excess.
Because Lifelines is written for a general audience, sev-
eral sections, notably those on genetics and development,
include a substantial amount of explanatory material which
will be familiar to most readers of this journal, and I have
therefore omitted them from this précis, or abbreviated
them to summary statements of the examples employed.
Chapter 1: Biology, freedom, determinism
The power of western science derived from its capacity to
explain and later to control aspects of the non-living world
studied by physics and chemistry. Only subsequently were
the methods and theories shaped by the success of these
older sciences turned towards the study of living processes
themselves. The past successes of science have been based
not so much on observation and contemplation but on ac-
tive intervention into the phenomena they wish to explain.
Biologists are now beginning to lay claims to universal
knowledge, of what life is, how it emerged, and how it
works. Throughout all life forms and all living processes,
certain general principles hold; certain mechanisms, cer-
tain forms of chemistry, exist in common. But intervention
into living processes confronts us with moral dilemmas, be-
cause biology impinges directly on how we live. Its tech-
nologies transform our personal, social, and natural envi-
ronments and make claims as to who we are, about the
forces that shape the deepest aspects of our personalities,
and even about our purposes here on earth.
The science we do, the theories we prefer, the technolo-
gies we use and create as part of that science, can never be
divorced from the social context in which they are created,
from the purposes of those who fund the science, the world
views within which we seek and find appropriate answers,
to the great what, why, and how questions that frame our
understanding of life’s purposes. So with modern biology,
whose diverse answers to these questions are imbued with
social and political significance. The dominant fashion for
giving genetic explanations to account for many if not all as-
pects of the human social condition – from the social in-
equalities of race, gender, and class to individual propensi-
ties such as sexual orientation, the use of drugs or alcohol,
or the failures of the homeless or psychologically distressed
to survive effectively in modern society – is the ideology of
biological determinism. I offer an alternative vision of liv-
ing systems which recognises the power and role of genes
without subscribing to genetic determinism, which recap-
tures an understanding of living organisms and their trajec-
tories through time and space as lying at the centre of biol-
ogy. It is these trajectories that I call “lifelines.”
1.1. Themes: Biological questions. There is commonly
supposed to be a hierarchy of sciences, ranging from
physics through chemistry, biology, and the human sci-
ences. In this convention, physics is seen as the most fun-
damental of the sciences to which the others must aspire,
or be reduced. But biological science raise themes which
cannot be reduced to physics. To show why, consider a frog
jumping into a pool. The cause of the jump may be de-
scribed as the contraction of the leg muscles, preceded by
nerve impulses, and so on. Or one could explain the jump
in terms of intention – to escape a predator – or in terms of
ontogeny, or of phylogeny – or in terms of the actin and
myosin fibres of which the muscle is composed. All are nec-
essary and valid parts of description; only the last is reduc-
tionist. Which explanation one finds satisfying depends on
the purposes for which it is intended.
1.2. Themes: Time. The concept of time and the direction
of “time’s arrow” are central to biology. Living processes
are complex, often irreproducible because historically con-
tingent, and hence also practically irreversible. Dobzhan-
sky (1973) asserted that “nothing in biology makes sense
except in the light of evolution.” I claim that nothing in bi-
ology makes sense except in the light of history – the his-
tory of life in general, of individual development, and of
our own science and its concerns. The past is the key to the
present.
1.3. Themes: Space. The second deep theme with which
biologists are concerned is that of structure. To the three di-
mensions of space must be added the dimension of time.
Organisms have forms which change but also persist
throughout their life’s trajectory, despite the fact that every
molecule in their body has been replaced thousands of
times over. How is form achieved and maintained? Cells,
organisms, are more than simple lists of chemicals. Neither
their three-dimensional structures nor their lifelines can
simply be read off from the one-dimensional strand of
DNA. Today the task of a biology of structure has become
one of understanding how to reassemble these compo-
nents, to explain both form and its transformation and per-
sistence through time.
1.4. Themes: Dynamics. Homeostasis is a dominating mo-
tif of biological thought. But the metaphor of homeostasis
constrains our view of living systems. Lifelines are not
purely homeostatic, they have a beginning at conception,
and an end at death. Organisms, and indeed ecosystems,
develop, mature, and age. The set points of homeostatic
theory are not themselves constant during this trajectory
but change over time. To put the organism and its lifeline
back at the core of biology means replacing the static, re-
ductive, DNA-centred view of living systems that currently
pervades biological thinking by an emphasis on dynamics,
process, the relationships between object and fields, and
the paradox of development by which any organism must
simultaneously be and become.
1.5. Themes: Autopoiesis. These processes of develop-
ment transcend the crude dichotomies of nature and nur-
ture, gene and environment, determinism and freedom. 
Instead we must speak of the dialectic of specificity and
plasticity during development through which the living or-
ganism constructs itself. The central property of all life is
autopoiesis, the capacity and necessity to build, maintain,
and preserve itself.
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Chapter 2: Observing and intervening
Science begins with observation, but no one observes neu-
trally. We construct our world. Observation demands sam-
pling and categorising events and processes, distinguishing
object from field. Most sciences are also interventive, re-
quiring that experimental conditions be constrained and
manipulated – and hence reduced (e.g., my own work on
memory in chicks, Rose 1992).
This example also points to another feature of science,
the use of resemblance (chick memory as equivalent to hu-
man memory). Metaphors occur when we liken some
process or phenomenon observed in one domain to that in
a quite different one. Metaphors are not meant to imply
identity of process or function, but should serve to cast light
on the phenomenon one is studying. Analogy implies a sur-
face resemblance between two phenomena, perhaps in
terms of the function of a particular structure. By contrast,
homology implies a deeper identity, derived from an as-
sumed common evolutionary origin. Thus, homology car-
ries with it an assumption of shared history and origins, and,
by inference, it implies common mechanisms (e.g., fore-
limb hooves of a horse and the human hand; chick and hu-
man memory).
Does memory consitute a Platonic natural kind? Are
there indeed “natural kinds” in biology? Neither individu-
als, nor species, nor complex biological molecules such as
proteins can be so regarded. Each is defined operationally
and has a unity given by process, not by composition.
Chapter 3: Knowing what we know
The purpose of observing and experimenting is to derive
knowledge of the world and its workings, to enable us to
predict and control it. This action imperative characterises
modern science. Bacon understood this when he described
experiments as being of two kinds, those that brought light
and those that brought fruit. For Bacon, knowledge came
through induction. Popper replaced induction with hy-
pothesis-making. Kuhn argued instead for paradigms,
frameworks within which the problem-solving of normal
science was set. But where do paradigms come from? For
Kuhn the question was an individualistic, almost psycho-
logical one. However, following both the older Marxist tra-
dition and the newer insights of the sociologists of science,
Kuhn’s question allows the social into science. We frame
our questions of the world in ways which are constrained
both by the material reality of that world and by the para-
digm blinkers: our social expectations and the history of
how our science chooses to ask its questions. Here the
power of metaphor in biology – often derived from tech-
nological or social artefacts – becomes important (e.g., ATP
as a currency system, DNA as a code, brains as computers;
social organisms as conforming to monetarist cost-benefit
economics). Favoured paradigms and hypotheses are rarely
simply disconfirmed (e.g., an experiment of mine done
jointly with Sheldrake to test so-called morphic resonance).
Nor does the fact that a technology “works” mean that the
framework in which it is based is true (e.g., claims that chil-
dren who misbehave at school suffer from attention deficit
disorder and can be treated with the drug ritalin; ritalin may
indeed make a child more tractable, but that does not con-
firm the original diagnosis).
A further constraint on science is the available technol-
ogy. The questions that we ask of the living processes we
study are not merely not answerable without the technol-
ogy, they are unthinkable. Before the development of light
microscopes in the seventeenth century, the existence of
bacteria and other single-celled organisms was wholly un-
suspected. So was the “unit” of life, the cell, until the mi-
croscopists of the mid-nineteenth century. Until the advent
of the electron microscope in the early 1950s, the internal
constituents of cells were unobservable and hence un-
known. It was impossible either to build theories about the
partition of cellular functions which such subcellular parti-
cles might embody.
Technology solves certain problems and suggests others.
But it also constrains the way we view the world. Example:
electron microscopy (EM). To prepare living tissues for EM
it is necessary to fix, embed, stain, and section. The ap-
prentice electron microscopist is taught how and what to
see, what to regard as “real” and what as “artefact” – the un-
wanted consequences of one or more of the procedures
which the living tissue has been put through. Thus, the new
observer is initiated into the conventional wisdom devel-
oped by forty years of work in the artificial world of elec-
tron microscopy. This fixed pattern of the electron micro-
graph forms the basis for drawing of cells in biology
textbooks and provides the convention within which even
experienced biologists mainly think of them. So powerful is
the technology that it becomes hard to move beyond it, to
think in three, let alone four dimensions (e.g., x-ray diffrac-
tion patterns; gel separation of proteins).
These are the sciences made possible by technology, the
technologies made possible by science. The world view we
create is derived from the intimate interaction of technol-
ogy and science with the eye of craft experience, shaped by
the theoretical expectations within which we as biological
researchers must live. It is a world which presents chal-
lenges which go deeper than Popperian hypothesis-making,
Kuhnian paradigms, and truth versus performance with
which those studying the epistemology of science attempt
to make their own sense of what we do. Wresting reliable
knowledge from the world we biologists study is, as
Koestler described it, an Act of Creation.
So what justification can there be for claiming that it is
possible to obtain reliable knowledge of the living world?
The evolutionary lineage which led to humans has been
characterised by the development of more flexible organ-
isms with bigger and more powerful brains, able to adapt to
respond to rapidly changing circumstances. To survive and
succeed, our evolutionary forebears had to rely on their
brains to make reliable hypotheses about the world around
and to act appropriately upon them. If the mental world
which we construct in this way did not correspond reason-
ably accurately to the way the world outside “really” is, we
could not survive. Such hypothesis-making may be seen as
the starting point for science. But science is socially organ-
ised hypothesis-making. Hypotheses must be shared,
tested, and agreed on amongst a community. Nothing that
occurs in the non-human animal world matches the cumu-
lative nature of hypothesis-making which constitutes hu-
man science. We are able to build on the tested and seem-
ingly validated hypotheses not merely of those who are
currently alive but those of all previous generations.
Humans, however, are more than just scientific hypoth-
esis makers. We live in communities shaped by many other
cultural and economic forces that provide strong guidance
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as to how we should view the world around us and our fel-
low humans. In Britain in the 1990s, where the gap between
rich and poor is greater than it has been for a generation,
the world is seen from very different perspectives by the di-
rectors of the privatised utilities and by the people they
have sacked. In a society in which there is a strong division
of labour and power between men and women in every field
of work from science to child care, their viewpoints on the
world will also differ. A white racist football fan will be un-
likely to make the same hypotheses about the world as will
the black player he abuses.
For many fields of scientific hypothesis-making, these
rather crudely drawn distinctions may be irrelevant, but bi-
ology claims to be in a position to tell us, as humans, who
we are, where we came from, where we are going, and how
we must live and relate to our fellow living creatures. The
metaphors and analogies we find attractive are laden with
cultural values and expectations that come from outside our
science. Those who deny this are ignorant of the hard work
done by philosophers and sociologists in developing an un-
derstanding of the nature of science and the knowledge it
creates.
Despite this doubt at the very core of the scientific en-
deavour, we are not in a position to assert that “anything
goes.” Although the observations we make about the world
are theory- and ideology-laden before we start, and the
joints into which we carve nature are provided less by a pri-
ori definitions than by operational need, they nonetheless
must make some more or less good fit with the world or we
could not proceed. Our hypotheses would fail. However
great their budget, genetic engineers will not be able to turn
humans into angels, nor cryogenicists restore the memories
of the past owner of a severed and frozen head.
Chapter 4:The triumph of reductionism?
To many scientists reductionism is first not second nature.
As an example, an exchange took place at a Royal Society
Meeting in 1986 between Popper, who argued that bio-
chemistry is irreducible to chemistry, and Perutz, who drew
on the role of haemoglobin to claim that it could be so re-
duced. But knowledge of the molecular structure of
haemoglobin explains how it serves as an oxygen carrier,
and cannot answer the biological question of what function
such a capacity serves in a living organism.
4.1. Reductionism as methodology. We find it easier to
understand phenomena if we can hold them relatively iso-
lated from the rest of the world and alter potential variables
singly, simplifying and enabling one to generate seemingly
linear chains of cause and effect (e.g., studying enzyme ki-
netics by altering either temperature or pH; altering both
simultaneously makes mathematisation almost impossible.)
Hence the attraction of reductionism and why it has served
science so well. But living systems are not simple. Variables
interact. Parameters are not fixed. Properties are non-
linear. And the living world is highly non-uniform. We fail
if we are not careful to remember that what happens in the
test-tube may be the same as, the opposite of, or bear no re-
lationship at all to what happens in the living cell, still less
the living organism in its environment. It all depends.
4.2. Theory reduction. One of the aims of science is to sim-
plify, to embrace a maximal description of the world within
the minimum possible number of laws and variables. The
history of science contains a number of examples of what
were originally believed to be different phenomena, and
were only later discovered to be identical (e.g., the morn-
ing and evening stars, regarded as distinct in previous cos-
mologies, now understood to be a single entity, the planet
Venus; the sciences of heat and light were once regarded as
distinct; today both heat and light are seen as forms of elec-
tromagnetic radiation).
Some unifications have been immensely powerful, par-
ticularly at the interface between biochemistry and chem-
istry. For example, Lavoisier’s recognition that the body’s
“burning” of the sugar glucose to carbon dioxide and water,
with the concomitant production of utilisable energy, was
in chemical terms the equivalent of oxidation. This under-
standing that living processes did not depend on some mys-
terious life force but involved chemical reactions which fol-
lowed the same rules as those of chemistry and could be
studied in isolation was one of the great reductionist tri-
umphs of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
More than mere metaphor, homology, or analogy, it was an
exact description. Yet there are dangers inherent in such
theory reduction, which led to a philosophy of mechanical
materialism amongst physiologists.
Modern textbooks offer the reduction of “gene” to
“DNA” as a case parallel to that of the identity of the morn-
ing and evening stars. But “gene” and “DNA” are not ( just)
two names for the same object. And it is at this point that
theory reduction tips over into its problematic, philosophi-
cal form which claims that ultimately chemical theory is re-
ducible to a special case of physics, biochemistry to chem-
istry, physiology to biochemistry, psychology to physiology,
and ultimately sociology to psychology and hence to physics
(e.g., E.O. Wilson’s [1975] claim that neurobiology will can-
nibalise sociology).
To see the implications of this type of reductionism, con-
sider biochemistry and physiology. Although the two sci-
ences may speak different languages, use different instru-
ments, and read different journals, the phenomena they are
studying are the same, but at different levels – also an am-
biguous term. But what would the elimination of physiol-
ogy for biochemistry imply? Are we trying to describe a
causal relationship – that biochemistry (say, of a muscle
twitch) is causally responsible for the physiological event?
If so, this is a very different use of the word “cause” from
the way in which we normally use it to describe the rela-
tionship in time between cause and effect – one event nec-
essarily and specifically following from another. But the
sliding of the actin and myosin filaments (the biochemist’s
description) does not precede the muscle contraction; it is
the muscle contraction, or at least part of it. That is, the re-
lationship between the events described in the two lan-
guages is one of identity, not cause – but a non-reductive
identity. There are features of the muscle twitch, such as
function, which physiology describes but biochemistry can-
not. To put it formally, ontological unity permits epistemo-
logical diversity. The key feature which distinguishes a
lower “level” from those above it is that at each level new
interactions and relationships appear between the compo-
nent parts, relationships which cannot be inferred simply
by taking the system to pieces.
Furthermore, philosophical reductionism implies that
whatever higher order properties emerge, they are some-
how secondary to the lower order ones. Parts come before
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wholes. Yet the nature of evolutionary and developmental
processes in biology means that there is no such necessary
primacy. Wholes, emerging, may in themselves constrain or
demand the appearance of parts. To understand the world’s
ontological unity we need the epistemological diversity that
the different levels of explanation offer.
Chapter 5: Genes and organisms
The trajectory of any organism through time and space – its
personal lifeline – is unique. Although each individual re-
sembles all others of the same species, and resembles more
closely still its parents and siblings, no two are identical.
What confers such similarities, such identities and differ-
ences, on the space-time trajectories of life? These ques-
tions are the objects of study of genetics and developmen-
tal biology, which began by asking rather similar questions
about the nature of life but at a key point in their history be-
came damagingly separated one from the other. This has re-
sulted in conceptual confusions which have persisted well
into the present day. But to appreciate the consequences of
these confusions we have to go back into the history of ge-
netic and developmental thinking. Biology’s own history is
centrally engaged within these current disputes.
The genesis of genetics lay with Mendel, who not only
showed that certain characters were transmitted indepen-
dently but introduced quantitative measures, observing
that they appeared in successive generations in simple and
reproducible ratios. Inheritance was discrete; each surface
property was represented by an unobservable particle or
store of information, on the basis of which the colour and
shape of the succeeding generations was determined
(hence, e.g., 3/1 ratios). Mendel was lucky. By contrast, the
characters that interested Galton – human features such as
height, strength of handgrip, head circumference, or intel-
ligence – varied continuously across a broad range and off-
spring tended to occupy middle territory between their par-
ents. Such continuously varying characteristics seemed to
blend. Indeed Mendel’s ratios turn out to be very special
cases, even though, following their rediscovery in 1900,
they formed the cornerstone of genetics. The individual
hidden determinants of surface characters became genes,
and the total of an individual’s genes formed its genotype
(nowadays genome). The surface characters themselves
comprised the individual’s phenotype. It is important to
recognise that none of these terms were very precisely de-
fined, and practically from the beginning meant different
things to different researchers, varying from the specific
features of any individual of a species to some Platonically
idealised “species type” to which all actually existing mem-
bers of the species approximated. Genes were essences: the
ultimate, indivisible units on which the outward forms de-
pended; the unmoved movers, unchanged changers, within
each organism.
“Phenotype” is similarly ambiguous, and is used to refer
to any or all observable or measurable features of an or-
ganism, from the presence of a particular enzyme to hair
colour or body feature or even a piece of characteristic be-
haviour such as gait whilst walking. Dawkins (1982) even
goes so far as to describe aspects of the external environ-
ment of an organism as part of its phenotype – for instance,
he sees the dam that a beaver constructs as part of that
beaver’s phenotype. Yet the dam is not the product of the
activity of a single individual, but of the collective labours
of many beavers. It also harbours a multitude of other
species. If the dam is a phenotype, it is the phenotype of a
community, not of an individual, and its relationship to any
individual’s genes, genotype, or genome is thus tenuous.
The distinction between discontinuous variation and
continuous variation remained problematic through the
1920s. Pearson developed many of the statistical methods
still in use today to analyse complex data. Indeed the histo-
ries of genetics and of statistics have been thoroughly in-
terlocked ever since. The resolution of the conflict de-
pended on the recognition that continuous variation, in
features such as height, could be regarded as a consequence
of the interaction of many genes of small effect. Diver-
gences from simple Mendelian ratios steadily accumulated
(e.g., sex-linked characters). Other divergences from the ra-
tios are less straightforward and the models became more
complex to account for them. However complicated and
varied the observed phenotypes, the modellers were still
determined to explain them on the basis of the interaction
of the indivisible causal particles which they conceived
genes to be. If the ratios did not work it was because some
other factors were obscuring the proper functioning of the
genes (partial dominance; incomplete penetrance). Once
these possibilities are admitted, there is virtually no distri-
bution of phenotypes found in the population to which a ge-
netic model cannot be fitted. In the traditional Popperian
sense, such genetic models are strictly unfalsifiable. Given
enough assumptions, any model can be “fixed” (e.g., schiz-
ophrenia).
Whilst the Mendelian rediscoverers were busy defining
the phenotypic features they observed as the products of
hypothesized genes, other biologists were looking at organ-
isms from quite a different perspective. How does the
union of egg and sperm ultimately produce an organism
which may consist of 1014 such cells, differentiated into tis-
sues and organs, precisely located in space? Embryologists
described cell division, from fertilisation to the formation
of the blastula and gastrulation, and identified a role for the
chromosomes. This rhythm of cell division unrolling in a
seamless sequence operates according to rules which the
early embryologists found hard to fathom. For some, the
only explanation was that the developing embryo was im-
bued by an irreducible life force. To most, this conclusion
was unacceptable; they were observing a complex piece of
living clockwork. Whichever philosophy one adopted, the
dividing ball of cells was splendidly accessible to experi-
mental manipulation. What would happen, for instance, if
one removed a portion of the dividing cell ball, or cut 
it neatly in half? The results confused researchers for
decades, for the conclusion seemed to be “it all depends.”
Depends on the organism, depends on how many divisions
the ball of cells has made prior to the cut; depends from
where in the ball one removes the sample (e.g., contrast be-
tween Roux, Driesch, and Loeb). Depending on the or-
ganism, at early stages in the cell division process, each cell
still retains all the determinants – genes – to make an en-
tire offspring; at later stages some regions of the develop-
ing ball of cells retain this capacity and others do not; later
still the capacity is entirely lost, and the developmental fate
of each region of the cell ball is fixed and cannot be modu-
lated.
Transplant studies revealed more. Sometimes a cell’s fate
is determined by the environment into which it has been
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transplanted, in others it carries its own fate with it (e.g.,
transplant a group of cells from the region of a developing
insect destined to become a leg, and insert it into the head
region. Depending on the age of the embryo, the number
of divisions it has undergone since fertilisation, the trans-
planted tissue may be incorporated into the developing
head or it may develop into an additional leg projecting
anomolously from the head). During mitotic division each
cell receives an identical set of determinants or genes and
is totipotent. Later, although all the genes are still present
in all the cells, which genes are expressed depends on the
developmental history of the particular cell. Thus gene ex-
pression depends on both time and space.
The major concern of developmental biology remained
that unrolling programme which led from a single fertilised
egg to the fully formed organism. How is it that what seem
at first sight to be very similar cell masses, going through
seemingly similar transformations, end up in the one case
producing a mouse and in the other a human? Why do the
daughters of a cell from one part of the dividing embryonic
cell mass end up as liver and from another as brain or
bones? How is it that all individual humans end up so as-
tonishingly similar? Developmental biology is the science
of the rules which produce regularities, similarities be-
tween organisms. Genes are part of a harmonious dialectic
of interaction with the environment by which fertilised cells
become mature adults through a trajectory described as on-
togeny. And the constraints on this trajectory are only in
part genetic.
By contrast, genetics was and is concerned with differ-
ences. Why is one Drosophila red eyed, the other white
eyed? Why do people differ in height? Why do some have
blood cells which carry a haemoglobin molecule which
seems unable to bind and carry oxygen as efficiently as is
normal? The question is to be answered in terms, ulti-
mately, of the modern descendants of Mendelian determi-
nants, the genes. Thus for genetics, genes came to be un-
derstood as discrete units which lead in linear fashion to red
versus white eyes or any other character of interest. On-
togeny is of interest only insofar as genetic differences may
produce abnormalities in development. Otherwise, the ge-
neticists’ organisms are empty of time and internal content;
there are only genes and phenotypes. They have no trajec-
tory, no lifeline.
Using Drosophila, Morgan and his group showed that un-
usual mutations were transmitted in a Mendelian manner
and increased by X rays. Genes had a physical location in the
cell, on chromosomes, and were thus distributed to daugh-
ter cells during mitosis, making possible the beginning of
gene mapping. The term gene now had two different mean-
ings. On the one hand it was still an abstract entity, the de-
terminant of a particular phenotypic character. On the other
it had a clear location, a map reference, and could be shown
to be physically transmitted between cells and their off-
spring during both division and sex. The step which took ge-
netics beyond Morgan’s location of genes to chromosomes
also brought it into conjunction with biochemistry for the
first time. Mutations in Neurospora were even easier to in-
duce and study than in fruit flies, but now the consequences
were metabolic. Mutants lack specific enzymes which play
a crucial role in the pathways which lead to missing metabo-
lites. Each specific mutation leads to the absence of a spe-
cific enzyme. Hence Beadle and Tatum’s formulation: one
gene equals, or produces, one enzyme.
Genes were no longer to be understood only as hidden
entities, metabolical accounting devices. They no longer
determined characters, but instead, in a yet-to-be under-
stood manner, were responsible for the production of en-
zymes. So what is a gene “for” a character? Consider eye
colour, which depends on the presence in the cells of par-
ticular pigments. In their absence, the eye is blue, increas-
ing quantities of the pigments provide colours which range
from green to brown. Ignoring the developmental pro-
cesses that lead to the formation of the eye, and within the
eye the iris, and the biochemical steps whereby the neces-
sary precursors to the synthetic pathway are produced, the
direct pathway that leads to the synthesis of the eye pig-
ments involves many different enzymes. Hence to bio-
chemists there is no longer any gene “for” eye colour. In-
stead there is a difference in the biochemical pathway that
leads to brown and to blue eyes. A gene “for” blue eyes
means “one or more genes in whose absence the metabolic
pathway which leads to pigmented eyes terminates at the
blue eye stage.” This rephrasing yet again exposes the dis-
tinction between a developmental and a genetic approach.
For the developmental biologist, what is of interest is the
route which leads to pigmented eyes. But the geneticist is
still interested in the difference between brown and blue
eyes and retains the misleading shorthand of genes “for”
such colour differences. Dawkins, in The Extended Pheno-
type (1982), explicitly makes the same point, before going
on to discount it as irrelevant, provided the system behaves
as if such “genes for” existed. That is, his genes are purely
theoretical constructs, combinations of properties which
may or may not be embedded in specific enzymes or
lengths of DNA, but which can be used to play mathemat-
ical modelling games. Sloppy terminology abets sloppy
thinking. And it has implications for gene technology too.
As more is learned about the human genome, so early sim-
plicities, such as the existence of a single gene responsible
“for” a particular disease, retreat. Many ostensibly “single
gene disorders” are now known to result from different
gene mutations in different people. All may show a similar
clinical picture but the gene mutation and hence enzyme
malfunction which results in the disorder may be very dif-
ferent in each case. This also means that drugs effective in
ameliorating the condition in one person may be simply in-
effective in another.
The history of how genes became DNA, culminating in
the famous Nature papers of Crick, Watson, Franklin, and
Wilkins et al. in 1953 is too well known to need retelling.
But what made a length of DNA a gene? Genes were now
coded for polypeptides, and the 1960s saw the breaking of
this code and the formulation of Crick’s Central Dogma:
DNA r RNA r protein
or, as Crick put it, “once ‘information’ has passed into the
protein it cannot get out again.”
A formulation which is as central to ultra-Darwinian the-
ory as it is to molecular biology, DNA had become the mas-
ter-molecule, and the nucleus in which it was located had
assumed its patriarchal role in relationship to the rest of the
cell. It is hard to know which had more impact on the fu-
ture directions of biology, the determination of the role 
of DNA in protein synthesis, or the organising power of 
the metaphor within which it was framed (e.g., Dawkins’s
[1986] description of willow seeds as floppy discs).
Periods of great unifying simplicity in science are fre-
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quently followed by times in which simplicity dissolves once
more into complexity. Not all DNA is coding; much is con-
cerned with regulation (operons, etc.). And much more
seems “junk” or “selfish” – Crick’s term. (Note that Crick’s
DNA’s selfishness is demonstrated by the fact that it does
not do anything for the cell or the organism in which it is
embedded; it simply allows itself to be copied. Dawkins’s
selfish genes on the other hand are so because they specif-
ically aid the successful reproduction of the organism which
contains them and hence their own replication.) Nor are
the coding sequences for any particular polypeptide aligned
along the DNA; they are separated by introns, and can be
spliced, edited, read in different ways. The result is that far
from being able to speak of one gene/one protein, both
genes and proteins are disarticulated. Genes can be assem-
bled from alternative pieces of DNA or rearranged so that
their codes are read differently. And proteins take on mul-
tiple forms as a result of cellular processes distal to DNA it-
self. “Genes” are no longer coterminous with DNA-beads-
on-a-chromosome. Nor are even these segments stably
located on the chromosome; as McClintock showed, genes
could jump. Hence the modern concept of the fluid
genome.
Far from being isolated in the cell nucleus, magisterially
issuing orders by which the rest of the cell is commanded,
genes, of which the phenotypic expression lies in lengths of
DNA distributed along chromosomes, are in constant dy-
namic exchange with their cellular environment. The gene
as a unit determinant of a character remains a convenient
Mendelian abstraction, suitable for armchair theorists and
computer modellers with digital mindsets. The gene as an
active participant in the cellular orchestra in any individual’s
lifeline is a very different proposition.
DNA is a stable molecule; what brings it to life is the cel-
lular environment in which it is embedded. Genetic theo-
rists have been misled by the metaphors that Crick pro-
vided in describing DNA (and RNA) as “self-replicating”
molecules or replicators, as if they could do it all by them-
selves. But they aren’t and they can’t. Replication isn’t an
inevitable chemical mechanism. Copying requires the pre-
cursor molecules – which themselves must be synthesized
– enzymes to unwind the two DNA strands, and others to
insert the new nucleotides in place and zip them up again.
And the whole process requires energy. Further, the his-
tones surrounding the relevant region or regions of the
double helix must be unwrapped, the DNA strands sepa-
rated, enzymes must transcribe the “sense” strand into its
matched length of RNA, individual RNA lengths spliced,
edited, and further manipulated in the cell nucleus, and if
and only if so permitted, leave the nucleus to be inserted
into the copying machinery in the cell cytoplasm. Without
the complex biochemical environment the cell provides,
“genes” in the DNA sense of the term simply cannot func-
tion.
This is why an individual’s lifeline requires more than
merely the mixing of parental DNAs at the moment of fer-
tilisation. Sperm provide only DNA. But an egg contains
more than just the maternal complement of DNA to match
that provided by the paternal sperm. It has in addition all
the cellular apparatus required to bring both sets of the
DNA together to play their part in the cellular orchestra, as
well as the mitochondria with their own independent DNA.
From this moment of conception on, the maternal cellular
machinery is responsible for directing the activation of par-
ticular genes (DNA-sequences) and hence the synthesis of
specific proteins. These proteins in turn include some
whose function is to act as switches, regulators to turn on,
and in due course turn off, other DNA-sequences. A con-
tinuous cycle of synthetic activity begins in which DNA-se-
quences are uncovered, transcribed into RNA, processed,
spliced, edited, translated into proteins which then provide
feedback control to the DNA, perhaps switching off their
own synthesis, perhaps switching on the synthesis of other
proteins by uncovering other DNA-sequences or influenc-
ing the splicing and editing steps. This exquisitely timed
and subtly orchestrated cellular symphony culminates in
due course in the synthesis of those proteins which begin
the process of replicating and segregating the chromo-
somes once more, enabling the cell to divide and the cycle
to recommence.
In the digital information metaphor all these cellular
mechanisms are dumb, because they do not carry “infor-
mation.” But it is the cellular machinery which times and
edits the synthetic processes. Insofar as the information
metaphor is valid at all, it can be expressed only in the dy-
namic interaction between the DNA and the cellular sys-
tem in which it is embedded. Cells make their own lifelines.
Thus in both the Mendelian and the biochemical senses
genes are only partially determinate entities within genomes.
How, when, and to what extent any gene is expressed – that
is, how its sequence is translated into a functioning protein
– depends on signals from the cell in which it is embedded,
and, as this cell is itself at any one time in receipt of and re-
sponding to signals not just from a single gene but from
many others which are simultaneously switched on or off,
the expression of any single gene is influenced by what is
happening in the whole of the rest of the genome.
When we talk about the development of an organism as
being a product of the interaction of genes and environ-
ment therefore, the phrase masks as much as it reveals. Nei-
ther “gene” nor “environment” is an unproblematic term. A
“gene” as abstract determinant is quite different from the
complex processing mechanisms which put together par-
ticular DNA sequences which define the primary se-
quences of proteins. Nor are proteins merely defined as
their primary sequences; they have complex secondary and
tertiary structures which depend not just on their amino
acid sequence but on their environment, on the presence
of water, ions, and sometimes other small molecules, on
acidity and alkalinity. The path from primary structure to
fully fledged protein does not involve as many regulatory
steps as that from DNA to protein, but it contains orders of
complexity which move us yet further away from the one
gene – one protein heuristic. And as proteins themselves
become assembled into higher order structures within the
cell, yet further constraints come into play.
The school textbooks which start with Mendel and his ra-
tios have it wrong. Without Mendel, genetics would never
have got off to such a start and he deserves honour for his
experiments. But the founders of a field, by choosing ex-
perimental systems which seem to give clear-cut answers,
often also produce an appearence of simplicity which is 
ultimately misleading. The famous and paradigmatic Men-
delian ratios are the results of rather special cases, the phe-
notypic expressions of enzyme pathways rather little influ-
enced by environmental circumstance, perhaps just
because they reflect relatively trivial features of that phe-
notype. By contrast, the expression of most genes is modi-
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fied at several levels. It is affected by which other genes are
present in the genome of the particular organism, by the
cellular environment, the extracellular environment, and, in
the case of multicellular organisms, by the extra-organismic
environment. Example: the ambiguous consequences of
knockout mutations. In many cases in which genes coding
for proteins which are supposed to have vital functions
within the cellular economy have been deleted, the absence
both of the gene and of the protein whose synthesis it codes
for seem to make little observable difference to the life of
the animal. It has “no phenotype.” This does not mean that
the protein concerned does not play a vital role in the cel-
lular economy; rather it is a demonstration of the power of
developmental plasticity, of functional redundancy in the
organism. Redundancy assists stability; it means that there
may be many alternative routes that the cell and the organ-
ism can adopt during development which can lead to an es-
sentially identical end-point. In the presence of a particular
gene and protein, one route is adopted, and in their absence
another is taken. Once again, there is no necessary linear
path between gene and organism. Such plasticity is not in-
finite; there are sharp limits to the tolerance of any gene –
or any phenotype – to environmental change. Outside these
limits, the response is to curl up and die. But within them,
the expression of any gene may be defined in terms of
Dobzhansky’s concept of norm of reaction – rather out of
fashion amongst today’s theorists who prefer a modern ver-
sion of preformationism, in which genes are prime movers.
Chapter 6: Lifelines
At the heart of modern biology lies the issue of the nature
of individual living units – organisms. Their lifelines may
range over many orders of magnitude in both time and
space. Some arise essentially fully developed, like a newly
budded yeast, others grow to a reasonably stable adulthood
before ageing and decaying, others grow incrementally
throughout their lives. Yet others go through a series of rad-
ical transformations in which entire body plans become re-
constructed, as when egg becomes caterpillar becomes
chrysalis becomes butterfly. Life persists not in three but in
four dimensions – a persistence, which is above all depen-
dent upon the maintenance of order: order within the cell,
order within the organism, and order in the relationship of
the organism to the world outside it. Genes and genomes
neither contain the future of the organism, nor are they to
be regarded, as in modern metaphors, as architects’ blue-
prints or information theorists’ codebearers. They are no
more and no less than an essential part of the toolkit with
and by which organisms construct their own futures.
Neither cells nor organisms can be considered in isola-
tion from their own external environments. The boundary
between cell and environment is its semi-permeable mem-
brane across which all trafficking must occur. For single-
celled organisms, the environment of the cell is obviously
also that of the organism, the ever fluctuating external
world, inherently patchy. Some regions may be antithetical
to survival – too hot, too dry, too acid – some may be rich
in food sources, others poor. Faced with such patchiness,
many single-celled organisms can take steps to seek out
more favourable conditions (e.g., cilia and flagella); but
their power to choose a favourable environment is limited
by the range of environments available, and survival will
also depend on the ability of the organism to adapt to less
than optimum conditions. (Hence the operon, which is the
mechanism whereby the organism in interaction with its
environment determines which of its available genes are to
be active at any one time.)
Such interactions between cells and environments be-
come more complex for a multicellular organisms. Buffered
by a regulated internal environment, cells no longer need
the operon mechanism but instead lose their autonomy
within the greater unity of the organism. They have sur-
rendered their capacity for replication and their totipo-
tency. They become specialised, as liver or brain, leaf or
root. In the course of this specialisation, as ontogeny pro-
ceeds, particular DNA-sequences are switched on or off in
defined temporal sequences. It is no longer only a case of
proceeding through the cell cycle to division, but of estab-
lishing cells with an appropriate structure, shape, and pat-
tern of enzymes to function as part of a particular organ. To
ensure harmony at a multicellular rather than a cellular
level, each cell has to be able to respond to the presence of
its neighbours and to signals from distant parts of the or-
ganism (hence hormones, transmitters, modulators, etc.)
arriving at its membrane surface. The cellular lifeline has
become subordinated to that of the organism.
Like the term “gene,” the term “environment” is thus
complex and many-layered. For individual gene-sized se-
quences of DNA, the environment is constituted by the rest
of the genome and the cellular machinery in which it is em-
bedded; for the cell, the buffered milieu in which it floats;
for the organism, the external physical, living, and social
worlds. Which features of the external world constitute “the
environment” differ from species to species; every organ-
ism thus has an environment tailored to its needs. Even for
the individual gene, the genomic background against which
it is expressed differs during the cell cycle as other genes
are switched on and off. Outside the organism, change is
virtually the only constancy. Stasis is death.
Boundaries between organism and environment are not
fixed. Organisms are constantly absorbing parts of their en-
vironment into themselves as food, and as constantly mod-
ifying their surroundings by working on them, by excreting
waste products, or by modifying the world to suit their
needs, from birds’ nests to beaver dams and termite
mounds. Organisms and environment interpenetrate. Ab-
stracting an organism from its environment, ignoring this
dialectic of interpenetration, is a reductionist step which
methodology may demand but which will always mislead.
Nor are organisms passive responders to their environ-
ments. They actively choose, and work to change them.
The first phases of the life cycle are those of development.
From the moment of fertilisation, cells grow, divide, and
hence multiply. Daughter cells begin to align themselves
with respect one to the other, to migrate to specific regions
within the developing embryo. Within each cell, particular
genes are switched on, others off, in intricate sequences, as
originally totipotent cells become specialised and the ma-
ture form of the organism unrolls from its undifferentiated
state. From very early in their development, organisms have
to be capable simultaneously of quasi-independent exis-
tence and of growing further towards maturity. Moreover,
the properties that enable them at any one moment to main-
tain their existence are not always merely miniature forms
of those they will need in adulthood. This is obvious for some
life forms. Frogs’ eggs become tadpoles become frogs. Each
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stage requires a radical transformation of body plan, yet one
during which the functions necessary to life must be pre-
served. But it is also true in quite subtle ways for organisms
which seem to show linear developmental trajectories.
When a newborn baby suckles at its mother’s breast, the
suckling reflex is not simply an undeveloped form of the
chewing technique that will be needed when the child
switches to solid food; quite different neural and mechani-
cal processes are involved. Life demands of all its forms that
they are able simultaneously to be and to become.
The unrolling processes of development are best under-
stood in terms of specificity and plasticity. Many ontoge-
netic processes are relatively unmodifiable by experience
(e.g., relatively fixed development of the visual system). But
plasticity is also necessary (e.g., alterations to visual cortex
neuronal connectivity dependent on rearing environment).
Specificity and plasticity are embedded properties of the
organism; both are completely made possible by the genes,
and completely made possible by the environment. They
cannot be partitioned.
Two contrasting metaphors have been used to describe
the process by which multicellular organisms develop: se-
lection and instruction. Consider the human brain, with its
highly ordered pattern of characteristically shaped and lo-
cated neurons. From conception to birth requires the gen-
eration of about a million cells an hour, whilst during post-
natal development some 30,000 synapses a second will be
created under each square centimetre of cortex, until the
full complement is present. Development requires the or-
dered birth and migration of these cells. To arrive at the cor-
rect target site both distant and local signals must be in-
volved (e.g., role of trophic factors). However, the
migrating cells or growing axons also need to keep in step
with one another; each has to know who its neighbours are.
The diffusion of a local gradient molecule, together with
the presence of some type of chemosensors on the axon sur-
face, could enable each to determine whether it has neig-
bours to its right and left and to maintain step with them.
Part of this process – the achievement of long-range or-
der – is compatible with a cooperative, instructionist
model, but the overproduction of neurons and synapses im-
plies also ultimate selection amongst cells or connections
competing for targets. Selection in this sense can account
for local but not distant processes. Instructive and selective
mechanisms are only part of the picture of development.
The maintenance of stable order requires the collective, co-
operative properties of the entire ensemble of cells. Each
depends on the others in the creation and preservation of
the dynamic pattern of connections which impose new pat-
terns on the world beyond the organism. Development is
essentially a constructivist process; the developing organ-
ism, in its being and its becoming, in its specificity and its
plasticity, constructs its own future.
Even the constructivist model of development discussed
above however implies a degree of determinism, albeit a
richer concept than that of the unidimensional gene. But
we need to go beyond this in emphasising the role of
chance, of contingency, at all levels of analysis of living sys-
tems. Consider the microlevel of the individual cell and its
subcellular components. Biochemists deal not with individ-
ual cells or molecules but with aggregates of millions, and
on this scale properties become relatively predictable. But
what is predictable for the mass does not apply to the indi-
vidual (e.g., there are only about 30 hydrogen ions in any
single mitochondrion). Chance and contingency affect all
cellular processes (e.g., numbers of bristles on Drosophila
legs; different foetal circumstances for identical twins de-
pending on placental relationships).
Organisms are supposed to maintain homeostasis. But in
fact the set points around which conditions fluctuate are not
constant but vary momentarily, diurnally, monthly, and over
a lifetime. Furthermore, they are maintained dynamically,
not statically. Hence homeodynamics. Seeing organisms as
merely homeostatic is to deny them lifelines. Each of our
presents is shaped by and can only be understood by our
pasts, our personal, unique, developmental history as an or-
ganism. Even the moment-to-moment stability of the or-
ganism is maintained not statically but dynamically; mole-
cules and cells turn over on timescales varying from
minutes to months. Why this ceaseless flux?
The answer is simple: living systems need to be dynamic
to survive, able to adjust themselves to the fluctuations
which, even in the best-buffered internal milieu, their co-
operative existence as part of the greater unity of the or-
ganism demands. It is to this irreducible dynamism as the
generator of stable order that we must turn in order to un-
derstand how, having constructed itself through the pro-
cesses of development, the organism is able to preserve its
integrity and act upon the external world. These are the
phenomena of autopoiesis, a concept introduced by Matu-
rana and Varela (1980).
Internal cellular stability depends on two features. First,
cells and organisms are thermodynamically open systems
far from equilibrium, which for their existence depend on
a continuous energy flow, generated through the catabolic/
anabolic cycle which results in the synthesis of ATP, ulti-
mately through the activities of autotrophic organisms (pri-
marily photosynthesis). Equations relevant to closed equi-
librium systems are largely inapplicable to living processes.
Second, the existence of an interacting metabolic web:
individual reactions are catalysed by enzymes; by sequences
of reactions, like glycolysis, by chains of enzymes whose
overall rates are seemingly controlled by individual enzyme
kinetic properties, so that in a chain the slowest reaction be-
comes the controller. However, just as in a living cell one
cannot abstract an individual enzyme reaction from the
metabolic dance of the molecules, so one cannot abstract
any single reaction pathway. Most of its components are in-
volved in many different reaction pathways, knitted to-
gether by multiple interconnections. Once such a web
reaches a sufficient degree of complexity, it becomes
strong, stable, and capable of resisting change; the stability
no longer resides in the individual components, the en-
zymes, their substrates and products, but in the web itself.
The more interconnections, the greater the stability and the
less its dependence on any individual component.
Further, the cellular web has a degree of flexibility which
permits it to reorganise itself in response to injury or dam-
age. Self-organisation and self-repair are its essential au-
topoietic properties. These properties of stability and self-
organisation are the key to the fundamental irreducibility of
living cells. The stability is dynamic, and depends in part on
metabolic oscillatory processes (e.g., calcium waves). Meta-
bolic organisation is not merely the sum of cellular parts,
and cannot be predicted from individual enzyme reactions
and substrate concentrations.
Cells are not simply bags containing semi-random mixes
but contain many internal structures (nucleus, mitochon-
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dria, etc). Each represents a separate compartment within
which relatively segregated sets of reactions can occur.
Communication between these compartments, in terms of
exchange of substances and signals between them, takes
place through selective membranes, which act as gate-
keepers across which specialised signalling molecules and
small inorganic ions control access. Homeodynamic order
within the cell is thus maintained not merely through the
self-stabilising properties of metabolic webs, but through
internal structural constraints provided by semi-permeable
lipid membranes in which are embedded proteins which
recognise and regulate the entry and exit of key metabo-
lites. Ionic changes also modulate the microenvironment
within which protein structure is modulated, complex
structures such as microtubules and ribosomes can self-
assemble, and enzyme-linked reactions occur.
Lifelines, then, are not embedded in genes. Their exis-
tence is posited on homeodynamics. Their four dimensions
are autopoietically constructed through the interplay of
physical forces, the intrinsic chemistry of lipids and pro-
teins, the self-organising and stabilising properties of com-
plex metabolic webs, and the specificity of genes which per-
mit the plasticity of ontogeny. The organism is both the
weaver and the pattern it weaves, the choreographer and
the dance that is danced.
Chapter 7: Universal Darwinism?
“Darwinism” has become an almost universal – and often
abused – term. Darwinian protagonists offer a “tough-
minded” ultra-Darwinism as a universal mechanism to ex-
plain all phenomena of life. Philosophers follow them; Den-
nett writes a book entitled Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995)
in which Darwinian mechanisms are described as a “uni-
versal acid” which eats away at everything it touches. Edel-
man (1987) interprets the brain processes concerned with
experience, memory, and consciousness as representing
“neural Darwinism.” Hull claims that scientific theories
themselves win or lose the struggle for acceptance accord-
ing to Darwinian mechanisms. One reads of Darwinian psy-
chology, Darwinian medicine, Darwinian economics.
Dawkins caps the lot with his claim that human culture it-
self operates on Darwinian principles in which the units of
transmission are not genes but “memes.” It may be time to
try to rescue Darwin from some of his oversolicitous mod-
ern friends if we are to do justice, but no more than justice,
to the part he and his ideas have played in the history of bi-
ology and in our understanding of living processes.
Before Darwin, the interpretation of life on earth was
trapped within a mode of thinking imposed by biblical tra-
ditions. Species were immutable, linked in a great chain of
being, beginning with the lowliest and ending with that
acme of god’s creation, humankind (Man) himself. The in-
dustrial revolution shattered this stability; change (and evo-
lution means simply change over time) became acceptable.
The discovery of fossils implied extinct species, whose his-
tory could be dated. Before Charles Darwin, both Erasmus
Darwin and Lamarck had sought to describe and account
for such changes. It was Charles Darwin who offered the
mechanism by way of a simple syllogism:
1. Like breeds like, with variations.
2. Some of these varieties are more favourable (to the
breeder or to nature) than others.
3. All creatures produce more offspring than can survive
to breed in their turn.
4. The more favoured varieties are more likely to survive
long enough to breed.
5. Hence there will be more of the favoured variety in
the next generation, and
6. Thus species will tend to evolve over time.
This process is natural selection. As a syllogism it has an in-
exorable logicality. If 1, 2, and 3 are true, 4, 5, and 6 follow
inevitably. This is why philosophers such as Dennett are
able to describe it as a universal mechanism. Yet for Dar-
win there were major theoretical difficulties at the heart of
the theory; the mechanism of transmission both of similar-
ities and variations; the classic argument from design; and
the problem of speciation.
Darwin’s achievement was to demolish the idea of the
immutability of species and, even more important, of a
great chain of being. Humans are no longer at the pinnacle
of life. Instead, living forms can be drawn as related to one
another as the branches and twigs of a bush. All of us cur-
rently alive, amoebae as well as humans, are in this respect
equal, the successful survivors of evolutionary history.
There is no scale of life on the basis of which one can judge
some currently living forms as “lower” and others as
“higher,” more or less “evolutionarily successful.” A further
crucial feature of Darwinism is its insistance on the role of
chance. Natural selection abolishes purpose from evolu-
tion, and, some felt in consequence, from human life itself.
7.1. Variation. The problem of transmission was resolved
with the theory of the gene, although when Mendel was re-
discovered at the turn of the century mutational change
seemed to replace natural selection, and it was not until the
“neo-Darwinian synthesis” of Fisher, Haldane, and Sewall
Wright around 1930 that it was seen that the two theories
supported rather than contradicted each other.
7.2. Heritability. Fisher’s synthesis was directed at trying to
understand the contributions of genes and environment to
variation in populations. In a uniform environment all the
variance would be contributed by the genes, and with iden-
tical genes all the variance would be contributed by the en-
vironment. But genotypes and environments both vary and
the purpose of heritability estimates is to try to tease them
apart. To do so however, it is necessary to make some sim-
plifying assumptions. Variance describes the way in which
any particular measure of a trait in a population is distrib-
uted about the mean value for that population, made up of
a component contributed by the genes and a component
contributed by the environment, which together can be
added to give a total of nearly 100%. The remainder, which
to make the mathematics work has to be a rather small pro-
portion, is considered to be the product of an interaction
between genes and environment. If genotypes are distrib-
uted randomly across environments, it is possible to esti-
mate heritability, which defines the proportion of the vari-
ance which is genetically determined. However, the
mathematics only works if all the relevant simplifying as-
sumptions are made. If there is a great deal of interaction
between genes and environment, that is if genes behave ac-
cording to Dobzhansky’s (1973) vision of norms of reaction,
if genes interact with each other, and if the relationships are
not linear and additive but interactive, the entire mathe-
matical apparatus of heritability estimates falls apart. Thus
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the meaningful application of heritability estimates is only
possible in very special cases, from which the majority of
traits of interest outside the special world of artificial selec-
tion are likely to escape. Furthermore the figure derived for
the heritability is itself dependent on the environment –
that is, if you change the environment, the heritability esti-
mate changes.
These caveats perhaps help to explain why heritability es-
timates have been so persistently misunderstood. They be-
come wholly misleading when applied to aspects of human
behaviour. Milk yield is a phenotype which is reasonably
straightforward to measure. But intelligence? Political ten-
dency? Likelihood of getting divorced? Religiosity? Job sat-
isfaction? As one cannot treat human populations quite like
breeding experiments with wheat or cattle, and distribute
genotypes across environments, one has to make do with
what between them nature and society provide. The stan-
dard techniques have involved comparing traits in siblings,
MZ and DZ twins, and the use of adoption studies. The
problems are manifold. To mention just two, separated
twins tend to be placed in rather similar environments;
whilst adoptive parents are unlikely to treat their adoptive
child “exactly” as they do a natural one, and are far more
likely to be anxiously on the lookout for tendencies which
reveal the child to be “taking after” some undesirable char-
acter of its natural parent. Such real life problems are sim-
ply swept aside in the process of fitting the numbers ob-
tained into the complex statistical manipulations required
to generate the seemingly objective heritability estimate.
As a result, seemingly bizarre traits turn out to have “high
heritability,” for which the most parsimonious explanation
is that they demonstrate the inappropriateness of attempt-
ing to apply a mathematical formalism devised for plant and
animal breeding to such dubious phenotypic characters as
the diversity of human social behaviour and attitudes. Yet
some behaviour geneticists argue that even such high her-
itabilities underestimate the true influence of the genes.
Bouchard (1997) proposes that our genes “predispose” us
to seek environments congenial to the genetic imperatives.
Thus genes create environments, and “environment” –
whatever that term may mean – ceases to be a truly inde-
pendent variable in the heritability equations. It is the
genes, therefore, which are a major cause of everything
from childhood accidents to divorce in midlife, for these
genes lead their owners to place themselves in situations in
which the probability of accident or divorce increases. Like
the claims for the “extended phenotype,” this argument
perversely swallows the four-dimensional universe of life-
lines entirely into the double helix of DNA.
7.3. Adaptation. The argument from design is confronted
head-on in Dawkins’s The Blind Watchmaker and its suc-
cessors (1986; 1995): “What use is half an eye,” he asks, and
answers “One percent better than 49% of an eye, and the
difference is significant.” The trouble with this argument is
that there is no way of determining whether, amongst our
evolutionary ancestors, 50% of an eye was really signifi-
cantly better in Darwinian terms – that it contributed sig-
nificantly more to reproductive success – than 49%. It
would depend what other costs the organism accrued in
achieving this 1% advantage, and how much having eyes
contributed to its success in finding food and avoiding
predators so as to increase its chances of finding a mate and
hence reproducing. There is of course no evidence on these
issues, and so the claim must remain an undemonstrable as-
sertion, although one which most biologists will find rea-
sonably convincing. In the classical Popperian sense, such
stories about evolution are unfalsifiable. All that we can do
is to offer plausible accounts of how a process may have oc-
curred or a structure evolved.
7.4. Sexual selection. If all adaptation serves the function
of enhancing survival, why do so many animals – especially
males – have traits which seem on the face of it to be inim-
ical to long and efficient life (e.g., the peacock’s tail)? Dar-
win’s interpretation of sexual selection was that females
were motivated to choose, and hence select beauty. More
modern versions argue instead that seemingly dysfunc-
tional adornments are markers of good health and hence
good genes. Whichever version of the theory is adopted, so-
ciobiologists have sought to press it into service to provide
an evolutionary “Darwinian” explanation for the prefer-
ences expected in human sexual choice, once again treating
metaphor as if it were homology. For example, competition
amongst human males for mates is discussed as the macro-
version of what is said to be the micro-level competition
amongst individual sperm to be “the one” to successfully
penetrate and fertilise the egg. Males and their sperm com-
pete, females and their ova quiescently await their fate. The
problem is that, as with most human extensions of evolu-
tionary mechanisms, but in an even more extreme form,
such accounts simply cannot encompass the rich diversity
of human experience, and instead have recourse to tradi-
tional and often sexist caricatures which ignore the histori-
cal and anthropological evidence of variation in social prac-
tices across time and space and instead treat current
western norms – or rather, assertive restatements of what
the authors perceive as those norms, for they show as little
respect for sociology as they do for history or anthropology
– as if they were human universals.
7.5. Altruism. With the claims for the genetic mechanism
and evolutionary significance of altruistic behaviour, we are
at the heart of sociobiological thinking. If organisms seek to
maximise their reproductive success, then how do we ac-
count for birds which on detecting a predator, draw atten-
tion to it, and simultaneously to themselves by uttering
warning cries? Ought they not instead try to make them-
selves as inconspicuous as possible, so as to diminish the
chance of being picked off? Earlier group-selectionist
ideas, once discarded, are creeping back into the literature
once more, but the dominant mode of explanation is kin se-
lection, a mathematical formulation which, if one grants its
basic assumptions – that is, that living forms exist primarily
to perpetuate their genes – is as inevitable a syllogism as the
original Darwinian formulation of natural selection. Al-
though I see no reason to doubt the principle, proving it is
harder. Certainly, behaviour which might be defined as al-
truistic does occur amongst group-living animals, although
equally there is no shortage of evidence as to competitive-
ness amongst them. The empirical question is whether ap-
parently altruistic behaviour can be shown to benefit pref-
erentially the kin of the altruist rather than the group as a
whole. Perhaps in response to the relative weakness of the
data, Trivers (1971) offered an alternative version: recipro-
cal altruism – an act performed to benefit non-kin, but
which is performed in expectation of a subsequent return
of the compliment. And once again, human sociobiologists
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have sought, on the slightest of evidence, to deprive human
unselfish behaviour of any function other than one of these
forms of selectionist altruism, once again reducing metaphor
to homology.
7.6. Speciation. It may seem extraordinary, but the Dar-
winian syllogism provides no mechanism for the formation
of new species, which was after all ostensibly what The ori-
gin was all about. All that is claimed is that in any given cir-
cumstances, external conditions (the environment, nature)
will favour the perpetuation of varieties which can do their
species-thing a bit better than the rest. For example, Ket-
tlewell’s peppered moths, which also demonstrate another
fundamental point. A “more favoured variety” is one which
is favoured under current circumstances. Evolution by nat-
ural selection can respond only to the current situation. It
cannot predict the future. At one point of the species tra-
jectory in time it is the peppered form which has the greater
survival value, at a later time the melanic, and then again
the peppered. The environmental change occurs and nat-
ural selection trails along behind, following and responding
but never leading and never predicting. Such evolutionary
processes could obviously modify a species over time to
such a degree that its members would no longer be able to
mate fertilely with their ancestors, could these be brought
back to life. In this sense, species can gradually be trans-
formed through processes of natural selection steadily
tracking environmental change. But this still does not ex-
plain how natural selection alone can result in one preex-
isting species splitting into two. For this, additional mech-
anisms are required; presumably primarily geographical
separation and founder effects, of which the most famous
example is Darwin’s own, the Galapagos finches. But could
this be all? For the orthodox ultra-Darwinian, there is noth-
ing else available.
Chapter 8: Beyond ultra-Darwinism
Ultra-Darwinism has a metaphysical foundation: the pur-
pose of life is reproduction of the genes embedded in the
“lumbering robots” which constitute living organisms.
There follow two premises: (1) the unit of life is an individ-
ual gene whose sole activity is to create the conditions for
its own reproduction by directing the development and
physiological function of the organism; (2) most aspects of
the phenotype are adaptive, selected for by the honing
force of natural selection. This metaphysic derives from a
combination of Hobbes and Smith. Life is a war of all
against all, but the invisible hand of the market generates
even cooperative behaviour from competitive individual-
ism. A further element is a restatement in scientific form of
the theology of preformationism. Our task is to preserve
and transmit copies of our DNA.
It follows that the prime function of every living organ-
ism is to maximise its inclusive fitness – that is, to ensure
the maximal spread of its own and its close relatives’ genes
in succeeding generations. This determinism worries Daw-
kins and others, who therefore claim that we have the ca-
pacity to rebel against the tyranny of our genes. But if the
power to rebel does not itself come from our genes, then
the argument implies a sort of Cartesian dualism, and the
mechanical materialism of selfish genery trips over into a
type of idealism.
The case against ultra-Darwinism rests on the following
claims: (1) The individual gene is not the only level at which
selection occurs. (2) Natural selection is not the only force
driving evolutionary change. (3) Organisms are not indefi-
nitely flexible to change; selection is “table d’hôte” and not
“à la carte.” (4) Organisms are active players in their own
destiny.
1. Any individual gene can only be expressed against the
background of the whole of the rest of the genome. Genes
produce gene products which in turn influence other genes,
switching them on and off, modulating their activity and
function. If selection ultimately determines whether a par-
ticular gene survives or not, it can only do so in context. A
gene is only selected if it results in a selectable phenotypic
change – yet what is required to produce such a change is
not one but many actual biochemical gene-size lengths of
DNA. Furthermore, Weismann’s barrier is not as imperme-
able as implied, so developmental processes also affect
transgenerational gene transmission. Waddington argued
that developmental processes in multicellular organisms
could help to both direct and, as he put it, canalise poten-
tially favourable mutations. Bonner (1974) identified two
routes around Weismann’s barrier. Thus both plants and
such animals as Hydra retain the capacity to differentiate
into somatic cells or to become sequestered as gametes or
to remain totipotent. Those cells which remain totipotent
retain the prospect of becoming gametes after an indefinite
number of cell divisions – and this means that any genetic
variation occurring during those divisions will be heritable.
That totipotency is available even to mammals is now
proven by the cloned sheep Dolly and her successors. Fur-
ther, during development, originally totipotent cells divide,
become determined, and migrate to appropriate positions
within the developing embryo, resulting in competive/se-
lective mechanisms operating at the cellular level; cellular
variation will affect the outcome of such competition.
So selection acts on genes, on genomes, and on cells, no-
tably during development. But for multicellular organisms
it is ultimately the organism as an integral unit which will or
will not reproduce and hence dispatch copies of its genes
into subsequent generations. So natural selection in the
sense that Darwin originally conceived it can only occur
through the actions and properties of the entire organism,
its phenotype. For ultra-Darwinists that is not a problem;
the phenotype is merely a proxy for the genes it contains,
the gene’s way of making copies of itself. But this implies a
direct relationship, one-for-one, between gene and pheno-
type, and this “empty phenotype” view ignores develop-
ment.
The fact that selection occurs at many levels dampens the
effects of change at any one level. For instance, mutation
rates in DNA are relatively constant, yet these are not nec-
essarily reflected in phenotypic change (hence Eldredge
and Gould’s punctuated equilibrium). Furthemore there is
a vast amount of hidden phenotypic diversity (e.g., isoen-
zymes) which is likely to be neutral so far as selection pres-
sures are concerned.
Finally in this context, organisms do not exist in isolation
but in populations, and populations in ecological commu-
nities involving many hundreds or thousands of different
species locked into relationships which may be competitive
or cooperative. Thus within species, evolutionary stable
strategies (Maynard Smith) mean that any individual’s char-
acter may or may not be selectively favourable, depending
on the balance between that individual and others in the
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population, whilst the fact that any species’ niche is defined
in the context of all other species within an ecosystem
(predator or prey, mutualistic or commensal, or even, in
Margulis’s term, symbiogenic, like mitochondria) and that
all species are evolving, means that the evolution of any one
is shaped and constrained by that of many others. Evolution
means coevolution, built on both competitive and cooper-
ative mechanisms.
2. Selection mechanisms include competition for scarce
resources, sexual and kin selection, founder effects, expan-
sion of populations into new niches, selective predation,
and coevolution of populations and species. Selection at any
given level of the hierarchy between individual genes and
ecosystems does not automatically imply selection and evo-
lutionary change at any other; there is sufficient flexibility
and redundancy within living systems to make such tight
coupling unnecessary. But not all phenotypic variation is
adaptive, and not all change is selective. Contingency also
applies (e.g., Gould’s [1989] account of the Burgess shale
fossils; dinosaur extinction following climate change). And
what constitutes an adaptation is itself problematic, and
evolutionary accounts become Panglossian Just-So stories
(e.g., flamingo plumage as pink to confuse predators rather
than as a consequence of their shrimp diet). Gould and
Lewontin (1975) used the famous spandrels of San Marco
as an example of how adaptationist assumptions could be
misleading; their account has been criticised by Dennett
(1995); however, architectural reassessment of the role of
spandrels (pendentives) favours the original interpretation.
3. Within the adaptationist programme, the trajectory
that any lifeline can take is ultimately limited only by the
question of whether it is adaptive. Of course, evolution is
cumulative and has to build on whatever materials it has at
hand. So to arrive at any adaptive structure, behaviour, or
molecular property there has to be a legitimate route from
where the present state of the system is to some presum-
ably more adapted place elsewhere. And these constraints
determine what is or is not evolutionarily possible (e.g., lim-
its on the size of single cells, and of multicellular organisms
– surface area/volume and mass relationships, skeletal
properties, etc., set by chemistry and physics). But there are
deeper prospects opened by discussion of “laws of form”
(e.g., Darcy Thompson’s topological transformations; radi-
olaria crystalline forms, pentadactyl limbs; pinecone pat-
terns in Fibonacci series; the role of morphogenetic fields).
4. The metaphor of natural selection is one in which na-
ture sets a series of challenges which organisms either pass,
in which case they are privileged enough to pass copies of
their genes on to a successor generation, or they fail. By
contrast, the autopoietic vision implies that organisms ac-
tively choose and transform their environments, to adjust
and appropriate them to their own ends (e.g., unicells mov-
ing to food rich environments, growing axons finding and
modifying targets, etc.). Organisms change environments
and environments have their own trajectories constantly
transformed, not merely by the workings out of the inani-
mate forces of weather, temperature, and cosmic history,
but above all by the interactions of myriad lifeforms.
Chapter 9: Origin myths
Where once the definition of being alive was to be a breath-
ing, metabolising, environment-sensing and responding or-
ganism, molecular biologists tend to see the basic function
of life as the power to replicate, and the basic unit of life is
therefore a molecule with this power, a naked nucleic acid
polymer. There are religious undertones to his view that in
the beginning was the word. But could life have begun with
a naked molecule of DNA or RNA? So-called self-replicat-
ing experimental procedures are already quite complex.
They must occur in a test-tube which serves as a surrogate
cell, including all the necessary mix of enzymes, ions, and
controlled temperatures. It follows that accurate replica-
tion could only have emerged long after the development
of cell-like structures capable of such crucial living pro-
cesses as metabolism, growth, and division. What charac-
terises all living organisms, including ancient fossils, is the
presence of a cell membrane, and such cells must precede
replicators.
Origin of life theorists and experiments have shown how
abiotic synthesis of amino acids and other organic precur-
sors is possible. The biochemical parsimony which charac-
terises modern living forms suggests that these substances
must have appeared prior to their organisation into repli-
cating organisms. Life consists primarily of arrangements of
the elements carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, to-
gether with smaller quantities of phosphorus and sulphur,
ions of calcium, magnesium, sodium, potassium, and some
heavy metals. Compounds of these most abundant ele-
ments are thermodynamically unstable but capable of rela-
tively long life in watery solution; their synthetic chemistry
requires energy but they trap energy easily in the form of
sugars; they readily combine to form long chain molecules,
lipids, polysaccharides, proteins, and nucleic acids, espe-
cially in a reducing atmosphere (Miller-Urey experiment).
The earth’s early atmosphere provided this environment; it
is life itself which has subsequently modified it by trapping
carbon and releasing oxygen. Oparin and Haldane pro-
posed that droplets of concentrated organic chemicals
could concentrate out of a prebiotic soup (coacervate
drops). Other concentration mechanisms could include
clay surfaces. Lipids spontaneously form micelles and
droplets surrounded by bimolecular membranes, within
which the soup would be concentrated. These represent
protocells. Such cells would have another property seem-
ingly fundamental to life in that there would be an electro-
chemical gradient across their membranes.
The next evolutionary step would be to stabilise the myr-
iad potential chemical reactions that could occur within the
proto-cells. Kauffman’s models suggest that, given enough
metabolic interactions, in due course catalytic and autocat-
alytic relationships would arise, especially granted the pos-
sibility of catalytic surfaces such as that provided by clay.
Computer models of such processes show that a random set
of chemicals in a constrained area soon settle into a robust
and autopoietic metabolic web in which stable balances of
constituents result. Traffic across the liposome membrane
will bring new materials into the cell and excrete waste
products, and cells which increase in size will simply split
into two.
Thus cell formation and division, and sophisticated meta-
bolic stability, have all been achieved by originally abiotic
processes, in which the properties which are characteristic
of life are embedded not in a single molecular substituent
but in the entire system which constitutes the cell, and
without replicators. The metabolic web must have ex-
tended beyond any individual proto-cell to embrace the en-
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tire population. If chemicals were to be exchanged between
cells, by ingestion or by cell division, the reactions within
each cell must have tended to converge.
Even before the problem of accurate replication had
been resolved, there would have been another more press-
ing problem, that of energy. An evolutionary bottleneck
would have been produced until the energy-generation
problem could be solved. Early chemoautotrophes would
in due course have been replaced by photosynthesizing or-
ganisms, which in turn were responsible for changing the
earth’s atmosphere (and could later be embraced within
more complex organisms, as chloroplasts, by symbiogene-
sis). Only after the development of effective energy-gener-
ating and utilising mechanisms, though presumably before
the development of the modern cellular systems, would it
be possible for nucleic acid based replication – probably
initially RNA – to emerge.
Once these molecules had been incorporated within the
metabolic web of the cell, they would offer a whole new
range of properties. For they would now achieve a level of
fidelity in copying and reproduction which would have
been unobtainable by mere random division without them.
Just how this mechanism settled down into its present day
form, based as it is on the trinity of DNA, RNA, and pro-
tein, is a matter of intense speculation. Contingency, rather
than laws of molecular form or adaptation, may rule at this
point in the story. But once a particular set of nucleic acid-
amino acid correspondences had emerged, convergence
within the web would be likely to help ensure its universal-
ity. In any event, the essential point is that once cells con-
taining these mechanisms had arisen, they would multiply
rapidly and swamp out all others, as only they could pro-
duce exact copies of themselves. Evolution, having gener-
ated nucleotide polymers within the primitive cells, had
now also produced a mechanism which could be relied
upon to amplify them, and before long to conquer the earth
– yet another reason why whatever the processes by which
life forms were first generated, so far as life on this planet
is concerned, they cannot repeat themselves.
Chapter 10:The poverty of reductionism
This chapter shifts gears, to focus on reductionism as ide-
ology in human affairs. The primacy given to reductionist
explanations of human behaviour leads to claims, made by
scientists but trumpeted by the media, that the origins of
everything from sexual orientation to violence, criminality,
and “compulsive shopping” lie in the genes. Neurogenetics
claims to be able to answer the question of where, in a world
full of individual pain and social disorder, we should look
not merely to explain but even more potently to change our
condition. Although this is not a new debate, the apparent
power of modern genetics gives it new force, and the ideo-
logues of neurogenetic determinism claim that their sci-
ence will in due course render sociology, economics, and
even philosophy, redundant.
Neurogenetic determinism is based on a faulty reductive
sequence whose steps include: reification; arbitrary ag-
glomeration; improper quantification; belief in statistical
“normality”; spurious localisation; misplaced causality; di-
chotomous partitioning between genetic and environmen-
tal causes; and confounding metaphor with homology. The
issue at stake is the appropriate level of organisation of mat-
ter at which to seek causally effective determinants of the
behaviour of individuals and societies. The structure of the
argument is similar whether the discussion focusses on in-
telligence, sexuality, or violence.
Reification converts a dynamic process into a static phe-
nomenon. For example, violence as an interaction between
people becomes “aggressive behaviour,” regarded as the
property of an individual.
Arbitrary agglomeration lumps together many different
reified interactions as if they were all exemplars of the one
character. Thus aggression becomes the term used to de-
scribe processes as disparate as a man abusing his lover or
child, fights between football fans, strikers resisting police,
racist attacks on ethnic minorities, and civil and national
wars as if in fact they were all examples of the same under-
lying mechanism of “anti-social behaviour” (e.g., the claim
that a genetic abnormality in monoamine oxidase predis-
poses to variants of these activities). Yet the identical act
performed in different contexts (e.g., war or peace) may be
socially desirable or undesirable (e.g., British troops in
Northern Ireland).
Improper quantification argues that reified and agglom-
erated characters can be given numerical values (e.g., the
IQ scale, which reifies “intelligence,” agglomerates many
different processes within the term, and then claims to be
able to provide a single number which defines where an in-
dividual lies in the intelligence hierarchy). Belief in statisti-
cal normality then assumes that in any given population the
distribution of such behavioural scores takes a Gaussian,
normal distribution. Yet such curves are a product of the
test design. There is no biological necessity for such a uni-
dimensional distribution, nor for one in which the popula-
tion shows such a convenient spread. Yet the power of this
reified statistic is that it conflates two different concepts of
“normality”; it has normative implications, but also to lie
more than two standard deviations from the mean is to be
“abnormal” (e.g., the bell curve).
Having reified processes into objects and arbitrarily
quantified them, the reified object ceases to be a property
even of the individual, but instead becomes that of a part of
the person (e.g., schizophrenic brains, genes – or even
urine – rather than of brains, genes, or urine derived from
a person diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia). This
shorthand of “gay brains” or “selfish genes” does more than
merely sell books for their scientific authors; it both reflects
and endorses the modes of thought and explanation that
constitute neurogenetic determinism, for it disarticulates
the complex properties of individuals into isolated and lo-
calised lumps of biology.
Misplaced causation is involved in aggressive encounters
when people show dramatic changes in, for instance, the
levels of circulating steroid hormones and adrenalin in their
bloodstream and the release of neurotransmitters in their
brains, all of which can be affected by drug treatments. A
person whose life history includes many such encounters is
likely to show lasting differences in a variety of brain and
body markers. But to describe such changes as if they were
the causes of particular behaviours is to mistake correlation
or even consequence for cause. Drugs such as ritalin may
make children more tractable at school; the cause of their
so-called attention deficit hyperactivity disorder is unlikely
to be too little amphetamine in their brains. The search for
“first causes” seems to lead inevitably to genes.
Confounding metaphor with homology occurs as follows.
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If first causes are genetic, then they must have evolved and
similar behaviours should be found in non-human animals.
Example: “aggression,” measured in rats by noting how long
they take to kill mice, and taking this as a surrogate for “vi-
olent behaviour” in humans.
Reductionist ideology not only hinders biologists from
thinking adequately about the phenomena we wish to un-
derstand, it has two important social consequences: it
serves to relocate social problems to the individual, thus
“blaming the victim” rather than exploring the societal roots
and determinants of a phenomenon; and second, it diverts
attention and funding from the social to the molecular (e.g.,
alcoholism research in the United States or Russia). For any
aspect of the living world, multiple forms of explanation are
possible. But for any such phenomenon there are also de-
termining levels of explanation – those which most clearly
account for the specificity of the phenomenon and also
point to potential sites of intervention into it. Effective sci-
ence requires a better recognition of determining explana-
tion and hence the determining level at which to intervene.
Failing this it becomes a waste of human ingenuity and re-
sources, a powerful ideological strategy of victim-blaming
and a distraction from the real tasks that both science and
society require.
Chapter 11: Making biology whole again
This chapter summarises the main arguments of the book
in the form of ten slogans, as follows:
1. Our history shapes our knowledge
2. One world, many ways of knowing
3. Levels of organisation
4. It all depends
5. Being and becoming
6. Stability through dynamics
7. Organism and environment interpenetrate
8. Structure constrains evolution
9. The past is the key to the present
10. Life constructs its own future.
To conclude: for humans as for all other living organisms,
the future is radically unpredictable. This means that we
have the ability to construct our own futures, albeit in cir-
cumstances not of our own choosing. And that it is there-
fore our biology that makes us free.
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Abstract: Lifelines mounts a vigorous attack on sociobiology on the utterly
mistaken grounds that sociobiologists believe that genes single-handedly
determine social behavior. The many previously published rebuttals to this
pernicious criticism are conveniently ignored by the author.
In an undeservedly gentle review of Not in our genes, an earlier
ideological polemic against sociobiology by Steven Rose (Lewon-
tin et al. 1984), Patrick Bateson wrote,
The issues of evolution, individual development and current function
are not the same. The majority of scientists who now call themselves so-
ciobiologists know it and say so. Therefore, to criticize the evolutionary
and functional arguments of these people on the grounds that they are
genetic determinists is to make precisely the mistake that [E. O.] Wil-
son made, treating different problems as if they were the same. Doubt-
less, it spoils the fun when the hate-object ceases to be hateful, but
Rose, Kamin and Lewontin had a duty to deep themselves better in-
formed about current developments in the subject they chose to attack
so freely. (Bateson 1985)
What was true then is even truer now. But for Steven Rose to
have troubled himself to learn what sociobiology is really about
would have definitely spoiled his fun, eliminating the “need” to
write his current book, Lifelines, which stridently covers much the
same ground as Not in our genes. Once again, the pre-eminent
charge is that sociobiologists believe in rigid genetic determinism
in which possession of a given gene guarantees the development
of a particular phenotype. Rose is keen to portray sociobiologists
as drooling determinists because he wishes to demolish the disci-
pline by showing that there is no simple one-to-one relationship
between gene and behavior. Rose makes this point at great length,
but his “achievement” is irrelevant, not only because sociobiolo-
gists are as aware as he of the complexity of development, but also
because sociobiologists leave it to others to study how genes and
environment interact during behavioral development. As Bateson
noted, sociobiologists deal with the evolution and current function
of complex social traits. Like all evolutionary biologists who study
phenotypes, they simply assume that some genetic differences
among individuals have the potential to cause differences in phe-
notypic development an assumption universally accepted in biol-
ogy.
A naive reader of Lifelines would never guess that sociobiolo-
gists have responded fully and often to the genetic determinist ep-
ithet (e.g., Daly & Wilson 1987; Maynard Smith 1997). Rose, how-
ever, regularly repeats shopworn charges without letting his
readers know that the accused have had something to say about
these accusations. For example, he repeats Gould and Lewontin’s
old canards that sociobiologists believe that (1) natural selection is
the only process affecting evolution, (2) every trait is an adapta-
tion, and (3) every half-baked speculation about the possible adap-
tive value of a given trait is true. He does not mention a single re-
buttal (for starters, see Borgia 1994; Endler 1986). And he
Commentary/Rose: Lifelines
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1999) 22:5 885
Commentary/Rose: Lifelines
886 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1999) 22:5
indulges in Gould and Lewontin’s penchant for aggressive
ridicule, producing an unnamed adaptationist who supposedly has
said that the pink legs of flamingos provide adaptive camouflage
for the birds when flying at sunset.
What Richard Alexander had to say about Gould and Lewon-
tin’s use of the “just-so story” applies with equal strength here.
Those . . . who parade the worst examples of argument and investiga-
tion with the apparent purpose of making all efforts at human self-
analysis seem silly and trivial, I see as dangerously close to being ideo-
logues at least as worrisome as those they malign. I cannot avoid the
impression that their purpose is not to enlighten but to play upon the
uneasiness of those for whom the approach of evolutionary biology is
alien and disquieting. (Alexander 1987)
That Rose has little interest in enlightened debate is apparent
on most pages of the book. For example, his dismissive treatment
of heritability studies of humans is based largely on ridicule and
dated criticism, such as the notion that separated twins are prob-
ably placed in similar environments. His readers never learn that
behavioral geneticists replied to this methodological criticism long
ago (e.g., Bouchard 1983).
Having trashed behavioral genetics and sociobiology, what does
Rose put in their place? In 1984, it was dialectical biology. In 1998,
we are offered homeodynamism and autopoiesis, two impressive
examples of obfuscatory jargon apparently intended to demon-
strate that development is a very complex process indeed. When
Rose says, “it is in the nature of living systems to be radically in-
determinate,” he means that we still do not know exactly how de-
velopment occurs. He embraces our current (and presumably
temporary) ignorance about some elements of proximate causal-
ity as evidence that we truly have the unbridled capacity to con-
trol our destiny.
Although a “philosophy” of this sort may appeal to those with
New Age sensibilities, other readers will note that Rose avoids
even one detailed scientific test of an autopoietic hypothesis
matched against a sociobiological alternative. Were he to have at-
tempted such a test, Rose might have seen that proximate, devel-
opmental hypotheses cannot substitute for those concerned with
the ultimate, evolutionary causes of behavior. This would have
been a useful lesson to convey to his readers, but instead Rose rails
against a mythical genetic determinism because he finds it easier
to debate a strawman than a sociobiologist.
The science of life as seen through 
Rose-coloured glasses
Mike Anderson
Department of Psychology, The University of Western Australia, Nedlands,
Perth, Western Australia 6907. mike@psy.uwa.edu.au
Abstract: This commentary takes issue with two of Rose’s central themes
from the perspective of the psychology of intelligence. In the case of re-
ductionism, I argue that Rose fails to live up to his own rhetoric by claim-
ing a veto from his own discipline (biology) over facts of the matter in an-
other (psychology). In the case of “Lifelines,” Rose’s argument is
contradicted by evidence from both individual differences and develop-
mental change in intelligence.
Steven Rose is grappling with issues in biology that have long been
a concern in psychology. My review will focus on two of them –
reductionism, and the necessity for a developmental perspective
(lifelines) for an adequate biological or behavioural science – to
show how palpably the book fails to live up to its own rhetoric.
Reductionism. I can agree with Rose that the excitement of de-
velopments in molecular biology does on occasion threaten to
overwhelm us with arrant and simplistic nonsense – his example
of statements about “genes for homelessness” is sufficient to make
this point. Yet, while arguing that scientific understanding of com-
plex phenomena can involve a number of different levels of de-
scription and while presenting a conventional taxonomy of these
levels on page 9, at the bottom of the very same page Rose asserts
that “some properties of living systems are not quantifiable, and
attempts to put numbers on them produce only mystification (as,
for instance, with attempts to score intelligence or aggression).”
Whether intelligence is quantifiable or not depends on whether
we have a theory that allows for the quantification of its constructs.
The arbiter of the possibility of quantification is a psychological
theory, because intelligence is a psychological construct and is not
something that a biologist can decide by fiat. Again on page 69
(during an embarrassing attempt to save his research program
from the logic of his own position), we are told that despite the
complexity of life the scientific method is at least capable of falsi-
fying some hypotheses, among them that “the Earth is flat, the
Moon is made of green cheese, or that IQ tests measure some
fixed, biologically determined feature of an individual.” But ex-
actly which science has adjudicated this last point? Certainly not
psychological science, because this is a proposition that is the cen-
tre of a lively current debate. I can only assume that Rose believes
that some biological fact establishes this psychological fact. I
would like to know what that fact is. How genes relate to DNA,
how DNA controls the synthesis of proteins, how sensitive gene
expression is to the environment of the cell, or whatever – all of
this is of no demonstrable significance to whether there is such a
thing as “general intelligence.” To think otherwise is to be a re-
ductionist.
Lifelines. Rose uses two related arguments to deride the scien-
tific utility of behaviour genetics. The first is the necessity of a de-
velopmental perspective (I have no problem with this) and the
second is the indivisibility of the effects of nature and nurture at
the level of an individual lifeline. The second is supposed to be a
consequence of the first, but I believe it is a red herring. Rose ar-
gues that each individual organism can be understood only in
terms of its own developmental history. But what science would
ever attempt such a thing? Taken to its extreme, science seen
through Rose-coloured glasses is the science of Freddo the Frog,
and Freda the Frog, and son of Freddo, and so on to near infinity.
In psychology it has long been recognized that there is indeed a
tension between nomothetic and idiographic approaches (the first
is the search for general laws of psychology and the second is the
attempt to understand the functioning of specific individuals). A
complete psychological science must surely accommodate both
(see Smith & Tsimpli 1995 for just such an attempt in the case of
an analysis of the abilities of a linguistic savant set against the back-
ground of general theories of intelligence). Seen in this light, be-
haviour genetics (in the nomothetic tradition) is but one method
of determining the general phenomena that a psychological the-
ory must accommodate – in this case whether a theory of intelli-
gence needs to take into account the fact that differences and de-
velopmental changes in intelligence are influenced by genetic
differences. Estimating heritabilities is just the behaviour geneti-
cist’s specialized method for estimating what in the truly experi-
mental sciences is called “effect size.” The basic scientific logic is
the same: Do genetic differences (the “experimental” variable)
contribute to measured differences in intellectual performance?
This is not a silly or misguided question, and all who make serious
attempts to answer it know that it is nonsensical to think we can
subsequently calculate what proportion of individuals’ intelli-
gence is due to their genes and how much is due to their environ-
ment. So this critique is a red herring and perhaps represents pos-
turing on Rose’s part, because the answer to this sensible question
militates against his own reductionist and a priori position. For de-
spite the myriad potential interactions between DNA, RNA,
“genes,” processes of embryogenesis, cellular and extracellular en-
vironments (and whatever else), it turns out that identical twins
reared apart are so alike in intellectual performance that measur-
ing two identical twins is just about indistinguishable from mea-
suring the same twin twice. So much, then, for lifelines. Not be-
ing a reductionist, I see no conflict between what Rose claims is
true for studying the biology of organisms, that is, the hegemony
of individual lifelines, and what appears to be true for studying and
understanding individual differences and changes in intellectual
performance.
Finally, if we take off our Rose-coloured glasses for a moment
we might discover some information that is surely of interest for
theorists of intelligence. Is it not of some interest, for example, to
discover that early in development there is some similarity be-
tween adopted children and their nonbiologically related siblings
(never greater than that shown with their biologically related off-
spring with whom they have not shared a home), but that this sim-
ilarity falls to the levels of similarity between any two randomly se-
lected individuals by early adulthood (see Scarr 1992)? Why
should this be so? None of this is to say that genetic studies can
explain what intelligence is. On the contrary, it will be a psycho-
logical theory, not a genetic one, that will do the real explanatory
work. But if such a theory can accommodate such data, then it will
be all the richer for it.
A clash of competing metaphors
Michael Bradie
Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green,
OH 43403. mbradie@bgnet.bgsu.edu
Abstract: Metaphors have three important functions in scientific dis-
course: heuristic, rhetorical, and epistemic. I argue that, contrary to pre-
vailing opinion, metaphors are indispensable components of scientific
methodology as well as scientific communication. Insofar as the choice of
metaphors reflects ideological commitments, all science is ideological.
The philosophically vexed question is how to characterize the sense in
which science is not merely ideological.
The seventeenth century was the locus of a dispute centered on
the question of the proper modes of representation for scientific
knowledge, a dispute that was to shape what we now call modern
science. Following the legacy of the Royal Society in England,
metaphors were condemned to play ancillary roles to mathemati-
cal representations.
This view is mistaken (Bradie 1999). Metaphors have three im-
portant functions in scientific discourse: heuristic, rhetorical, and
epistemic. In their heuristic capacity, they serve as guides for fur-
ther research and formation. In their rhetorical capacity, they are
useful devices for the communication of research and results. Fi-
nally, they have an epistemic function. Scientific descriptions and
explanations are fundamentally metaphorical. Mathematical mod-
els in biology are representations of the physical interactions of bi-
ological organisms. As such, they are “metaphorical redescrip-
tions” of phenomena in mathematical terms (Bradie 1997; Hesse
1966). With these brief remarks to set the stage, let us turn to an
analysis of Rose’s critique of the metaphors of reductionism.
Rose’s book is a critique of an “ideology” that he labels “ultra-
Darwinism” and a brief for replacing it with a better vision, a vi-
sion he calls a “homeodynamic” view of the evolution and devel-
opment of organisms. This is a clash of competing metaphors.
While I agree with Rose that scientific disputes are not merely ide-
ological conflicts, in light of the framing remarks on the nature of
metaphors in science, it may be harder to spell out the nonideo-
logical character of science than some may suppose. It should also
be noted that I am using the concept “metaphor” in a stronger
sense than Rose’s. For him, metaphors are often mere metaphors,
what I have labeled heuristic or rhetorical metaphors. But all sci-
entific modeling involves unavoidable distortions – whether one
calls them metaphorical redescriptions or not.
In Chapter 2, Rose remarks on the “paradox of science”: in try-
ing to provide a “true” account, we must filter our understandings
through conceptual frameworks framed by the “experience and
expectations of its practitioners” (p. 24). The deep question is:
How should we best view biological phenomena, in terms of enti-
ties or processes? These are, in fact, two deep metaphors which
shape the kinds of solutions we are prepared to accept for partic-
ular problems (p. 42).
Rose cautions about the “seductive trio” of metaphor, analogy,
and homology. When we use mere metaphors as analogies or ho-
mologies (such as when we say that the brain is a computer), or
when we use analogies as homologies (as in treating animal con-
flict as homologous to human aggression), then we “delude our-
selves” (p. 68). The metaphors and analogies we find “attractive”
are not based in the “science,” but are ideologically based (p. 69).
The bottom line: science is ideologically based, but it is not just
one ideology among others. There are, Rose claims, “reality
checks.” But how are we to characterize these checks? Rose here
finds himself in the familiar position of someone who wants to ac-
knowledge the ideological source of our representational schemas
without slipping down the slope into epistemological anarchy.
There are many examples of the use of metaphors of varying
probity in Rose’s book but limitations of space preclude a discus-
sion of them here. The fact is that scientific discourse is rife with
metaphorical formulations, allusions, insinuations, and applica-
tions. Rose’s account brings out both the positive and the negative
features of many metaphors. Rhetorical devices have the power to
inspire and suggest as well as confuse and obscure. Can we do
without them? Can we somehow abandon our metaphorical mod-
els of speech and representation and get down to the “plain, un-
varnished truth” of things? I suspect not. In promotion, explana-
tion, and dissemination, metaphors play a central role, and
prospects for metaphor-free speech and representation is virtually
nil. To take the easy case first, consider the rhetorical dimension,
which covers the transmission of information among specialists
and from specialists to the general public. Scientists must be able
to communicate their programs, techniques, and successes to a
wide audience. As our collective understanding of the world
increases, our individual understanding decreases. The history of
science has been the history of increasing specialization. The re-
sult is that as our cultural understanding of particular features of
the world gets deeper, scientists have difficulty communicating
their technically coached results effectively to wider audiences, let
alone understanding disciplines other than their own.
Even so, if my argument is correct, scientific theories and their
applications are fundamentally metaphorical (hence, ideological)
in character. The “sins” of the reductionist ideology (such as prob-
lems of agglomeration, spurious localization, etc.) are the un-
avoidable by-product of scientific conceptualization. As soon as
we agree that cases can or are to be grouped together, we are en-
gaged in “ideology.” The reductionist might be an extreme case
but when we reject reductionism (in favor of Bishop Butler’s dic-
tum that “everything is what it is and not another thing”) then we
swing toward the other extreme where all cases are unique. To go
all the way in this direction is to forego all possibility of scientific
understanding or of producing any systematic understanding of
nature. We need to stop somewhere between the two extremes. Is
there a natural stopping point? Is there (1) some place “dictated”
by nature, as it were, or do we inevitably (2) choose places to stop
on the basis of interests and convenience? If the latter, then sci-
ence can never be free from ideology and rather than pretend that
it is, perhaps we should promote analytical practices that bring to
the surface our ineluctable biases.
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What the human annals tell us
Gwen J. Broude
Department of Psychology, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604-0152
broude@vassar.edu
Abstract: Evidence reveals numerous cross-cultural universals regarding
human mental processes and behavior. Similarly, cross-cultural data are
consistent with predictions from theories of kin selection, reciprocal al-
truism, and sexual selection inspired by Darwin’s theory of evolution by
natural selection. Thus, the “annals of human behaviour” do provide “ex-
ample[s] fitting the sociobiological bill,” (Lifelines, p. 202) thereby, sup-
porting sociobiological accounts of human behavior.
In Lifelines, Steven Rose wants to persuade the reader that re-
ductionism – as a method, but more especially as a theory – is a
bankrupt and dangerous paradigm. On Rose’s view, reductionism,
with liberal (not guilty) help from wrong-headed ultra-Darwinists,
points falsely to the genes, aided by natural selection, as the sole
determinants of the functioning of biological organisms. As foils
for his argument, Rose singles out such prominent sociobiologists
or friends of sociobiologists as Daniel Dennett, Richard Dawkins,
and E. O. Wilson, who have tried to account for biological minds
and behavior in light of selectionist theory. Rose targets, in par-
ticular, sociobiological accounts of kin selection, reciprocal altru-
ism, and sexual selection as examples of the troubled waters into
which unwary biologists, seduced by the reductionist agenda,
might find themselves wading. Rose asks whether any examples
from the annals of human behavior might fit the sociobiological
bill. As a recovering cultural relativist trained in the Franz Boas
school of anthropology, I want to take up Rose’s challenge.
Selectionists predict that we should find psychological and be-
havioral uniformity in response to shared opportunities and chal-
lenges that the world has to offer to our species. So, taking up
Rose’s challenge, are there any such uniformities in human func-
tioning as described by anthropologists? Here is a list of cultural
universals from the guru of social anthropology, George P. Mur-
dock (1945): age-grading, athletic sports, bodily adornment, cal-
endars, cleanliness training, community organization, cooking, co-
operative labor, cosmology, courtship, dancing, decorative art,
divination, division of labor, dream interpretation, education, 
eschatology, ethics, ethnobotany, etiquette, faith healing, family
feasting, fire making, folklore, food taboos, funeral rites, games,
gestures, gift giving, government, greetings, hair styles, hospital-
ity, housing, hygiene, incest taboos, inheritance rules, joking, kin
groups, kinship nomenclature, language, law, luck superstitions,
magic, marriage, mealtimes, medicine, obstetrics, penal sanctions,
personal names, population policy, postnatal care, pregnancy us-
ages, property rights, propitiation of supernatural beings, puberty
customs, religious ritual, residence rules, sexual restrictions, soul
concepts, status differentiation, surgery, tool-making, trade, visit-
ing, weaving, and weather control. Other observers of human cul-
tures have proposed other lists which extend the number of uni-
versals. So anthropologists find uniformity in how human beings
organize their lives. Cultural relativists tend to focus on local vari-
ations. Some people are monogamous and some are polygynous
and some are polyandrous, they assert, so we can’t find anything
shared across cultures. This misses the astonishing fact that, in
every known human culture, people stand up in front of their
neighbors and commit themselves to a culturally sanctioned mate.
Ditto for other efforts to focus on variations on the theme across
cultures while missing the theme itself.
What about Rose’s target sociobiological theories? Is there any-
thing in the annals of human behavior that might cause us to view
kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and sexual selection theory as
something less than bankrupt? Any anthropologist will tell you
that the kin group is the basic functional unit of organization
across societies. Generations of anthropology students have been
bored to tears by the endless focus on kin lineages and kin termi-
nology and kin groups with which anthropology professors regale
them. People across cultures depend upon relatives as opposed to
non-kin for their domestic, religious, economic and political well-
being. They share resources and cooperate on tasks preferentially
with kin and leave their wealth to kin (Broude 1994). Across hu-
man societies, it sure does look as if nepotism flourishes and blood
is, indeed, thicker than water.
Ethnographic descriptions also indicate that human beings con-
duct their interpersonal relationships in ways that are consistent
with reciprocal altruism theory. Patterned exchange among
nonkin is endemic across cultures. Friendships, voluntary associ-
ations, and cooperative work groups of all sorts, in which mutual
aid and support are expected, are found everywhere. Anecdotes
are endemic in the ethnographic literature in which the failure to
reciprocate a gift given or a favor done is met with indignation and
thinly veiled hints or threats (Broude 1994). The husband-wife re-
lationship, itself a cultural universal, is a compact between unre-
lated individuals in which each contributes to the welfare of the
other and of the offspring of both. Even in cultures that are in-
voked as examples of the altruistic ethic, we find expectations of
reciprocity lurking below. Among the Kalahari !Kung, for exam-
ple, people give away their possessions freely, and the !Kung are
frequently hauled out as an example of a communitarian society.
But while gift-giving is universal among the !Kung, so is gift-
receiving. Moreover, exchanges tend to take place among a small
number of partners, who may even be inherited and each of whom
keeps a running tab of who has given what to whom and when
(Shostak 1981).
Theories operating under the umbrella of sexual selection also
live comfortably with the ethnographic data. We see sexual selec-
tion played out, for instance, in the almost universal double stan-
dard regarding extramarital sex in which women’s sexual infideli-
ties are viewed as more serious than those of men, as sexual
selection theory would predict. Thus, in one cross-cultural survey,
women were permitted to engage in extramarital sex in only 11.2%
of 116 traditional cultures around the world, while extramarital sex
norms were more permissive for men than for women in 77.7% of
these cultures. Even when extramarital sex is condemned for both
spouses, punishments for infringements of these norms are typi-
cally considerably more severe, and often dramatically so, for
wives. And where extramarital sex norms for wives are permissive,
the husband is likely to receive a benefit. For example, among the
Lesu of New Ireland, a wife who engages in sexual relations out-
side her marriage receives a gift from her lover, which she then
hands over to her husband (Broude 1994).
Rose argues that biological organisms, including human beings,
construct their own futures. Gene-mediated selectionist theory on
his view perverts this fact of life. What salvages it? Interactionism.
We all say that we are interactionists, observes Rose. But some of
us, on Rose’s view, are more interactionist than others. Rose is a
good interactionist. Sociobiologists, he claims, are not.
Interactionists recognize that the behavior and development of
biological organisms are the joint product of biology and environ-
ment. But, then, selectionist theory is deeply interactionist. Who
takes the cooperation of biology and environment in producing
lifelines more seriously than a selectionist? I am interested in
hearing how Rose reconciles evidence of human universals from
the human annals with an interactionist theory that does not make
room for selectionist thinking.
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No short cuts to science
Bruce G. Charlton
Department of Psychology, university of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle
NE1 7RU, United Kingdom. bruce.charlton@ncl.ac.uk
Abstract: Steven Rose regards oversimplification of biology as the
supreme sin, inevitably leading to evil consequences, and requiring an
unique distortion of scientific practice to avoid it. To avoid this, he pro-
poses a short-cut to scientific knowledge by defining certain areas of biol-
ogy that are intrinsically flawed. But this achieves only a subordination of
science to politics. There are no general-purpose shortcuts for evaluating
the validity of theories, and no substitutes for testing specific theories us-
ing relevant evidence.
Steven Rose is against “reductionism” in science. For his major ex-
ample, he invents a theoretical framework termed “ultra-Darwin-
ism” and characterized by intellectual bankruptcy and moral de-
pravity. The insistent refrain of Lifelines is: “things are more
complex than that.”
But this is not enough, because in science things are always
more complex than that – science is a search for simplified, uni-
fying theories. The proper question is whether or not the simpli-
fication is useful, whether or not the simple model works as a the-
ory, whether its consequences are consistent with the test of
further observations.
Hence it is clear that what Rose objects to is inappropriate sim-
plification, rather than simplification per se. But inappropriate
simplification is merely a type of bad science – simplification is in-
appropriate when it does not work. So, Rose is against bad science.
Nothing controversial about that. The problem then becomes:
how can we tell bad science from good? How can we tell over-
simplification from the right amount of simplification?
To paraphrase Einstein: theories should be as simple as possi-
ble, but no simpler. In other words, we should simplify as much as
possible (because simple models are more rigorously testable and
more useful), but we will know that a scientific theory is oversim-
plified when its consequences are inconsistent with structured ob-
servation. An oversimplified theory will not be predictive, because
it has missed out important variables. Simplification is bad only
when it does not work. In opposing oversimplification, however,
Rose conflates the pragmatic and the ethical. For Rose, oversim-
plification in biology is evidence of moral depravity. He does not
accept that any wickedness due to oversimplification is accidental;
he is trying to argue for a special logical link such that oversimpli-
fication inevitably leads to evil consequences. Implicitly, he sees
oversimplification as the supreme sin, requiring an unique distor-
tion of scientific practice to avoid it.
Rose is transfixed by a specific ethical danger: that biological
theories about human being may be oversimplified and that such
oversimplified biological theories are more likely to be misinter-
preted, misapplied, and used to justify moral harm than are any
other sorts of theory. With this in mind, throughout Lifelines Rose
is trying to find a formula by which we might know in advance of
testing whether a biological theory is oversimplified. The idea is
that theories and scientists grouped under the ultra-Darwinist
umbrella will be condemned a priori. It seems to me that Rose
wants to do this in order that the general public (who lack specific
scientific knowledge) can prevent themselves from being hood-
winked by repressive political propaganda, probably right-wing,
that is masquerading as science.
In trying to rule out this particular source of harm, Rose has im-
plicitly set himself the task of constructing a general-purpose short-
cut to measuring the truth of scientific theories – to know whether
a theory is valid or vapid without having to go through all the hard
work of reading, understanding, observing, and experimenting. In
other words, Rose is seeking a shortcut to scientific knowledge.
If I am right about the fundamentally ethical drive behind the
writing of Lifelines, this would explain why Rose hardly seems to
have read about, let alone made the intellectual effort to under-
stand, the major work in evolutionary biology over the past 20
years. Yet this has been a period of remarkable progress during
which the theory and practice of evolutionary biology had been
transformed. A few of these major advances are name-checked;
but never explicated, engaged with, or refuted. Throughout Life-
lines, Rose fails to confront the best and most recent scientific
work and attacks obviously inferior studies, garbled media reports
of research, or old papers from the 1960s and 1970s that have of-
ten (as is the way for most science) since been revised or super-
seded. This is merely shooting fish in a barrel.
Mistakes may be forgiven in a book of this scope. But some are
evidence of a failure to do the elementary homework necessary for
a person who is purporting to critique and redirect evolutionary
biology. For example, on page 227 Rose writes “to cling to ‘the
gene’ as the sole unit and level of selection under these circum-
stances, as Maynard Smith and the ultra-Darwinists do, seems
perverse.” Well, it happens to be the case that Maynard Smith is
co-author of a book (Maynard Smith & Szathmary 1995) called
The major transitions in evolution (which was also published as an
essay in Nature; Szathmary & Maynard Smith 1995) – a major
work on exactly the topic of the many units and levels of selection
that Maynard Smith is supposed to have perversely ignored. May-
nard Smith’s book forms part of a significant branch of mainstream
evolutionary biology that includes important work by David L.
Hull, Richard Dawkins, and some others who are elsewhere cat-
egorized in Lifelines as being among the single-gene-obsessed-
ultra-Darwinists. Perhaps Rose does not know this work or un-
derstand its implications – or perhaps he knows but has excluded
it. Whatever the explanation, this line of evolutionary research tor-
pedoes Rose’s major argument. Scientists like Maynard Smith
have already achieved a level of understanding of multi-level se-
lection and interaction far beyond that called for in Lifelines.
Evolutionary biology is a science like any other, if it is allowed
to be. It should not be treated as a special case. Blending ethical
and social criticism with science, as Rose does, is a recipe for dis-
honesty and double standards. He has subordinated human biol-
ogy to politics, and is mainly concerned to fit human biological
knowledge into a pre-existing agenda of what is acceptable.
By contrast, I would argue that biology is oversimplified only
when it is untrue; and not because simple theories are uniquely
susceptible to misapplication. An oversimplification of human na-
ture might be used to justify repression; but then again, tortured
casuistic logic or a denial of human nature can be used to justify
repression with equal facility. Hence, “reductionism” and “ultra-
Darwinism” are merely boo-words, and are irrelevant to the
proper practice of science. The validity of a specific theory can only
be determined by the laborious work of evaluating its conse-
quences on the basis of specific relevant evidence. There are no
short cuts to science, and no substitutes for substantive knowledge.
Metabolic complexity has no bearing 
on genetic determinism
Athel Cornish-Bowden
Institut Fédératif Biologie Structurale et Microbiologie, Laboratoire de Chimie
Bactérienne, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 13402 Marseilles
Cedex 20, France. athel@ibsm.cnrs-mrs.fr
ir2lcb.cnrs-mrs.fr/~athel/homepage.htm
Abstract: Metabolic systems are complicated and contain very large num-
bers of interacting reactions and many internal regulatory mechanisms.
This does not prevent the genetic composition of an organism from influ-
encing its behavior, however, nor does it preclude the possibility that some
aspects of its behavior may be amenable to simple explanations.
In 1774, Leonhard Euler claimed at the court of Catherine the
Great that he could prove the existence of God, silencing his op-
ponent, Denis Diderot, with the following challenge: “Sir, (a 1 bn)/
n 5 x, hence God exists; reply” (quoted by Singh 1998). Like
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Diderot, Rose finds algebra hard to follow (p. 160) and might find
it just as difficult to recognize the irrelevance of Euler’s argument
to the proposition it was supposed to prove. Rose’s own style of
discussion is similar, however, apparently in the hope that his read-
ers will be sufficiently ignorant of biochemistry to think that his
emphasis on its complexity has some bearing on the question of
whether genes influence behavior.
Books that set out to explain why organisms behave as they do
describe observations of behavior on almost every page. The
books of Richard Dawkins, whom Rose selects as his special tar-
get, illustrate this well: readers can reject all of the author’s inter-
pretations while remaining fascinated by the purely factual infor-
mation that these books contain. How can one hope to convince
anyone of the truth of a theory without supporting it with abun-
dant facts? Yet hard biological information is extremely sparse in
Rose’s book. There is a great deal about what he thinks of other
biologists’ opinions, but almost no observations from behavioral
biology. Nonetheless, in his preface (p. x) he aligns himself with
the practising biologists “who spend a significant part of every
working day thinking about and designing experiments,” dismiss-
ing Dawkins and Dennett as “people who either no longer do sci-
ence or never did it.” What a pity, therefore, that Rose chose to in-
clude so little of the experimental basis of his ideas in his book.
There are a few vague remarks about how chicks behave, and
that’s about it.
Rose claims throughout the book to be a biochemist, and in the
remainder of this review I shall concentrate on the section
(pp. 158–66) that deals with the complexity of metabolic networks
and underlies the suggestion at the end of the book (p. 307) that
genes are just individual workers in the great molecular democ-
racy of the cell. As this section occurs in a chapter with the same
title as the book, it is fair to regard it as the core of the book.
However, even as a standard biochemical account of the basic
ideas of metabolic regulation, divorced from its role in the whole
thesis, it is peculiar. In a muddled account of enzyme catalysis that
does not contain any algebra, Rose confesses that he finds the al-
gebraic relationship between a reaction rate and a rate constant
hard to grasp. He then presents metabolic regulation in terms of
the tired old myth of the rate-limiting reaction, saying that in prac-
tice it often turns out that the rate-limiting step is one of the first
in the sequence – obviously advantageous so far as the cellular
economy is concerned: Does it “turn out,” or is it assumed with-
out considering any other possibility? The enzyme phosphofruc-
tokinase is asserted in innumerable textbooks to be the rate-limit-
ing enzyme for glycolysis. If it were, then overexpressing it would
increase the glycolytic flux, but even though the relevant experi-
ments were done in yeast more than a decade ago (Heinisch
1986), and have since been repeated in other organisms, the re-
sults – no detectable increase in glycolytic flux when phospho-
fructokinase is overexpressed 3.5-fold – have yet to be taken seri-
ously by the hordes of biotechnologists in search of the mythical
rate-limiting enzymes.
Rose appears to be conscious that his account is faulty, because
at the end of it he quotes Kacser and Burns (1979) to the effect
that control is shared among all the enzymes of a system. But does
he mean the mea culpa that follows? If Kacser and Burns are right,
then what was the point in wasting pages on a muddle? If they are
wrong then why are they being quoted? Presumably the attraction
of their paper lay more in its title and some quotable sentences
than in any serious study of its content.
If these pages have any point at all it is to establish that metab-
olism is complicated, involving very large numbers of interacting
reactions. True enough, but what does that have to do with the
idea that genes can affect behavior? A system can be highly com-
plicated, with many internal regulatory devices, yet its behavior
may still be amenable to explanation in terms of a particular set of
external influences: Does anyone doubt that the path taken by an
airliner is affected by the actions of its pilot, or must one just say
that it is a complicated device and the pilot is just one of many
components in its democratic organization?
Behavioral neurogenetics 
beyond determinism
Wim E. Crusio
Institut de Transgénose, CNRS UPR 9074, Génétique, Neurogénétique et
Comportement, 45071 Orléans Cedex 2, France. crusio@cnrs-orleans.fr
Abstract: Rose’s Lifelines justifiably attacks the rigid genetic determinism
that pervades the popular press and even some scientific writing. Genes
do not equate with destiny. However, Rose’s argument should not be taken
too far: genes do influence behavior, in animals as well as in man.
Let us start with my conclusion: Lifelines by Steven Rose should
be required reading for every biologist, especially those working
in behavioral and neural genetics. Rose presents a meticulously ar-
gued case against the deterministic, reductionist mode of thinking
that pervades much of modern biology. However, much as I find
myself in agreement with many of Rose’s starting points and con-
clusions, I disagree with many of his arguments that lead from the
one to the other. In addition, Rose weakens his arguments by fre-
quently inserting politically inspired barbs (against Thatcherism,
or the privatization of utilities in the United Kingdom, for exam-
ple).1 This is unfortunate, because in my experience this allows
people to brush aside his otherwise valid scientific arguments,
with the brief observation that Rose is ideologically biased.
The first chapters of the book offer excellent reading and, al-
though a few strained arguments will occasionally be encoun-
tered, it is mainly the last few chapters, where Rose discusses be-
havioral and neural genetics, that I find myself most in
disagreement with him. For instance, on page 190 Rose argues
that heritability estimates can be valuable for an animal or plant
breeder interested in crop yield or milk yield in cows, but not
when applied to human behavior. In principle, I agree with this
observation (Crusio 1990), but I disagree with Rose’s way of ar-
riving at this conclusion. His argument is that milk yield is a phe-
notype that is more straightforward to measure than intelligence,
religiosity, or other such characters. This reminds one of the con-
tention that IQ, because it is a complex character, is a soup, and
that whereas genetic analysis of its components, such as the size
of tomatoes and the weight of potatoes is reasonable, analyzing
soup is not (Roubertoux & Capron 1990). But is such a deceptively
simple measure as milk yield not also a “soup”? Milk yield is, in
fact, a complex character, the sum of many different “subcharac-
ters” such as fat content, chemical composition, water content,
and so on. If Rose finds that heritability estimates of milk yield can
be done, then it follows that such estimates are also possible for
IQ in human beings, at least in principle. The point he misses is
that the sole utility of a heritability estimate lies in the fact that it
predicts the response to selection of the character in question
(Crusio 1999), something nobody in his right mind would envision
for IQ or religiosity in human beings, I hope.
The picture that Rose paints of behavior genetics is quite a car-
icature. It seems almost as if he wants to argue that genes and be-
havior have nothing to do with one another and that if genes do
influence behavior, then they only do so in animals and surely not
in man. In his efforts to show this, Rose sometimes misrepresents
the things said by others, for instance, when he discusses the work
of Cases et al. (1995) on aggressive behavior in a mouse mutant
lacking monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) activity: Rose first de-
scribes a test used by some to measure aggression in rats: mouse
killing behavior. Of course, whether killing a mouse that belongs
to a totally different species is a good measure of the aggressive
tendencies of a rat is debatable. But Cases et al. were studying ag-
gression of male mice vis-à-vis conspecifics, a completely differ-
ent situation. Rose then continues to say that “this behaviour in
the rat is transmogrified into an analogue of the aggression shown
by drive-by gangs shooting up a district in Los Angeles, as in the
concluding sentences to the paper by Cases” (p. 294). Again, we
have a groundless (and needless!) accusation. At no point in the
Cases paper are gang shootings or even distantly similar events
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mentioned. All Cases et al. (1995, p. 1766) are saying is that the
results obtained with their mice support the notion that the be-
havioral problems described in males from a Dutch kindred
(Brunner et al. 1993) are due to their MAOA deficiency and not
to “unusual genetic background or complex psychosocial stres-
sors.” This conclusion seems to me completely warranted by the
data. Still, as I have argued before (Crusio 1996), although the
knock-out mice may be a good model for the problems encoun-
tered in the Dutch kindred, it is debatable whether these troubles
are adequately described by the word “aggression.” In addition, it
is becoming increasingly clear that the MAOA deficiency is a very
rare mutation, so far described only for this single Dutch family
(Stamps & Gurling 1998). So once again I find myself in agree-
ment with Rose, namely, that the MAOA mutation does not ex-
plain most (or even any) of the everyday violence that we observe
in the streets – without agreeing with the arguments he uses to ar-
rive at this conclusion.
In fact, both my agreement and my disagreement with Rose can
be illustrated by studying a small experiment more closely: a com-
parison of aggressive behavior in two inbred mouse strains, NZB
and CBA/H. The behavioral test is a situation in which some stan-
dard opponent (a male mouse from a non-attacking strain) is in-
troduced into the cage of the animal to be tested. The behavioral
measure is simply whether or not an attack occurs. Of course, this
test situation is very simplified compared to natural situations, but
not more so than the learning tests that Rose deems acceptable
for his chicks. In this testing situation, about 80% of males from
the NZB strain attack, as opposed to about 30% of CBA/H mice.
In a series of careful experiments, Roubertoux, Carlier, and col-
leagues (Carlier et al. 1991; Roubertoux et al. 1994) have shown
that apart from some important effects of the (maternal) environ-
ment, this strain difference is owing to genetic differences be-
tween these strains. The results warrant two conclusions. First,
genes can influence behavior, even a complex one like attacking a
strange conspecific. However, this experiment also tells us another
important fact: although all animals within a strain are highly sim-
ilar genetically, about 20% of the supposedly aggressive NZB mice
do not attack, whereas about 30% of the non-attacking strain
CBA/H do. In short, even under the controlled conditions of a
simplified laboratory test, where all environmental conditions are
standardized as much as possible, genes do not determine behav-
ior in a rigid fashion. Apparently, mice have a “choice.” And if this
goes for mice, then I agree with Rose that it will not be different
for human beings.
Rose is right in attacking the deterministic notion found so of-
ten in the popular press (and even in scientific writings) to the ef-
fect that genes equal destiny. This is an important and valuable
message. However, we should take care not to let the pendulum
swing too far by denying any influence of genes on behavior. It is
the task of behavioral neurogeneticists to find the correct balance
between these opposing views.
NOTE
1. Some of these barbs degenerate into inadmissible ad hominem at-
tacks. A glaring example of this can be found in note 17 on pp. 206–207.
Rose asserts that many of T. J. Bouchard’s articles appeared in “Acta ge-
netica gemellologica” (sic: the correct title of the journal is Acta geneticae
medicae et gemellologiae), a “somewhat obscure journal . . . or in volumes
of conference proceedings, rather than in refereed journals.” Of course, it
is evidence and arguments that matter, not the place where they have been
published. Not only does such a nasty attack distract from Rose’s main ar-
guments; the accusation is also wrong. A Medline search renders 42 arti-
cles for “Bouchard TJ,” of which 40 are on twins. These 40 articles were
published in 30 different journals. Three articles (plus a news item) ap-
peared in Science, one in Nature. Only two articles are actually published
in the Acta. I expect and demand that Dr. Rose offer his apologies to Dr.
Bouchard.
Stability of behavioral traits within 
the framework of neural plasticity
Richard A. Depue
Laboratory of Neurobiology of Temperament and Personality, Cornell
University, Ithaca, NY 14853. rad5@cornell.edu
Abstract: Lifelines supports the theme that behavioral development is a
fluid, life-long phenomenon. In contrast, many emotional and cognitive
traits are subject to strong genetic influence, and are highly stable over
many years. The manner in which neuroplasticity and trait stability co-
occur needs to be modeled. An outline of such a model is provided to pro-
mote discussion of this complex issue.
Rose elegantly supports the theme emerging in many life and be-
havioral sciences that development is a life-long phenomenon
characterized by the ability of the organism to reorganize and
change in the face of changing environments. In contrast to this
theme is the fact that many emotional personality traits are sub-
ject to strong genetic influence (Bouchard 1994; Tellegen et al.
1988), and are highly stable (in terms of an individual’s rank order)
over as many as 20 years (Costa & McCrae 1994). Furthermore,
twin studies have shown that the stable component of positive
emotional levels itself has a heritability that approaches 80%, and
that stress-induced variation in positive emotional levels are tem-
porally quite limited, returning to pre-stress trait levels as if a he-
donic set-point influence were operative (Lykken & Tellegen
1996). The same finding occurs with respect to some forms of cog-
nition: IQ levels (which can be thought of as a cognitive trait
marker) of identical twins reared apart show equally high heri-
tability as those for identical twins reared together (Bouchard
1997), and IQ is relatively stable after adolescence.
Clearly, the development of cognitive abilities and intelligence,
as well as emotional behavior, must be dependent on powerful ex-
perience-dependent neuroplasticity processes. And just as clearly,
more intense environmental conditions can effect major changes
in behavior. Extremely stressful conditions, or stressors occurring
during early stages of development, may cause long-term modifi-
cations of neurotransmitter and/or neuropeptide functioning that
can be accompanied by “personality” changes (Le Moal & Simon
1991; Yehuda & McFarlane 1997). Similarly, animal work indi-
cates that transitions in hedonic set point may occur under certain
conditions (Ahmed & Koob 1998). But, within the normal range
of environmental circumstances, temporal stability of behavioral
traits is often observed. The manner in which neuroplasticity and
trait stability co-occur needs to be modeled, but Lifelines provides
no clear guidelines for this problem. I offer the following possi-
bilities on which Rose’s thoughts would be valuable.
Specifically at issue is the manner in which individual differ-
ences in emotional personality and some cognitive traits become
stabilized. To be clear, let me define personality traits, like extra-
version, anxiety, and fear, as emotional systems that have evolved
to increase our adaptation to critical stimuli in the environment,
such as rewards, uncertainty, and aversive stimuli, respectively. I
and others (Gray 1992) assume that individual differences in the
neurobiological sensitivity (or reactivity) to these critical stimuli
underlie phenotypic variation in the traits. Moreover, the neural
foundation of these emotional systems involves networks of brain
regions that interact to emotionally evaluate and respond to envi-
ronmental stimuli (LeDoux 1992). It seems likely that individual
variation in the neurobiological sensitivity to critical stimuli is due,
not to structural variation in brain regions that comprise the net-
work associated with an emotion system, but rather to variation in
the functional properties of neurotransmitters/neuromodulators
that modulate the functional processes of the network.
A large body of animal research suggests that behavioral stabil-
ity may occur within a plastic neural environment via a sequence
of factors (Depue & Collins 1999).
1. Genetic factors can strongly influence a biological variable
that plays a central role in a trait’s phenotype, such as a neuro-
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transmitter that strongly modulates a network’s functioning. For
instance, genetic effects on the number of midbrain neurons of
transmitters of wide distribution (e.g., dopamine, serotonin) have
been demonstrated to markedly and stably influence trait levels of
emotionally-relevant behaviors in animals. This factor can be
viewed as the lowest-order foundation of the concept of trait.
2. Significantly, this biological foundation may strongly modu-
late the impact of the environment on experience-dependent pro-
cesses. To extend our example, the genetically-influenced number
of transmitter-synthesizing neurons may influence the mean
range of magnitude of critical stimuli that can (i) activate neuro-
transmitter projections sufficiently strongly to (ii) generate their
effects on neural and behavioral processes. With an increasing
number of neurons, the range of magnitude of effective stimuli
that can activate emotional behavior is increased into the weaker
extreme of the range. Animal research strongly supports the op-
eration of this factor.
3. The product of this positive genotype 3 stimulus-efficacy in-
teraction, which may be reflected in the synaptic density within
the trait’s neural network, may begin to develop during early post-
natal life, and may represent a relatively stable psychobiological
foundation that mediates the influence of trait-salient contexts
over emotional processes. This psychobiological foundation serves
as the background upon which future experience-dependent pro-
cesses may act, and may be seen as the basis of temperament.
4. Stability of this psychobiological foundation or temperament
level is assumed to be maintained over time by at least two factors:
(a) the psychobiological foundation of the temperamental trait has
now established the mean range of effective critical stimuli more
strongly, thereby further influencing the extent to which the envi-
ronment has “access” to experience-dependent neuroplastic pro-
cesses. At later stages of development, one can presume that the
operation of an active genetotype 3 critical environment interac-
tion will play an important role in maintaining initial differences.
But most importantly, (b) individual differences in neurotrans-
mitter functioning (e.g., due to variation in neuron number) may
strongly influence the experience-dependent neuroplastic pro-
cesses themselves, thereby influencing the extent to which critical
stimuli gain control of and facilitate emotional processes.
By way of example, this model may be applied to the personal-
ity trait of extraversion (Depue & Collins 1999), which has strong
genetic influence and is stable over many years and life stressors
(Lykken & Tellegen 1996; McGue et al. 1993; Tellegen et al. 1988).
Genetic variation in the number of dopamine neurons in the mid-
brain is reflected in very stable variation in extraversion-relevant
behavior in animals. Moreover, dopamine is critical to the devel-
opment of control of rewarding contexts over behavior through its
modulation of heterosynaptic plasticity: dopamine facilitates the
connection of efferents from brain regions carrying the salient con-
text of reward to brain regions involved in integrating extraverted
behavior. And, most importantly, individual differences in
dopamine functioning in animals correlate with the degree to
which the environment gains control over extraverted behavior.
Thus, the important point concerning stability is this: because
animal research indicates that neurotransmitter functioning can
play an integral part in (a) determining the range of effective crit-
ical stimuli that have access to an emotional system, and (b) the
extent to which those stimuli gain influence over behavior, indi-
vidual differences in neurotransmitter functioning may modulate
both of these processes and, hence, the extent to which trait-
salient contexts facilitate emotional processes. In this way, early
experiential processes may lay the foundation for trends in emo-
tional behavior by moderating the strength of later experience-
dependent processes involving the functional capacities of a sig-
nificant neurotransmitter projection system (Collins & Depue
1992). Therefore, across the lifespan, individual differences in
neurotransmitter functioning may modulate synaptic arborization
within network circuitry associated with an emotional system,
which in turn would modulate responsivity to critical stimuli and
be manifested in stable variation in emotional expression.
Multidetermination
Judith Economos
Radio Computing Services, White Plains, NY 10701. judith@rcsworks.com
Abstract: Professor Rose is inflamed against the views of Richard
Dawkins concerning genetic determinism. He has constructed an image
of a much stupider and eviller Dawkins view than is likely to be true and
argues against it. This is unrewarding, but otherwise his discussion of bi-
ology is very interesting.
Steven Rose is writing against reductionism, gene determinism,
and Richard Dawkins, whose Selfish gene (1976) was, for me, a
revelation in its day. He is offended by Dawkins’s way of looking
at biology, which he sees as a crude and oversimplified view of or-
ganisms. There would be nothing wrong with this if he simply en-
gaged in open combat with Dawkins’s cheerful geneticism. But he
seems vehement. A danger of vehemence is a tendency to misde-
scribe the opposition. In the Preface Rose tars the opposition with
Nazism, eugenics, racism, anti-Semitism, elitism, and sexism.
When a scholar and a gentleman is seen doing something as un-
scholarly and ungentlemanly as poisoning the well, it is embar-
rassing. No, let me explain: It was more than embarrassing. It
made me so angry I nearly refused to read the book at all. That
would have been a pity, because it is otherwise an informative and
well-written book
Rose blames this crude biology on reductionism and determin-
ism. Fortunately he does not take on the whole problem, but only
asserts that organisms are not genetically determined. He pro-
poses to demolish “radical” reductionism. Reductionism is the
view that every phenomenon can, in principle, be explained using
only terms and laws of physics: no irreducibly novel stuff or laws
need be introduced.
Rose concentrates on trying to break the chain at the reduction
of behavior to genetics. Everyone knows behavior is sensibly de-
scribed and explained only in intentional, teleological, functional,
and instrumental terms. Even so, if you deny the theoretical pos-
sibility of (someday, somehow) reducing those terms (by stages) to
purely physical terms your alternatives are:
1. asserting that the behavior of living things is supernatural
(owing to immaterial forces);
2. denying that there are any laws that govern organism be-
havior; and
3. asserting that new primitive terms must be added to the ones
about quarks and mesons and whatnot, and new primitive laws
added to the ones about strong and weak forces, gravity, and elec-
tromagnetism. This is emergentism.
Rose is an emergentist. Emergentism is appealing but incoher-
ent. If life is material, then it obeys the laws of matter; if the laws
of matter have to be augmented with laws of life, then what does
it mean to say the universe is material? Could you add terms about
the Life Force, or souls, to the physical primitives and still call the
universe material?
Rose’s first step in destroying reductionism (as he sees it) is to
undermine naïve faith in the pure objectivity of “science.” This is
a healthy corrective to any starry-eyed ideal of science surviving
into this decade. Robust skepticism is the basis of science, not its
bane. Nor does the point have much to do with reductionism.
He demonstrates, for those of us who missed the last several
decades, that observation is neither direct nor passive but directed
by the theory that provides its motivation and context, by the in-
strumentation that makes it possible, by the ideology of the per-
son doing the research, and by the underlying metaphors of the
time. Again, while none of this is part of ideal science, it is cer-
tainly part of the human beings who do science. Although we can
separate out a lot of personal bias, it is hard, as they say, to prove
a negative; even cross-cultural peer review cannot screen out the
unknown bias of an age. (Again, it does not have much to do with
reductionism.)
Rose spends the best part of Lifelines on an account of molec-
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ular biology, genetics, embryogenesis, and development. This is a
wonderful review and I recommend it for the teaching of children.
There is a lot of fluidity, self-organization, dynamism, process.
This is fine and true, except that he seems to believe that reduc-
tionism cannot handle them; that it can deal only with a motion-
less Erector-set reality. I don’t think reductionism is so feeble.
I was struck by the refrain that cells and organisms are “free” to
make (choose, construct) “their own futures.” It sounds so brac-
ing and hopeful and brave, until it occurs to one to wonder why, if
this is true, so many of them construct such short and painful fu-
tures for themselves, and almost all the rest construct inglorious
and finite ones. “Choice,” when applied to cells, is peculiar. The
“self-determination” of a cell, or an embryo (by which he means
that not all its story is read off from its genes) is not related to the
free will essential for moral responsibility, and pretty remotely kin
to persuadability in everyday life and politics. I wondered whether
Rose thought it had something to do with either of them, and, if
not, why it seemed so important to him. The “freedom” of cells
from total determination by their genes is just “slavery” to their
environments as well. This is so even if their environments are
acted upon by their natures, which are chemical and physical.
That a cell during embryogenesis does not behave like a player pi-
ano, with its genes as bumps on the player roll, but is sensitive to
and interactive with its continually changing environment, does
not imply that its behavior is undetermined by the laws of physics
and chemistry. The only alternative determinants are impersonal
laws of randomness, or whims of supernatural agencies.
Sometimes Rose is so gleeful at denying genetic determinism a
point that he awards it to chemical determinism (pp. 170 ff). In
even a noncellular context, he explains, ribosomes and micro-
tubules, provided with the right chemicals, will assemble them-
selves from components “spontaneously, like oil films on water,
without the need for specific genetic instructions – an intrinsic
molecular property which turns out to be at least as important for
the origin of life as do the famous replicating molecules of DNA
and RNA.”
Rose makes a useful distinction between the “genes” of
Dawkins, which are “inferred entities,” and the actual “genes,”
blurrily visible under powerful microscopes, that are biochemical
loci on chromosomes. These “real” genes are messy; they are
spread along the chromosome; they are in pieces that are assem-
bled, like words into sentences, to do different things at different
times; most of them seem to have no function, some seem imper-
vious to natural selection, and there is (he says) evidence that it 
is technically possible that Lamarckian effects might obtain.
Dawkins’s “genes,” in contrast, are whatever in the organism ex-
plains the heredity of phenotypic characters. Rose believes that
this view of genes contributes to a careless and “brutish” view of
organisms, and that the carelessness and brutishness spreads right
up to a view of human beings and human society, where it is dread-
fully harmful. Which is why he got so untoward in the preface, I
suppose.
I am not wise enough to decide whether any view based on an
attempt to understand and explain the world ought to be rejected
because it might have harmful political consequences. I shall in-
stead assert that genetic determinism is not as stupid and untrue
to the world and its ambiguities as Rose urges. The law of gravity
seems simple and deterministic, yet not everything on earth is
glommed together in one immobile mass. The law applies to every
molecule of water – yet water is not always at the lowest point. It
is found suspended in the atmosphere, travelling up the tissues of
trees, hydrating cells by the gazillion, and piled up as snow on high
places. Despite these apparent exceptions, the law of gravity is
universal and holds. Similarly, if genes – the theoretical kind,
which must ultimately be reduced to the physical kind – govern
behavior, they will do so subject to interference from other deter-
minants, and there will be detours and apparent exceptions, which
we have not begun to work out. I am prepared to believe that we
shall work them out and that the unity of explanation without
emergent laws and entities will hold.
Neurogenetic determinism is 
a theological doctrine
Walter J. Freeman
Department of Molecular and Cell Biology, University of California at
Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-3200. wfreeman@socrates.berkeley.edu
Abstract: In “Lifelines” Steven Rose constructs a case against neuroge-
netic determinism based on experimental data from biology and in favor
of a significant degree of self determination. Two philosophical errors in
the case favoring neurogenetic determinism are illustrated by Rose: cate-
gory mistakes and an excessively narrow view of causality restricted to the
linear form.
Fred Allen, a comedian in the golden age of American radio in the
1930s, used a metonymic device he called “Allen’s Alley” to make
social commentaries. In one of his mock interviews, this of iden-
tical twins, a Wall Street financier and a Bowery bum, he asked
them to explain their differing circumstances. The broker boasted,
“My mother was a drunk and my father was a gambler, so I hadda
make something of myself.” The bum whined, “My mother was a
drunk and my father was a gambler, so what chance did I have?”
Here is the crux of Steven Rose’s argument. Genetic determinists
are willing to grant a share of control to the environment, but they
are unwilling or unable to assign even a minute fraction to self-
determination, because that would be equivalent, in their view, to
explaining the operations of the body by resort to mental or spir-
itual causes, or even regression to miraculous suspension of the
laws of physics and molecular biology. This is a matter of princi-
ple, because assigning a fraction of 1% or even 0.1% of the deter-
minants remaining after identifying the nature–nurture sources of
control would violate the law of universal causality. Yet self-con-
trol in everyone is like a spark in a bit of tinder, which, if it catches,
can ignite a life of adventure, but if it goes out, can lead to a life
of stale drudgery. Rose has fanned his spark into a campfire; now
the neurogenetic wolves are circling, looking to make a meal of
warm flesh.
The thesis that Rose advances is not an arcane exercise in the-
oretical biology. It addresses core questions: How are individuals
in societies to confront the political and ideological forces by
which some degree of social conformity must be achieved, and
how can individuals understand and deal with the rationales and
explanations of social controls that are provided by academics in
neurobiology, sociobiology, and medicine? Chapter by chapter,
Rose wades through the experimental data and statistical analyses
that medical, social, and biological scientists use to demonstrate
their conclusions that, in all societies, the choices that we citizens
make are caused by the chemicals in our foods, the pollutants in
our cities, and the sequences of base pairs in our genes. These ma-
terials mediate the release of hormones, the firing of action po-
tentials in our brains, and the laying down of memory traces, start-
ing even within the uterus, that determine whom we will love or
kill, and which stimuli and signals coming to us from our environ-
ments, outside our control, we will respond to.
In the course of 309 pages of erudite exposition and argument
Rose notes in passing that experimental biologists seldom read
philosophy and often regard their peers who do as declining
through the stages of “philosopause” and anecdotage into senility.
What a mistake! Many of the critiques that Rose directs against re-
ductionism in biology have already been well thought through by
philosophers.
One of the threads that links his materials is Gilbert Ryle’s
(1949) concept of “category mistakes.” His now classical example
is confusing a university with its collection of buildings or its fac-
ulty. This “reification,” as Rose calls it, is the most damaging as-
pect of reductionism, because it identifies a character trait with a
molecule, each in an entirely distinctive realm of discourse. This
simplistic kind of thinking has led a generation of otherwise intel-
ligent college students to ingest a broad variety of substances in
the fruitless pursuit of chemical enhancement of their IQs, and by
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so doing to obviate the necessity for hard study, and it has been
used to justify the wholesale sell-out of the profession of psychia-
try to the HMOs in the pursuit of quick and inexpensive chemical
fixes of complex emotional problems, to mention only two of the
more obvious meretricious social practices based in category 
errors.
In his pivotal Chapter 10 on “The Poverty of Reductionism”
Rose writes (p. 279): “Neurogenetic determinism, I argue, is
based on faulty reductive sequence whose steps include reifica-
tion, arbitrary agglomeration, improper quantification, belief in
statistical ‘normality’, spurious localization, misplaced causality,
dichotomous partitioning between genetic and environmental
causes, and the confounding of metaphor with homology.” I sum-
marize this thread by means of the philosophical distinction be-
tween linear causality and circular causality (Freeman, in press).
There are two major meanings of the verb “to cause.” The more
common is to make an effect happen, which requires an agent to
perform as a cause in a strict and invariant temporal order. This
view supports what philosophers call “linear causal chains,” so that
in theory, by linear extrapolation, every event can be derived by
steps from a First Cause, which for theists is God and for atheists
is the Big Bang, or perhaps the latter as the tool of the former. In
all cases this belief system provides the foundation of neuro-
genetic determinism.
The alternative and less common meaning is to explain without
invoking agency and with permission of simultaneity and even re-
versal of time order. Philosopher Donald Davidson (1980) asks:
Why on earth should a cause turn an action into a mere happening and
a person into a helpless victim? Is it because we tend to assume, at least
in the arena of action, that a cause demands a causer, agency and agent?
So we press the question: if my action is caused, what caused it? If I did,
then there is the absurdity of an infinite regress: if I did not, I am a vic-
tim. But of course the alternatives are not exhaustive. Some causes have
no agents. Among these agentless causes are the states and changes of
state in persons which, because they are reasons as well as causes, con-
stitute certain events as free and intentional actions.
Circular causality explains the interactions between semi-au-
tonomous elements at multiple hierarchical levels. Rose provides
a full array of examples from multiple fields of biological research,
particularly his own in the molecular changes that relate to learn-
ing in simpler systems. But they are not that simple, ever.
Is the lifeliner objectively free?
Steve Fuller
Department of Sociology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United
Kingdom. steve.fuller@durham.ac.uk
Abstract: Although Rose claims to rely on Marx’s paradoxical view of his-
tory to explain the freedom enjoyed by what he calls “lifelines,” he blurs
what one might call the “objective” and “subjective” senses of freedom.
This, in turn, reflects his overreaction to biological reductionism. Conse-
quently, in discussing biology-related policy issues, Rose fails to distinguish
genuinely efficacious interventions and merely convenient ones.
Steven Rose periodically invokes the Marxist motto “Men [sic]
make history but in circumstances not of their own choosing” to
capture the concept of “lifeline,” his nonreductionist, autopoietic
version of Richard Dawkins’s “extended phenotype.” According to
Rose, an organism’s genetic and ecological resources constrain the
course of its development without fully determining it. The or-
ganism’s actual trajectory is the result of multivariate interactions
at several levels of organization, which together constitute the or-
ganism’s “homeodynamics,” that is, its ongoing struggle to con-
struct a viable future from a fluctuating present. Rose’s firm
grounding in the biochemistry of the nervous systems precludes
vitalism as a metaphysical commitment, yet he sympathizes with
the vitalist picture of organisms as actively seeking alternative
means in an everchanging environment to achieve ends that are,
in some sense, independent of that environment. In light of this
picture, Rose argues that at least some organisms – certainly hu-
mans – enjoy a significant measure of freedom. But does Rose’s
concept of lifeline actually live up to the Marxist motto? More gen-
erally, does it constitute an adequate conception of freedom?
The paradoxical character of the theory of history epitomized in
the Marxist motto is normally explained in terms of a proposition
found in Hegel but traceable to Spinoza, Leibniz, and ultimately
the Stoics: freedom is the recognition of necessity. Rose (p. 18)
takes this to mean that once we realize the exact extent to which
we are constrained, we can act within our means to construct a
world worth inhabiting. However, this is a misleading, or at least
incomplete, rendering of what Marx, Hegel, and their predeces-
sors were trying to say. In addition, they believed that you cannot
determine the degree of freedom someone enjoys without look-
ing at what follows from that person’s actions. Freedom does not
exist in a world where agents pursue many different courses of ac-
tion that then issue in a much narrower range of outcomes. When
the present appears open to alternative futures, agents tend to re-
gard the world solely in terms of the resources it provides to real-
ize their ends. Rose’s rhetoric sometimes veers this way. Yet, de-
pending on the pattern of actual outcomes, the situation may be
exactly reversed – our diverse action may simply be means to some
other larger end. In that case, as long as we act within the relevant
options – almost any action will do – the larger end is served.
No doubt this sounds like I am inching towards Dawkins’s
“gene’s-eye view of the world,” in which biological diversity has no
proper end other than the safe conveyance of genetic information.
Yet, Marxists have also pointed to the proliferation of consumer
choices in advanced capitalism as having this character. Con-
sumers spend increasing time and energy deliberating over possi-
bilities; the long term and large scale consequences of these are
usually negligible for their own lives, but they latently serve to re-
juvenate the circulation of capital. Because consumers are regu-
larly presented with multiple options that force them to refine
their wants more precisely than they otherwise might, they are un-
likely, in the normal run of things, to discover just how overdeter-
mined their world really is. Thus, their subjective sense of free-
dom lacks an objective basis. Joined in their belief in the cunning
of reason in history, Dawkins and Marx see this point very vividly
in a way that Rose does not.
Consider what Rose rejects under the rubric of “reductionism.”
There is more at stake than simply a denial of the gene’s-eye view
of the world. Also at issue is the very idea of a coherent systemic
perspective from which the biological world can be regarded. For
Hegelians and their kin, there is a gold standard of objective free-
dom, whereby an agent inhabiting a world can be said literally to
know what it is doing. If the standard is to be met in a given pop-
ulation, then the diversity of its members’ actions must be
matched by an equal or greater diversity of outcomes. In addition,
these outcomes must generally correspond to what the members
wanted, ideally in the terms they expected. If both conditions are
satisfied, then there are good grounds for concluding that the pop-
ulation is objectively free. From a systemic perspective, such a
population exerts significant control over its collective future.
Although the gold standard of objective freedom is impossibly
high, it does enable us to distinguish between types of interven-
tion one might make to improve the human condition. Specifi-
cally, the most convenient level of intervention is not necessarily
the most efficacious, if it turns out that once a cause is removed,
its deleterious effects are largely reproduced by another factor ei-
ther present or latent in the environment. The freedom exempli-
fied by the intervention, then, would be merely subjective. Rose
falls potentially foul of this critique in his discussion of lung can-
cer treatment (p. 305). Tobacco companies are currently major
funders of research into the molecular biology of the lungs and the
localization of “predisposing” genes for cancer. Rose regards this
research as a strategic misdirection that capitalizes on the persua-
siveness of reductionist rhetoric. A more direct route to cutting
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lung cancer, according to Rose, is simply to restrict the sale of to-
bacco-based products, the use of which is known to be highly cor-
related with incidence of lung cancer.
Before judging the adequacy of Rose’s proposed intervention,
we would need to know its ultimate aim. What is the curtailment
of tobacco sales meant to eliminate: lung cancer per se, premature
death, excessive healthcare costs, a certain kind of lifestyle, or the
unpleasantness of a smoke-filled environment? In some of these
cases, the intervention may have the efficacious results Rose
seeks. But in others, tobacco may simply be replaced by another
set of products that engender largely the same effects or even
worse. Which is which depends just as much on a clarification of
ends as on the presence of scientific knowledge and political will.
Because Rose fails to provide this clarification – what philoso-
phers call “axiology” – his conception of freedom, though de-
fended with scientific evidence, does not have the objective char-
acter promised by his reliance on the Marxist motto.
Rose succeeds where Wilson fails
Jerry Hirsch
Departments of Psychology, Ecology, Ethology and Evolution, University of
Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820. jhirsch@s.psych.uiuc.edu
www.psych.uiuc.edu/people/faculty.html
Abstract: Rose’s accomplishment in combining ontological unity with
epistemological diversity contrasts it with Wilson’s failure in overempha-
sizing the former and not appreciating the latter. This commentary cites
the two most authoritative discussions of the inapplicability of heritability
to human data, corrects several historical errors or inaccuracies in genet-
ics, and criticizes the characterizations of Jacques Loeb and Robert
Plomin.
I congratulate Professor Rose on a fine accomplishment. Though
not perfect, Lifelines is a tour de force of good sense and packed
with useful information, elegantly presented and well written. Not
only does he give us an eloquent account of what modern behav-
ioral biology had become and how it got there, but he has also
taken the trouble to delineate what it is not: he has expended the
time and effort to use Dawkins (and Dennett) as his foils.
Immediately prior to receiving this book, I had completed re-
viewing E. O. Wilson’s 1998 Consilience: The unity of knowledge
(Hirsch 1999). The contrast between the two books in their 
approaches to reductionism could not be more stark. In Rose’s 
language, Wilson argues for an absolute ontological unity: “The
central idea of the consilience world view is that all tangible phe-
nomena, from the birth of stars to the working of social institu-
tions, are based on material processes that are ultimately re-
ducible, however long and tortuous the sequences, to the laws of
physics” (Wilson 1998, p. 297). Wilson fails completely to appre-
ciate what Rose correctly emphasizes: “Each level of organization
of the universe has its own meanings, which disappear at lower lev-
els” (p. 296); and “To understand the world’s ontological unity we
need the epistemological diversity that the different levels of ex-
planation offer” (Précis, Ch. 4, last sentence).
In addition, Wilson repeatedly advocates heritability analyses:
“Heritability . . . measure has considerable merit . . . is the back-
bone of human behavioral genetics . . . is a sound measure of the
influence of genes on variation in existing environments. . . . Hu-
man behavior genetics is an infant field of study. . . . In only one
level of analysis, the estimation of heritability, can it be said to be
an advanced scientific discipline” (Wilson 1998, pp. 154, 155,
170).
Despite coming down on the side of the angels in his discussion
of the misapplication of heritability analysis to human data, when
a problem has already been handled effectively in the literature by
recognized authorities, there is no excuse for Rose (or Wilson!) to
ignore their work and to attempt not very effectively to re-invent
the wheel. As I have previously emphasized in agreement with
Cavalli-Sforza, “in science we all have an obligation to be familiar
with the current state-of-the-art and to incorporate previous de-
velopments into whatever we do” (Hirsch 1997, p. 213). Today no
one interested (pro or con) in human heritability can ignore the
following analyses by the two distinguished statistical geneticists,
Oscar Kempthorne and Albert Jacquard, and both published in
the highly respected journal Biometrics:
The idea that heritability is meaningful in the human mental and be-
havioral arena is attacked. The conclusion is that the heredity–IQ con-
troversy has been a “tale full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” To
suppose that one can establish effects of an intervention process when
it does not occur in the data is plainly ludicrous. Mere observational
studies can easily lead to stupidities, and it is suggested that this has hap-
pened in the heredity–IQ arena. The idea that there are racial–genetic
differences in mental abilities and behavioral traits of humans is, at best,
no more than idle speculation. (Kempthorne 1978, p. 1)
The need for great rigour exists particularly in the case of research
projects which have serious implications for us all; this is the case when
psychologists study the “heritability of intellectual aptitudes.” They
should take the precaution of systematically defining in a precise way
the sense in which they use the word “heritability”; they should also
state whether the assumptions under which this word can be used hold
true in their studies. It is highly probable that most of the time this ex-
ercise in rigour would lead them to the conclusion that none of the three
parameters proposed by geneticists can be of any use in solving their
problems. (Jacquard 1983, p. 476)
I must correct some historical errors and/or inaccuracies, which
though unfortunate, do not vitiate the important message of
Rose’s book.
1. It is not correct that “colour-blindness or haemophilia . . . oc-
cur only in males” (p. 103). Because the gene correlates of these
two traits are located on the human X-chromosome and are re-
cessive, they occur far more frequently in males than females. But
there certainly are affected women.
2. It is inaccurate to suggest that “Mendel’s laws . . . were con-
firmed and extended during the 1920s and 1930s when Thomas
Hunt Morgan and his team . . . found a suitable animal model . . .
Drosophila melanogaster” (p. 110). It was in 1909 that Morgan
started studying the fly and by 1915 he and his team had already
published their first important book on the fly work, “The mecha-
nism of Mendelian heredity.” By 1933 Morgan had been awarded
the Nobel prize for that work. Rose’s account of his fly eye-color
experiment states “Morgan found some which seemed unusual . . .
they had red rather than white eyes (p. 110). It should read the re-
verse: white rather than red eyes.
3. It is inaccurate to say that “the other reason why Drosophila
were interesting to him was that their cells contained unusually
large and readily visible chromosomes” (p. 111). The giant poly-
tene chromosomes in the nuclei of the salivary glands of
Drosophila and other dipteran larvae were unknown until de-
scribed by Painter in 1933.
4. It is not historically correct that “norm of reaction . . . [is] a
term originally introduced by . . . Theodosius Dobzhansky in the
1950s” (p. 133). It was first defined and introduced in 1909 by
Richard Woltereck, professor of zoology at Leipzig (Dunn 1965,
p. 96; Platt & Sanislow 1988, p. 254). It is certainly true that later
Dobzhansky emphasized the importance of the concept.
5. After having characterized Richard Dawkins as “theoreti-
cian-polemicist,” it is grossly unfair to call Jacques Loeb (p. 109)
“the Dawkins” of his day. Merely because, from today’s perspec-
tive, Loeb might appear to have exaggerated the organism-as-
machine analogy and might have influenced Rockefeller funding
policy, this is no justification for dismissing Loeb’s entire career.
He was a very productive, influential and highly respected scien-
tist (an intimate and long-time [1891–1924] friend of T. H. Mor-
gan, who certainly did not brook fools lightly). As reported: “Be-
tween 1901 and 1924 [year of his death], Loeb was proposed for
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a Nobel Prize by about a hundred sponsors in ten different coun-
tries” (Nobel Foundation, 1962, p. 256). For evaluations by col-
leagues (e.g., Osterhaut) and his students (e.g., Northrup, a No-
bel laureate) who knew him well and/or collaborated with him see
(Hirsch 1973, especially pp. xvi–xix).
6. To Bouchard’s refusal to allow his data to be scrutinized by
Rose and other scientists (p. 207) can be added the case of Robert
Plomin discussed on p. 275 whose analyses Professor Peter
Schoenemann (Purdue University) has been unable to examine,
even after a member of the U.S. Congress (Collins, 22 June, 1995)
repeated the request for him.
To conclude, this is the best treatment, with which I am famil-
iar, of the limitations on reductionism, especially with the added
integration of the very important concept of epistemological di-
versity.
Steven Rose’s alternative to ultra-Darwinism
David L. Hull
Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208.
d-hull@nwu.edu
Abstract: Stephen Rose’s formulation of evolutionary theory is too scat-
tered and impressionistic to serve as a genuine alternative to ultra-
Darwinism. In addition, he has muddied a distinction that is crucial to our
understanding of evolutionary phenomenona – the distinction between
homologies and homoplasies.
Creationist and Marxist critics of present-day evolutionary theory
have much in common. They both parody their opponents, but
this argumentative strategy is common throughout science, not to
mention every other intellectual discipline. Most of their works
consist mainly in criticism. Constructive alternatives are notable
for their absence. “If you find present-day versions of evolution-
ary theory so deficient, where is your alternative?” Phillip John-
son, the current spokesman for creationism, replies that he is not
obligated to provide such an alternative. Steven Rose, a Marxist,
thinks that criticism alone is not enough. “The challenge to the op-
ponents of biological determinism is that, while we may have been
effective in our critique of its reductionist claims, we have failed
to offer a coherent alternative framework within which to inter-
pret living processes” (p. ix). Rose wrote his Lifelines to meet this
challenge.
How successful is Rose at providing an alternative to what he
terms “ultra-Darwinism”? I am afraid not very. I agree with much
of what Rose has to say and find many of his asides right on target.
For example, he argues that the conventional distinction between
science and technology is artificial. Building a bridge that stays up
is a test of the theoretical principles used to build it, and develop-
ing a new instrument for conducting an experiment is as much a
technological achievement as building a bridge (p. 57). According
to Rose, science is more than individual scientists thinking up hy-
potheses and testing them. It is “socially organized hypothesis-
making” (p. 66). In response to those who would reduce highly
complex systems to the actions of their simplest parts, he notes
that physicists are still unable to derive the properties of a sub-
stance as simple as water from the quantum states of its con-
stituent atoms (p. 88). And, finally, he argues that Edelman’s
neural Darwinism is a “seductively misleading metaphor” (p. 144).
As much as I agree with all the preceding observations, I just as
strongly reject other parts of his exposition. Some of my reserva-
tions concern minor points. For example, Rose repeats the tired
old story of how male scientists have portrayed sperm as active
agents in finding their way to fertilize passive ova. He states that
it is “increasingly apparent that the ovum is not merely the passive
recipient of the victorious sperm, but plays an active part in the
process” (p. 152), a view that has been commonplace for over half
a century. But some stories are too good not to keep retelling even
if they are not true. As we all know, lemmings march to the sea to
commit mass suicide, the good-tasting viceroy butterfly protects
itself from its predators by mimicking the bad-tasting monarch,
and male praying mantises succeed in copulating with female
mantises by offering the upper parts of their body as food while
the lower parts do their business. That none of these stories is true
seems to bother no one. To add to this list, doubt has been recently
cast on the most famous example of all – industrial melanism in
the peppered moth.
But not all of my reservations with respect to Rose’s book are so
minor. Through the years I have come to realize that the distinc-
tion made by biologists between homologies and homoplasies is
fundamental to our understanding of natural processes. We can
perceive regularities and patterns in nature. Some of them are due
to common descent; for example, the spiracle in sharks is homol-
ogous to the Eustachian tube in humans. But other patterns do
not depend on genealogical relations. Some are due to the per-
formance of common functions in similar processes; for example,
a torpedo-like shape is common among aquatic organisms that
spend a good deal of time swimming. The similarity in shape
among so many aquatic organisms is homoplastic. If one wants to
reconstruct phylogenies, homologies are the message and homo-
plasies are noise. If one wants to understand the evolutionary
process, homoplasies supply the message and homologies are
noise.
Rose succeeds in obliterating this important distinction. For
Rose, “homologies” imply a “deeper identity, derived from an as-
sumed common evolutionary origin” (p. 34), but then he goes on
to offer two alternatives to homologies – metaphors and analogies.
In metaphors, phenomena that occur in different domains are
compared; for example, the energy flow controlled by ATP and the
flow of currency in a bank. Analogies concern superficial resem-
blances between two phenomena; for example, the blood circu-
lates in animals as sap circulates through plants. I am afraid I fail
to see any significant differences between metaphors and analo-
gies as Rose defines them. But more important, he leaves out
those entities that are deemed similar because they perform the
same function in similar processes or, as they are called in the
philosophical literature, natural kinds. Nature can be subdivided
into kinds in numerous different ways. The task is to find kinds
that function in natural regularities (commonly termed laws of na-
ture).
Rose admits that within the world of human artifacts “it may not
be unreasonable to try to seek the essence of, say, a table or chair”
(p. 35). Such an essentialist view of the world “may even be pos-
sible when one is studying inanimate phenomena such as comets,
electrons or chemical elements” (p. 35). But the living world, so
he claims, cannot be subdivided into kinds that function in laws of
nature. He first argues that lineages such as species and sub-
species are not natural kinds because they are temporary, spa-
tiotemporally restricted, and have at best fuzzy boundaries in con-
ceptual space. I could not agree more.
I have been arguing this position almost as long as Ernst Mayr
and Michael Ghiselin. Rose then turns his attention to individual
organisms. They are not natural kinds and for the same reasons.
Finally, Rose moves to the molecular level arguing that proteins
and enzymes are not natural kinds either because they must be
functionally, rather than structurally defined. He does not say why
functionally defined kinds cannot function as natural kinds. But,
more important, he ignores all the genuine kinds to be found in
ecology (such as carnivores, herbivores, and parasites) and evolu-
tionary biology (such as founder populations, peripheral isolates,
and possibly the species category itself ).
But to return to the opening paragraph of this review: Does
Rose provide anything like a coherent alternative to ultra-
Darwinism? As far as I can judge, he has not.
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Selection and “freedom” in biology 
and psychology
Julian C. Leslie
School of Psychology, University of Ulster at Jordanstown, Newtownabbey,
Northern Ireland, BT37 0QB. jc.leslie@ulst.ac.uk
Abstract: Rose provides a coherent account of how a number of simpli-
fying assumptions apparently come together to support neurogenetic de-
terminism, or “ultra-Darwinism.” This view, he demonstrates, is deeply
flawed. He proposes instead that we must take account of the interaction
of processes that determine our developmental trajectory at every stage.
Unfortunately, he associates this defensible position with the claim that
this gives freedom of action to humans. The implications of this for the in-
terpretation of his general thesis are discussed.
The greatest obstacle to progress in the behavioural and brain sci-
ences is the use of inappropriate theoretical models. In the Anglo-
Saxon tradition, we often fail to see the need to articulate the un-
stated assumptions which underpin our proposed explanations in
specific areas. In this book, as previously, Rose does a great ser-
vice by attending meticulously to questions of underlying as-
sumptions. Some of these are summarised, late in the book, in his
succinct summary of neurogenetic determinism.
In Rose’s view, neurogenetic determinism involves the steps 
of “reification, arbitrary agglomeration, improper quantification,
belief in statistical ‘normality’, spurious localization, misplaced
causality, dichotomous partitioning between genetic and environ-
mental causes, and the confounding of metaphor with homology.”
(p. 279). Behaviour analysts, from Skinner (e.g., 1950) onwards,
have shared many of these concerns. One of Rose’s strengths is his
clear recognition that from a general belief in unified science –
the belief that phenomena at one level can in principle be trans-
lated into phenomena at “lower” levels – nothing in particular fol-
lows about preferred levels of description and explanation. Rather,
each level has its own explanatory system and particular purposes
which it can achieve. In this context, behavioral accounts of psy-
chological phenomena may, for example, be seen as independent
of, rather than poor substitutes for, psychological or genetic ac-
counts of human behaviour. Also, as Rose illustrates, there are as-
pects of psychological phenomena which exist solely at that level
and cannot be related to direct genetic influence.
There is much to applaud here, as elsewhere in Lifelines. There
are many themes in this impressive and exciting book which chime
with the selectionist and functional-analytic themes of contempo-
rary behaviour analysis. This may lay the groundwork for the anal-
ogy between natural selection as an evolutionary mechanism for
species and the selection of behaviour in the individual by its con-
sequences (see Skinner 1969, Ch. 7) to be extended.
Much public discussion of the behavioural and brain sciences,
in broadcast media as well as in print, is dominated by those who
would persuade us that we need only one level of explanation, and
one explanatory principle. Throughout this book, Rose points up
the inadequacy of these tactics in general and as used by neuro-
genetic determinists in particular. This is a task well worth doing,
and it is done well. However, as with his earlier treatment of some
related issues (Rose et al. 1984), I am left uneasy as to how non-
specialists (or even specialists) will interpret its implications for
the psychological explanation of human behaviour. The problems
arise out of Rose’s concern to point out the limitations of excessive
reliance on natural selection at the level of the single gene to ex-
plain all biological phenomena.
Let us examine Rose’s summary of his own case against neuro-
genetic determinism or “ultra-Darwinism” (p. 215). There are
four claims:
1. Selection occurs at levels other than that of the single gene.
2. Natural selection is only one of several factors producing
evolutionary change.
3. Organisms are not indefinitely responsive to change.
4. In Rose’s words: “Organisms are not mere passive respon-
ders to selective forces, but active players in their own destiny.”
While accepting Rose’s assertion that his “principal target is the
dogmatic gene’s-eye view of the world,” I want to consider Rose’s
account of the fourth claim which will tend to catch the attention
of all general readers as well as that of psychologists. With this
fourth claim he allows for the possibility that conventional men-
talism may take the place of rigorous philosophical and scientific
analysis. Very early in the book, he sets the stage for this disap-
pointing coda. There is an assertion that: “The central property of
all life is the capacity and necessity to build, maintain and preserve
itself, a process known as autopoiesis. This why . . . we, as living
organisms and specifically as humans, are free agents.” (p. 18).
Along with this (p. 9), he has specifically included mentalistic psy-
chology as one level of explanation in a critique of the notion of
the hierarchy of the sciences. Taking the book as a whole, then, it
is possible for the reader to conclude that Rose concurs with those
nonscientific commentators who wish to believe that a determin-
istic and scientific account of human psychology is not possible.
I do not think this is Rose’s position. The problem is a subtle one
of presentation. In a further account of autopoiesis (p. 245), he is
at pains to distinguish his account from one in which purpose di-
rects evolutionary change: “Autopoiesis, organisms as active play-
ers, is as apparent when a single-celled organisms swims away
from a depleted food source towards a richer one, as . . . in the de-
cision of an impoverished Mexican to cross the border into Cali-
fornia” (p. 245). This comparative analysis is really no different
from that used by Skinner (1972), who noted that the behaviour
of many species including humans is modified by contingencies of
reinforcement. Furthermore, although humans prefer to live
within social systems that positively reinforce prosocial behaviour
rather than those that punish antisocial behaviour, they are never
“free” in the conventional sense of that word. Rather, their be-
haviour is selected by the prevailing contingencies of reinforce-
ment. Skinner concluded that, in Western traditions, the aspira-
tion “to be free” meant “to be free from aversive control.” Rose
says that we are “free,” but he actually means that we are influ-
enced by a complex set of forces, and no one of these can be said
to determine our eventual behavioural state or psychological char-
acteristics. As with other biological phenomena, human behaviour
can only be understood in terms of the interaction of many pro-
cesses over the lifespan.
Genetic and biological determinants 
of psychological traits
Colin Martindale
Department of Psychology, University of Maine, Orono, ME 04469.
rpy383@maine.maine.edu
Abstract: Rose seems to be arguing against an extreme ultra-Darwinism
that probably has no adherents. He incorrectly argues that a number of
psychological traits are very difficult to measure. This is not the case. Rose
argues that intelligence has no biological correlates. In fact, it is correlated
with brain size, EEG evoked potentials, and cerebral glucose uptake dur-
ing problem solving. Data that Rose should be aware of are omitted when
they do not fit the case he is trying to make.
Rose raises various objections to sociobiology and what he calls ul-
tra-Darwinism. By the latter, he means a reductionist, determin-
ist biology which, among other things, attributes a number of traits
such as intelligence to genetic causes and, at least in some ver-
sions, claims that the only point of organisms is to replicate genes.
His refutation fails for a number of reasons. Other commentators
will doubtless point them out. I restrict myself to comments on his
remarks on behavioral genetics.
Rose does not deny that there are biological determinants of
traits such as intelligence. Environmentalists have surrendered on
this issue (Sternberg & Grigorenko 1997). They have been re-
duced to quibbling about the proportion of variation in intelli-
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gence that can be attributed to genetics. Their preferred estimate
is around 40% as opposed to hereditarians’ preferred estimate of
at least 70%. Rose tries various tricks to discredit the concept of
intelligence. On page 69, he lumps together the idea that IQ tests
measure “some fixed, biologically determined feature of an indi-
vidual” with the ideas that the moon is made of cheese and that
the earth is flat. In fact, because intelligence involves speed of
mental processing, reaction time on a variety of tasks is correlated
with IQ (Jensen 1982). More telling, there are reliable differences
between more and less intelligent people in glucose uptake in the
brain during problem solving (Haier et al. 1988). EEG evoked po-
tentials are related to intelligence (Caryl 1994). Finally, there is 
no longer any question that intelligence is related to brain size
(Jensen & Sinha 1993). Like it or not, intelligence is related to bi-
ology. It is difficult to imagine how one could learn one’s brain size
or glucose uptake rate; it is quite easy to see how such things could
result from genetic factors.
On p. 190 we are told that intelligence is not easy to measure,
and it is implied that it is as difficult to measure as political ten-
dency, religiosity, job satisfaction, and so on. The latter traits are
easier to measure than intelligence, but all can be quite reliably
and validly measured. The possibility that Sir Cyril Burt’s data on
the heritability of intelligence may have been fraudulent is men-
tioned on p. 191. Rose neglects to mention that Burt’s heritability
estimate for IQ is about the same as that found in dozens of other
studies in which no fraud has ever been alleged.
Another disquieting omission concerns the fact that Thomas
Bouchard, who is involved in the largest study of twins reared
apart, would not allow Rose to see his primary data. This was prob-
ably due to U.S. laws regarding confidentiality. Were I to do an in-
nocuous study of preference for polygons, I could not show Rose
my primary data. I would first have to remove all information con-
cerning the identity of the participants. There are many studies of
twins reared apart in countries with laws different from those in
the United States. Looking at the primary data will not change the
facts they contain.
The standard formula for computing heritability only works if
genetic effects are additive. [See Wahlsten: “Insensitivity of the
Analysis of Variance to Heredity – Environment Interaction” BBS
13(1) 1990.] However, Rose does not tell us that concordance
rates (if one twin has a trait does the other also have it?) provide
about the same information as heritability per se. If concordance
is higher in monozygotic than in dizygotic twins, this is evidence
for a genetic contribution to the trait. This is especially true if the
twins were reared apart. Rose may not like it that there is a large
genetic component in traits as diverse as attitude toward the death
penalty and probability of divorce. To try to explain the findings
away by saying that they arose from the use of statistics originally
developed for plant and animal breeding will not do. Many statis-
tics used in psychology are derived from or identical to statistics
developed in agriculture. The numbers don’t know what they are
about; it would have been pointless to re-invent statistical wheels.
Attributing findings in behavior genetics to the statistics used
does not explain why some things are consistently found to be ge-
netic and others not. For example, anyone who does a study of
manic-depressive illness will find a concordance rate of about 80%
for monozygotic twins and 20% for dizygotic twins (Goodwin &
Jamison 1990). Probably anyone studying attitudes toward pajama
parties would find a concordance rate of about zero for both types
of twins. We can think of paths from proteins to psychological
traits. It is difficult to see why statistics would consistently associ-
ate some traits but not others.
Some misunderstandings and
misinterpretations about sociobiology 
and behavior genetics in Lifelines
by Steven Rose
Stephen C. Maxson
Department of Psychology, Graduate Degree Program in Biobehavioral
Sciences, The University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-4154.
maxtiger@aol.com
Abstract: Lifelines by Steven Rose is supposed to present a new perspec-
tive on biology replacing an emphasis on genes with one on organisms.
However, much of the book is a highly biased critique of sociobiology and
behavior genetics. Some of the flaws in Rose’s description and depiction
of these fields are presented and refuted. Also, it would appear that these
aspects of the book and many others are, in fact, related more to Rose’s
perennial concern for the ideology, social origins or social consequences
of behavioral biology. These concerns are, I believe based, in part, upon
Rose’s misunderstandings and misinterpretations of genetics, behavior ge-
netics, and sociobiology.
Lifelines by Steven Rose is supposed to present a new perspective
on biology which emphasizes organisms rather than genes. How-
ever, much of the book is a biased critique of sociobiology and be-
havior genetics.
Wilson defined sociobiology as “the systematic study of the bi-
ological basis of all social behavior” (1975, p. 4), and he included
in it both proximate and ultimate explanations for the causes of so-
cial behaviors. These are similar to the five types of explanations
described on pages 10–14 of Rose’s book. One of these focuses on
whether or not a social behavior is adaptive, and whether or not
the adaptation is due to natural selection acting in the past on her-
itable variants.
Those concerned with the origin of behavioral adaptations are
rarely interested in the exact details of their genetics (Barkow et
al. 1992; Krebs & Davies 1993). However, Rose suggests that ul-
tra-Darwinian sociobiologists do not recognize a possible role of
epistatic interactions among genes in effects of selection on the
evolution of social behaviors. This is false, at least for the follow-
ing sociobiologists. Wilson (1975, p. 70) writes, “Real selection,
however, is directed not at genes but at individuals, containing on
the order of tens of thousands of genes or more, and . . . relatively
small amounts of interactions between loci can generate suffi-
ciently tight linkage disequilibria to make the entire chromosome
respond to selection as a unit.” These are not the words of Rose’s
ultra-Darwinist. Similarly, Dawkins (1982, p. 111) writes, “The
statistical structure of the gene-pool sets up climate or environ-
ment which affects the success of any one gene relative to its 
alleles. . . . The point is the obvious one that selection at one locus
is not independent of selection at other loci.” Again, these are not
the statements of Rose’s ultra-Darwinist. Yet Wilson and Dawkins
are, for Rose, archetypes of ultra-Darwinian sociobiologists.
Rose also suggests that they believe that all behaviors are adap-
tations due to effects of natural selection acting on heritable vari-
ants, and that there is no other explanation for the evolution of be-
havior. However, Dawkins (1982, p. 29) writes “This is not to say
that all behaviour patterns necessarily have a Darwinian function.
It may be that there is a large class of behaviour patterns which
are selectively neutral or deleterious to their performers, and can
not usefully be regarded as products of natural selection.” He goes
on to his own “critique of naive adaptationism” and his own list of
constraints on the evolution of adaptations, including those for be-
havior. Similar material is discussed by Wilson (1975) with regard
to phylogenetic inertia as a constraint on adaptations. He also con-
siders the role of inbreeding and genetic drift in evolution, in-
cluding that of behavior. Regardless, even Rose accepts the possi-
bility that some behaviors are adaptations due to natural selection
acting on heritable variations. But he seems to believe that most
if not all involve selection at the group rather than the individual
level.
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Rose appears to be more concerned with claims for behavioral
adaptations in humans than in animals. He suggest that ultra-
Darwinian sociobiologists, such as E. O. Wilson and R. Dawkins,
believe that altruism and other social behaviors in humans are an
effect of kin selection acting in the past on heritable variants, and
that they reject cultural explanations for human social behaviors.
However, this is not their position. Wilson (1975) recognizes four
peaks in the evolution of social behavior. These occur in the colo-
nial invertebrates, the eusocial insects, nonhuman mammals, and
humans. He believes that kin selection was the most likely in-
volved in the evolution of social behavior of colonial invertebrates
and eusocial insects, and that it plays little or no role in the evolu-
tion of social behavior in nonhuman mammals or humans. In 1975
(p. 381), he writes, “The requisite refinement and personalization
in vertebrate relationships are achieved by . . . a greater role of
learning” and in 1978 (pp. 153 and 156), he writes, “Human social
evolution is obviously more cultural than genetic” and “Through
convention of reciprocation, combined with a flexible, endlessly
productive language and a genius for verbal classification, human
beings fashion long-remembered agreements upon which cul-
tures and civilizations can be built.” Similarly, Dawkins (1976) rec-
ognizes the role of learning and culture in human behavior and
adaptations; To better understand their role, he developed the
concept of the “meme.”
In contrast to most sociobiologists, most behavior geneticists are
concerned with the details of the genetics that are involved in in-
dividual differences in adaptive and nonadaptive behaviors in lab-
oratory and natural populations of many organisms, including bac-
teria, protozoans, round worms, mollusks, fruit flies, and other
arthropods, fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals. How-
ever, most of the emphasis has been as elsewhere in genetics on
round worms, fruit flies, mice, and humans. Since many variations
in many behavioral traits are due to variation in alleles of more than
one gene, the concepts and methods of quantitative genetics,
which had their beginnings not only in the works of Fisher (1930)
but also Wright (1968), have been widely used. This partitions the
phenotypic variance into genetic and environmental components.
The genetic variance is again partitioned into additive, dominance,
and interaction components. All three components can be and
have been assessed in quantitative genetic analyses of animal and
human behaviors (Plomin et al. 1997; Rose 1994).
As Rose recognizes, these components can be used to estimate
the broad (genetic variance/phenotypic variance) or narrow (ad-
ditive variance/total variance) heritability of behaviors in animals.
This has been done by Dobzhansky (1968), among others. It
would appear that the biochemical, genetic, cellular, and devel-
opmental complexities and interactions which occur in both ani-
mals and humans would not be, for Rose, problematical in esti-
mates of heritability for not only animal but also human behaviors.
However, as Rose indicates, genetic and environmental effects on
individual differences may be confounded in studies of humans
but not animals. Adoption studies of individuals and of twins
raised apart can address this problem (Plomin et al. 1997; Rose
1994).
Rose does not directly critique the latter method. Rather, he
makes misleading statements about the studies of Thomas
Bouchard on twins reared apart. He says that Bouchard and his
colleagues have published their finding in obscure, unrefereed
journals. However, Bouchard and his colleagues have published
their findings in Science (Bouchard et al. 1990), The Journal of
Personality (Bouchard & McGue 1990), and the American Jour-
nal of Psychiatry (Segal et al. 1990). He also claims that Bouchard
has refused him and others access to the primary data, but he ne-
glects to mention that both informed consent agreements and fed-
eral law prohibit release of primary data which would identify in-
dividuals in this study (Wright 1998).
Lifelines is a difficult book to read and to review. Among the rea-
sons for this are:
1. Rose frequently makes disparaging personal comments
about those that he disagrees with. For example, he writes (p. 5)
of R. Dawkins, “with all the brash style of a cheeky adolescent
cocking a snook at everything his elders hold dear.” Similarly, he
describes the young James Watson as ambitious and bumptious.
2. It is replete with factual errors. For example, on page 4, Rose
writes, “genetic generalizations are still derived from just three or-
ganisms, the rat. . . .” Actually mice and not rats are the primary
mammalian organism used in genetic research. He also overlooks
the contributions of C. elegans and all plants to genetics. Also, he
claims that an article of mine (Maxson 1996) argues for genes with
effects on mouse killing by rats as a model for human aggression.
In fact, my paper is not about interspecific aggression of rats but
rather about intraspecific aggression of mice as animal models.
3. As already indicated, his comments on and critiques of so-
ciobiology and behavioral genetics are seriously flawed. There are
similar errors with regard to population genetics. For example, he
writes (p. 216), “Fisher and Haldane’s approach was derided as
‘beanbag’ genetics precisely because it depended for its mathe-
matics on the assumption that each gene was an isolated unit.” 
In fact, Fisher, Haldane, and Wright were aware of the existence
of gene interactions, and the difference among the three was 
not with regard to the fact of gene interactions but rather with re-
gard to the most effective population size for adaptive evolution
(Provine 1971). Also, Lewontin (1998, p. 62) writes, “Thus, theory
had a bad name . . . as bean bag genetics, solely concerned with
individual genes. This reaction has hidden the essential contribu-
tion of Wright in 1931 and of Fisher in 1918. They were interested
in coping with gene interactions from the very beginning.”
4. Rose’s book seems to be as much, if not more, about biology
and politics. Although he writes (p. xi), “I largely refrain from dis-
cussing the ideology, social origins or social consequences of ultra-
Darwinism and reductionism,” he frequently takes up this topic as
on pages 73–74, 115–16, 192, 212, and 272–301. These detract
from the development of his theory of Lifelines, and it may ac-
count for the absence in his book of some relevant and significant
topics such as homeobox genes and development (Gehring 1998).
A holistic developmental theory requires
better research techniques
George F. Michel
Psychology Department, DePaul University, Chicago, IL 60614-3504.
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Abstract: Research pragmatics, not a defective conceptual framework,
supports modern biological reductionism. Conducting research to reveal
the casual web underlying the multiple developmental pathways leading
to any species-specific characteristic requires better research techniques
than those commonly used. It takes much patience, time, and effort to gain
even small glimpses of an answer to any developmental question.
Lifelines presents a coherent account of living systems that inte-
grates physics, chemistry, and biology in a way that is intended to
undercut any attempt to use only reductionistic explanations of
the human condition. As Rose notes, deterministic biological ex-
planations resurfaced during the late 1960s without any specific
advance in biological science or theory. However, they have been
advanced (to the dismay of thoughtful scientists) by recent bio-
medical and popular interpretations of modern molecular genet-
ics and neuroscience. Rose argues that the reductionist trend
stems from both a tradition of determinism in biological training
and thinking and the failure of “opponents of biological deter-
minism . . . to offer a coherent alternative framework within which
to interpret living processes” (p. ix). However, many such frame-
works have been proposed during the last 100 years and several
quite recently (cf. Elman et al. 1996; Gottlieb et al. 1998; Michel
& Moore 1995). Why then does reductionism persist?
The reductionist tradition certainly influences the way many bi-
ologically oriented investigators pose research questions, apply re-
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search techniques, interpret findings, and train students. It does
so because this is more efficient in generating research results and
providing ready interpretations than research that “celebrates
complexity” and focuses on the specific dynamics of the organism-
environment system over its life-span. While I appreciate Rose’s
efforts, biological determinism will continue to dominate because
unraveling the organismic-experiential causal web underlying the
multiple developmental pathways of species-typical characteris-
tics is not easily done, nor is there a generally accepted set of tech-
niques for doing so.
In contrast, researchers in neuroscience, molecular and behav-
ior genetics, sociobiology, and cognitive science, have shown that
it is relatively easy to conduct research on questions of proximate
causation, phylogenetic relationships, and adaptive function.
There are many ways to investigate the contributions of genes and
various neural processes and structures to behavior and many of
these involve exciting new technologies to attract popular interest.
Of course, only reductionism assumes the nervous system to be
organized by gene-controlled processes (Rose nicely illuminates
the difference between genetic involvement and genetic control).
Sociobiology has demonstrated the efficiency of collecting data
that address alternative game-theoretical or economic models of
generalized types of behavior, presumably controlled by genes.
Such results fit current thinking about adaptation and natural se-
lection so well that they tempt researchers away from pursuing de-
velopmental questions.
In contrast, typical developmental research techniques are lim-
ited and problematic. Many studies involve correlating individual
differences earlier and later in development. This does not reveal
whether the individuals have changed between measurement pe-
riods (a developmental event). Nor do these studies reveal the de-
velopmental processes that contribute to maintaining relative po-
sition across age periods. The absence of correlation may be
interpreted by reductionists as indicating that early developmen-
tal events have no impact on later events because they are biolog-
ically controlled. Alternatively, high correlation may be inter-
preted as strong biological control during that age period.
Other developmental techniques examine the relation between
a manipulation (or clinical event) occurring earlier in develop-
ment and the individual’s characteristics later in development.
Even if a relation exists, nothing is revealed about the causal web
connecting the two developmental periods. If a relation does not
exist, nothing is revealed about the processes that blocked the con-
nection.
A common technique of depriving an organism of certain ex-
periences to determine their influence on development presumes
that one already knows or suspects that such experiences con-
tribute to development. A few carefully crafted programmatic
studies have revealed that development can depend upon experi-
ences which do not at first appear to be relevant. Thus, the ab-
sence of deprivation effects only means that the missing experi-
ences were not relevant for that developmental outcome, or if they
were, that their loss could be compensated for by other means.
For example, in some bird species, song can develop without hear-
ing other singing birds or the bird’s own singing, but that does not
rule out other auditory experience. Even if for some species all au-
ditory experience were ruled out, other experiences (e.g., vestibu-
lar and/or respiratory experience, or specific social experiences)
could be involved (Clayton 1994). Thus, although deprivation
studies can fail to reveal how develop occurs, they can support re-
ductionist interpretations.
Since models of learning often fail to provide insight into the
development of many species-typical characteristics, some argue
that individual experience is unimportant for them. However,
learning models represent only a small part of the range of expe-
riential events that contribute to development, some of them
seemingly irrelevant. Most stimulation studies fail to identify the
experiential influences on development because they provide ei-
ther a broad-band level of stimulation that approximates those
that are characteristic of the natural environment more than the
usual laboratory situation, or they provide unusually high levels of
very complex stimulation. No one would deny that approximating
a normal environment can support normal development or that
normal development can be disrupted by stress or overstimula-
tion. Hence such studies do not challenge reductionism. Only a
few studies (e.g., bird-song, imprinting, sex differences in rat be-
havior) have manipulated levels and patterns of stimulation within
the bounds of their normal occurrence to identify their contribu-
tion to the development of species-typical behavior (cf. Gottlieb
et al. 1998; Ten Cate 1994; Moore 1992). In each case, such ex-
periences are profoundly involved in the normal development of
the species-typical behavior. [See also Baker: “The Biology of
Bird-Song Dialects” BBS 8(1) 1985; Johnston: “Development, Ex-
planation and the Ontogeny of Bird Song–Nature” BBS 11(4)
1988.]
Careful, time-consuming, programmatic investigations need to
be encouraged if we are to understand development and avoid
what some see as the pitfalls of reductionism.
Determinism, omniscience, and the
multiplicity of explanations
Mary Midgley
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Abstract: Complete determinism is, as Karl Popper said, “a daydream of
omniscience.” Determinism is usually conceived as linked with a particu-
lar science whose explanations are deemed fundamental. As Rose rightly
points out, biological enquiry includes many different kinds of question.
Genetic determinism, making genes central to biology, is therefore biased
and misguided. The crucial unit must be the whole organism.
The clash between determinism and free will is not, as is often
said, a hopeless, unavoidable philosophical deadlock. Mostly it is
simply the product of an arbitrary, vague, overambitious concept
of determinism. Karl Popper wrote the epitaph of that concept,
observing, “Physical determinism . . . was a day-dream of omni-
science which seemed to become more real with every advance of
physics until it became an apparently inescapable nightmare.”2
He meant, of course, that claiming omniscience turned out to be
incompatible with human freedom. We now know, too, that this
slapdash deterministic claim has faults that go far beyond this par-
ticular inconvenience. Within physics itself, the traditional idea of
determinism is now openly scheduled for rethinking.
However, the trouble is not confined to physics. The need to re-
think determinism in biology is even more urgent, though it has
not yet been so fully understood. Lifelines firmly grasps this alarm-
ing nettle. It both shows the urgency of the need and suggests con-
structively the general lines on which we might meet it.
Rose attends sharply to metaphors, which are of course the
main channel through which such large-scale concepts shape our
thinking. Biologists (he says) should insist that organisms make
themselves rather than being helpless objects driven by the chem-
icals that compose them – rather than being, for instance, “the 
vehicles of their genes.” Of course, both these formulations are
metaphors drawn from the same human concept of agency. But
the first formulation needs to be sharply stressed today in order to
balance the second, which has lately got entirely out of hand.
The active-passive story has been used to give a bizarre dra-
matic twist to the notion of causality, suggesting a transaction
where a genuinely active entity drives an inert, passive one rather
than a neutral process within which they both play their part. Thus
(as Rose points out), recent talk about genes often seems to ab-
stract from their own causal context altogether, treating them as if
they were somehow autonomous uncaused causes, prime movers
in the evolutionary game.
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Current notions of determinism easily encourage this kind of
one-sidedness, because the determinist framework is usually
linked with a particular study, thus giving that study’s favoured en-
tities a strange kind of privileged causal force. We see many kinds
of hyphenated determinism, of which Skinner’s social-determin-
ism was a striking example. Others have been economic-, physi-
cal- or neurogenetic. Each variant claims that its chosen study pro-
vides the most fundamental form of understanding available, that
the causes it deals with are the only ultimately effective causes.
These hyphenated determinisms are, then, necessarily biased.
They are reductive in the general sense of downgrading other
studies to secondary, provisional status. They embody the ambi-
tious Enlightenment project of providing a single unified expla-
nation of all phenomena – Popper’s “day-dream of omniscience”
– in the simplest possible way, by trying to conquer their neigh-
bours in the name of unification. They try to streamline all our
multifarious thought-forms into unity by drilling them into vari-
ous formal hierarchies.
As Rose points out, however, the plurality of thought-forms is
not a luxury. It mirrors real complexity in the world. Explanations
take different forms because we need to answer many different
kinds of question, and “the reason for asking the question will de-
termine the most useful type of answer” (p. 14). Even within bi-
ology itself, many quite different kinds of question arise, simply
because life is such a complex phenomenon. Ecology, ethology,
and developmental biology ask their own distinctive kinds of ques-
tion, often large ones. It is not sensible to treat these questions as
somehow less scientific than those of genetics or neurology and to
try to reduce them to those sciences.
If, however, we accept this plurality of questions, with the vari-
ety of methods for answering that it demands, we see that biology
as a whole – indeed science as a whole – could never be, and is
not meant to be, the kind of single vast, elegant, infallible, monis-
tic calculation that unifying rationalists have visualised. It must al-
ways be a fallible co-operative enterprise, an ongoing, fluid, prag-
matic compromise between many points of view. Those many
points of view, if taken seriously, give us a far better understand-
ing of the complex world around us than we could hope to get from
any formally unified study.
All this is no disaster. It simply repeats what every working sci-
entist knows about the difficulties of unifying knowledge: that
there is a constant dialectic between the unifications of theory and
the complexity of the facts, a dialectic which must never be al-
lowed to degenerate into outright conquest. In fact, it only means
that science is, after all, a human institution. That is why the dream
of a tidy omniscience was unrealistic and never needed. That is
why, as Rose puts it, “far from being determined, or needing to in-
voke some non-material concept of free will to help us escape the
determinist trap, it is in the nature of living systems to be radically
indeterminate, to continually construct their – our – own futures,
albeit in circumstances not of our own choosing” (p. 7).
We live, then, in a world too complex to be investigated by any
single method, one in which no single form of order determines
what will happen. Though living things are in many ways orderly
and intelligible to us, each of them is a unique individual with its
own tendencies and is also subject to the constant play of chance.
Complete predictability is not, even in principle, possible or nec-
essary. “It is just this combination of predictability and unpre-
dictability that distinguishes living systems and processes from the
much simpler events that form the terrain of the sciences of
physics and chemistry” (p. 154). That is why we must use “a per-
spective on biology which transcends genetic reductionism, by
placing the organism, rather than the gene, at the centre of life”
(p. x).
Rose is surely right. This conceptual shift is indeed overdue.
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Biological determinism versus 
the concept of a person
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Abstract: Rose presents an important critique of the determinism and re-
ductionism of modern biology. However, such trends are probably tem-
porary aberrations in the development of science. Another form of deter-
minism which has deeper roots is emerging from modern studies of brain
dynamics. To reconcile this evidence with the concept of a “person” will
require more radical rethinking of our received notion of natural law.
Steven Rose’s Lifelines is a critique of modern biological sciences,
aimed particularly at the reductionism and determinism which
prevails today in many areas of research and popular science writ-
ing. Rose’s underlying philosophy is Marxist and therefore mate-
rialist. Although I do not share either of these perspectives (Miller
1995), I have much sympathy for his critique of modern biology.
Amongst the areas of research emphasised in Rose’s book is psy-
chiatric genetics. I recently studied the evidence on the genetics
of schizophrenia and was shocked by the naivete of molecular ge-
netic studies of schizophrenia. Traditional psychiatric genetics has
produced abundant evidence that mental disorders such as schiz-
ophrenia are in part determined genetically. This evidence points
strongly to the view that many (perhaps very many) genetic fac-
tors are involved. Probably the genetic aspects of the disorder are
relatively rare combinations of many individual genes, all of which
are common, and in themselves probably quite benign. In molec-
ular psychiatric genetics, however, the goal is usually to find “the
gene” or “genes of major influence.” This search, on which vast re-
sources have been lavished, seems to assume that schizophrenia is
a clearly defined category, so that it can be defined genetically in
terms of one or a very few genetic factors. This betrays gross ig-
norance – both of the large body of evidence about schizophrenia
favouring a dimensional rather than a categorical definition for the
disorder, and of the traditional psychiatric genetics. Its implicit as-
sumption “one gene – one psychological characteristic” or “one
gene – one diagnosis” seems very similar to the underlying as-
sumption of phrenology, and is not much more sophisticated con-
ceptually. This work certainly fits well into Rose’s critique of re-
ductionism and determinism.
Rose also suggests that the trends in modern biology have an
ideological basis. My views on this are complex, but in partial
agreement. On the one hand, there are many contradictions in
modern times which suggest that modern biology does not have
any coherent ideological driving force. For instance, biology now
tends to emphasise determinism, in curious contrast with other as-
pects of the contemporary world view that emphasise individual-
ity, free enterprise, and personal responsibility. On the other hand,
prevailing ideas about Darwinism or ultra-Darwinism do have
their main impact not in terms of any obvious technological ad-
vance, but in promoting a view of human beings as genetic ma-
chines in competition. This view could be regarded as ideological.
I take all this to represent the fundamentalisms of our times; in
thirty years time (one hopes) we will look back on the 1990s with
amazement that scientists could have fallen for such crass atti-
tudes. Thus the reductionism and determinism Rose criticizes
may be a temporary aberration, not part of the main stream of sci-
entific thought going back to the Renaissance.
In passing, Rose also regrets the fact that the physical sciences
are taken as models for biology. In this he may be mistaken. The
achievements of Galileo and Newton cannot be simply regarded
as intellectual developments determined by the socio-cultural de-
mands of their time. They provided us with the historic hypothe-
sis that natural laws are a more fundamental description of the
world than those based on final causes; they also provide a frame-
work for quantitative description of the world based on mass,
Commentary/Rose: Lifelines
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1999) 22:5 901
length, and time (with some elaborations added later). This de-
scriptive language is quite fundamental to the scientific enter-
prise.
The notion of natural law was at first a tentative hypothesis.
However, in the centuries after Newton, it has become a dogma,
to which it seems (especially in biology) there can nowadays be no
exception. This leads to two major points, one relating to reduc-
tionism, the other to determinism.
The term “reductionism” refers to two rather different types of
explanatory arguments. The type criticised by Rose arises in part
from a certain type of experimental design. The explanatory argu-
ments which follow, such as they are, are often unsatisfactory be-
cause the higher-level phenomena to be explained are simplified
to the point of caricature, rather than being considered in more
realistic detail. Rose’s book stresses the dynamic complexity of liv-
ing things, which is not seen until one manages to avoid the over-
simplification produced by reductionist experimental designs.
Nevertheless, within this complexity, a second, much better
type of explanatory argument can be constructed, crossing be-
tween levels of description, such as some of those found in physics.
Examples from physics include the hypothesis of atoms, based on
the weight- or volume-ratios of combining substances, or the ex-
planation of the gas laws in terms of the dynamics of colliding gas
molecules. Similar kinds of explanation in biophysics are those of
Hodgkin/Huxley relating the action potential to ionic fluxes. Ex-
planations of this types are now also becoming possible for higher
brain functions, thereby crossing between the neurobiological and
the psychological levels, even for the human brain. Admittedly, in
brain biology, such explanations often need to be framed in a
somewhat different manner. They rely more on informal argu-
ments and comprehensive scholarship than on elegant mathe-
matical demonstrations. In addition, it is necessary to “build up”
from what is actually known at the lower level, as well as to “build
down” from what is known at the higher level, in order to frame
explanations which cross between levels. Nevertheless, the prin-
ciple of cross-level explanation is the same as in physics. When it
is successful in brain biology, it is at the same time reductionist and
holistic and does more justice to the complexity of the high-level
phenomena to be explained than accounts which simply look for
lower level explanations of what one observes, or the simplistic
“reductionism” criticized by Rose.
Arising from this second type of explanation, is a variety of
neural determinism based on much more robust science; the
growing field of forebrain neurodynamics. This offers a much
more solidly based determinism, deriving directly from the bio-
physics of single nerve cells, and their coming together as cell as-
semblies. This work is likely to be more enduring, and more diffi-
cult to shrug off as a temporary aberration. If we take the concept
of natural law as a dogma, a principle to which there can be no ex-
ceptions, this work on neural dynamics is implicitly undermining
the concept of a person in a far more fundamental way than does
the science Rose decries. The concept of a person, though not a
scientific one, is very important, arguably more so than the scien-
tific enterprise itself. Hence we should try to find a way to escape
from the apparent determinism of modern brain dynamics. To do
this, we need to re-examine our notion of causality, and to reclaim
the idea of natural law as a tentative hypothesis, rather than as a
rigid law to which there can be no exceptions.
The implications of this would be profound. In the early days of
Renaissance science, when the idea of natural law was a tentative
hypothesis, there were no attempts to provide scientific explana-
tions of history. This only came later (in the years leading up to the
French revolution). As natural law became a dogma, theories be-
came more confident and attempted to explain history as well as
the here-and-now, or what was seen in the laboratory. If we are to
reclaim the idea of natural law as a tentative hypothesis rather than
the Orthodox Dogma of our present Brave New World, to which
we must all subscribe, we will need to re-examine the status of ar-
guments purporting to provide scientific explanations of history.
This includes both Darwinism and Marxism.
Facing complexity: Against scientific
oversimplification
Guenther Palm
Department of Neural Information Processing, University of Ulm, D-89069
Ulm, Germany. palm@neuro.informatik.uni-ulm.de
Abstract: Steven Rose’s book is essentially a plea for considering the va-
riety and complexity of life and against simplistic reductions of human and
animal behavioral phenomena to single genetic causes.
Lifelines by Steven Rose is interesting and entertaining to read. It
covers many areas of biology ranging from molecular biology to
genetics and development. But first and foremost, the author has
a definite case and argues for it. The main targets of the book are
(1) simple genetic determinism, according to which our prospects
in life are determined by our genes, and (2) a simplistic under-
standing of reductionism according to which all of biology and
even human sociology can ultimately be reduced to the physics of
the molecules and atoms we are composed of. I strongly sympa-
thize with most of the arguments in the book, but I am less happy
with some of the philosophical overtones and some exaggerations
which show that the author is sometimes a little too eager to have
an argument with other scientists. For example, I must admit that
I enjoyed reading Dawkins’s “The selfish gene” about as much as
this book; I did not see Dawkins as guilty of the scientific over-
simplifications about “gay genes” and the like that are the main
target of Rose’s book and that are apparently gaining ground in
some scientific communities and even in the prestigious unspe-
cialized journals Science and Nature.
I was also unaware of the magnitude of the danger to our hu-
man self-esteem and the potential sociopolitical consequences of
these ideas. Being trained in mathematics and cybernetics, I used
to consider it obvious that assuming that biological phenomena
can eventually be reduced to chemical or even to physical phe-
nomena does not mean reducing biology to chemistry and chem-
istry to physics, simply because of the enormous increase in com-
plexity that one faces in trying to explain higher level phenomena
in lower level terms. It is mainly in order to deal with the enor-
mous complexity of living beings that we still need all the scien-
tific disciplines from physics to biology. Hence, I would still de-
fend reductionism (and also determinism) in properly construed
form. I also think simplicity is perhaps the most important crite-
rion for good science. Trying to see how far we can get by assum-
ing the simplest laws to hold everywhere and always and allowing
for exceptions and complications only when forced by the facts has
brought us far and has proved to be a sound methodological prin-
ciple. But its success may primarily be due to the simplicity of our
minds rather than the world we are trying to understand. Thus a
statement like “nature is simple” may be right as a methodologi-
cal principle, but it may be false as a factual statement about “na-
ture.”
I used to believe that all of this was more or less equally clear
to many if not most scientists, but after reading the examples given
by Rose (in particular in the second half of the book) I have
changed my opinion on this point. Moreover, I have myself expe-
rienced how hard it is to convey these basic ideas to a journalist
who firmly beliefs in the ultimate truth of science and wants a
spectacular story. Having read this book one realizes the danger
of this process and the potential damage it can do to our self-
image and thereby to our social relations. The public misconcep-
tion of the underlying philosophy of science regarding the tenta-
tiveness of scientific hypotheses tends to lead to an overestimation
of scientific results and an almost religious belief in science. This
is particularly dreadful in scientific statements concerning human
nature and social affairs. It is rather a methodological scientific as-
sumption than a scientific result, for example, that we have no
freedom of will. More concrete examples of such overinterpreta-
tions concern the localization of schizophrenia or homosexuality
in one brain region or in one gene. The most imminent danger of
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false beliefs in such simple “scientific” explanations that reduce
social, environmental, and biological complexities to the safe play-
ground of single causes and physical laws is that they prevent us
from facing complexity. And it is high time to face it, that is, to de-
velop methods and intuitions to deal with complex situations.
Extrapolated lifelines
T. E. Rowell
Department of Integrative Biology, University of California at Berkeley,
Berkeley, CA 94720. thelma@ingleton.demon.co.uk
Abstract: Extending lifelines still further, beyond determinism leads to
doubt about females’ ability to select mates with “good genes,” and to a
scenario for troop selection and to a link with questions of scale in ecology.
My first, and main, response to Lifelines is to raise a cheer; any
counterattack against the overwhelmingly fashionable “a gene for
everything” paradigm is to be welcomed. That it should come
from Rose, an undeniably successful reductionist in his research
methods, should give it more power and durability. We can but
hope that the accessible style of the book will allow its message to
be taken into the political arenas where decisions are now being
made on the basis of the attractively simple-seeming molecular
genetical explanations of life.
I should like to follow up and extend a couple of lines of thought
started by reading Lifelines. The first led me to reconsider mate
choice, recently an extremely fashionable topic in behaviour jour-
nals, and brought up by Rose in Chapter 7. [See also Buss: “Sex-
Differences in Human Mate Preferences” BBS 12(1) 1989; Ken-
rick & Keefe: “Age Preferences in Mates Reflect Sex Differences
in Human Reproductive Strategies” BBS 15(1) 1992; Rushton:
“Genetic Similarity, Human Altruism, and Group Selection” BBS
12(3) 1989, Ed.] On what basis might a female mammal select a
mate, given that, in most cases, he offers no parental help, but
merely genes? Recent studies have assumed that females “select
for good genes,” but what does that mean? The males offering
themselves for selection have survived to maturity, which means,
in elephant seals and many monkeys, for example, that they are
10–12 years old. Clearly none of their genotypes is dysfunctional,
simply because they have survived so long. But, is that splendid
specimen evidence of a lucky couple of good seasons while he was
a juvenile, or of some genetic advantage? And conversely, is that
rather bedraggled male one who, because of his superior geno-
type, has been able to survive challenges which would have killed
a lesser being? The phenotypes among which the female should
choose are the result of such a lengthy interaction with the envi-
ronment that reading the genetic contribution is surely impos-
sible.
In any case, on offer is a more or less random selection of half
the male’s genes, which may or may not find a congenial environ-
ment in the genetic and cytoplasmic contribution of this particu-
lar female. Logically, it seems very doubtful that a valid selection
“for good genes” can be made. A female, to be on the safe side,
should avoid a sick-seeming male, because it might be infectious.
She should on the whole prefer older males, because they have
survived longer. And it would be as well to mate with several
males, in case the first is infertile and so causes her to waste a
whole breeding season. Apart from those considerations, and
hurtful though it may be to the male ego, whom she mates with is
a matter of practical indifference to her.
There is some evidence that females may in fact follow these
simple rules-of-thumb. Most male secondary sexual characters
become more pronounced with age: the antlers of deer get larger
each mating season, the tail of a peacock becomes longer and the
eyes more numerous (Petrie et al. 1991). Females thus have evi-
dence of relative age, and are frequently observed to choose older
males (while on a longer evolutionary time scale, of course there
is pressure on the males for earlier development of these traits and
hence for their increase in ultimate size). Careful observation of
oestrous females under natural conditions, even those that seem
at first sight to be controlled or sequestered by males, frequently
reveals promiscuous mating (e.g., Cords et al. 1986).
The second line of thought concerns emergent properties of in-
teracting systems, introduced by Rose in Chapter 4. While Rose
only took this to the level of the emergent properties of the 4-
dimensional individual organism, it can be carried further. Best
known, perhaps, is Hinde’s (1974) description of how the ex-
change of a series of communicative gestures between two indi-
viduals makes a social interaction; from a series of interactions
over time emerges a relationship between the pair; and from the
network of pairwise relationships between a group of animals
emerges an organised social group. [See Bernstein: “Dominance”
BBS 4(3) 1991, Ed.] Such a group, or herd, or troop interacts as a
unit with its environment. Appropriate questions can be asked of
the system at each of these levels, and they cannot be answered at
lower or higher levels – they simply make no sense except at their
appropriate level.
The level of cooperation and coordination among members of
a troop will, to a large extent, determine its success at exploiting
its environment and defending itself against predators. A preda-
tor perceives the troop as an entity which, depending on the de-
gree of coordination within it, is either worth stalking, or better
abandoned in favour of less well defended neighbours. Although
it will be an individual that the predator eats, selection thus acts
on the behavior of the troop, to which each individual contributes.
The selection on the individual is for cooperative behaviour within
its troop. Note that this troop selection, which acts on animals liv-
ing together who need not be related, nor are a closed inter-
breeding unit, is not the same as group selection, which is a con-
struct of population genetics concerned with closed, or almost
closed demes. [See Wilson & Sober: “Reintroducing Group Se-
lection to the Human Behavioral Sciences” BBS 17(4) 1994, Ed.]
This line of thought also leads on beyond intra-specific interac-
tions to ecological questions: Allen and Starr (1982) consider hi-
erarchy of scale in space and time, showing that questions are only
relevant, and can only be asked, at the appropriate level; reduc-
tionism can in this case lead quite literally to failing to see the
wood for the trees. Their book makes an excellent companion to
the one under review.
Psychology and sociology: Beyond 
neither determinism nor science
Carmi Schooler
Section on Socio-environmental Studies, National Institute of Mental Health,
Bethesda MD 20892-9005. carmi.schooler@nih.gov
Abstract: While agreeing with Rose’s reasoning about why the causes of
organisms’ behaviors cannot be reduced to the solely biological and mo-
lecular, this review questions Rose’s uses of the terms “determinism” and
“contingency”; his occasional seemingly cavalier acceptance as fact of un-
proven hypotheses about social and psychological phenomena; and his
general disdain for the psychometric tradition and its causal modeling ex-
tensions.
To someone whose research crosses the macro-level, molar fields
of sociology and psychology, it is gratifying to see a distinguished
researcher on molecular mechanisms of cognition write a book
that presents strong arguments against solely reductionist views of
behavior. Rose’s arguments stressing the importance of different
levels of phenomena in causing behavior should give pause to the
apparent stampede to explain all human function in extreme re-
ductionist terms. I find Rose’s critique of ultra-Darwinists con-
vincing, although my relevant expertise is limited. Where I am
more entitled to an opinion, I generally agree with his criticism of
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sociobiology and find Rose’s much needed description of the lim-
itations of heritability estimates generally on target. His admoni-
tion constantly to bear in mind the full implications of gene/envi-
ronment interaction are well taken.
One is left with two kinds of qualms:
(1) There can be some concern that all of Rose’s views should
not be summarily dismissed because some of them are taken as
soft-headed or overstated;
(2) Rose’s occasional display of scientific arrogance toward psy-
chology and sociology in what may be a byproduct of doing re-
ductionist science (even if for methodological rather than ideo-
logical reasons).
The first set of qualms center on Rose’s use of the term “deter-
minism.” Given Rose’s theoretical reasoning and empirical exam-
ples, there seems to be no problem if what is meant by the book’s
subtitle “Biology beyond determinism” is that an organism’s de-
velopment is not solely determined by its genes and its behavior
by its biological characteristics. On the other hand, if one truly be-
lieves, as Rose appears to, that other levels of phenomena also af-
fect an organism’s behavior, arguing that not all is biology does not
make that organism’s behavior any less fully determined. Nor do
the effects of contingency make it any less determined. For Rose,
“contingency” has several meanings. One is that causal patterning
may be extremely complex and diffuse. Another concerns our dif-
ficulty in measuring a particular event or process whose effects are
relevant. A third is the spatio-temporal conjunction of previously
separated processes that then jointly affect the organism. None of
these forms of contingency makes the way the organism changes
or responds any less determined.
Differences in connotation between the terms “change” and
“respond” suggest another questionable way Rose sees organisms
as somehow being beyond determinism. “Change” implies that
the object or organism being acted upon is relatively passive, that
is, the movement of a billiard ball after being hit is calculable as a
direct function of the forces acting upon it. The way of striking the
cue ball, however, is a function of the player’s response to the de-
mands of the situation, a response that involves not only physical
abilities and state, but also motivation, knowledge of the game,
and ability to plan for the future. Still, these characteristics are a
direct function of the player’s past history as embodied at the in-
stant of striking the ball. Since it is not completely determined 
by the immediate external environment, this active, and indeed
proactive, response might be seen as beyond determinism. Nev-
ertheless, it is completely determined by the player’s history.
This description of the determinacy of the billiard player’s re-
sponse probably accords with Rose’s own views. He sees “biology
as history” (p. 18). When he describes humans as free agents it is
in the “Marxist sense of the freedom of necessity” (p. 18). Unfor-
tunately, to a non-Marxist “freedom of necessity” may seem an
oxymoron, likely to provide only cold comfort to someone who
bought Rose’s book believing that the subtitle promised a release
from determinism to free will.
Grounds for my qualms over reductionist arrogance come from
the way Rose lists, without citing a single relevant empirical study,
a whole host of psychological and sociological explanations of at-
tention deficit hyperactivity disorder (e.g., relations with parents,
size of class in arguing that the theory that the disorder’s cause is
“‘inside’ the child’s brain . . . is almost certainly wholly fallacious”
(p. 56). Carrying out the relevant studies may be more difficult
than counting the pecks of a chick in a meticulously controlled en-
vironment, but doing so is necessary if our knowledge of human
behavior is to go beyond ex cathedra assertions of what appears
obvious to the asserter. In a similar vein, one is bemused by Rose’s
belief (discussion pp. 191–92 and n. 17, p. 206) that he would
learn much by inspecting the primary data of Bouchard’s (Bou-
chard et al. 1990) twin research. Only someone trained in the psy-
chometric and related statistical techniques that Rose apparently
disdains can appropriately appraise the research in question.
More generally, one is bothered by Rose’s consistent linkage 
of racism, genetic studies, and the psychometric methodology.
Granted, he has much history on his side. Nevertheless, doing
twin studies is no proof of racism. Neither is respect for the ac-
complishments of the psychometric tradition and its extensions
into causal modelling of non-experimental data. The one of Rose’s
objections to heritability studies that is off-the-mark is his con-
tention that the relevant psychological and environmental vari-
ables are not measurable. Mine is admittedly the perspective of
someone who, with the aim of assessing the psychological effects
of environmental conditions, has spent much of his career devel-
oping rigorous psychometric measure of such psychological char-
acteristics as job satisfaction, self-esteem, and intellectual func-
tioning. These measure are valid indicators of the individual’s
psychological functioning in a particular time and situation. By
themselves they say nothing about what the individual would be
like in other times and situations. They do, however, provide a
means of modeling development, stability, and change in the in-
dividual’s psychological functioning.
I have been equally involved in developing statistically rigorous
measures of environmental conditions, such as the substantive
complexity of work. On mathematical grounds, it is even more im-
portant to get accurate measures of independent environmental
variables than dependent psychological ones, especially if we want
to compare the magnitudes of the psychological effects environ-
mental variables with the magnitudes of biological ones (presum-
ably measured accurately). If we are to take seriously Rose’s con-
cern for how individuals are affected by different aspects of their
environments, the measurement of environmental variables and
their effects should not be left to armchair speculation.
Why twin studies really don’t tell us much
about human heritability
Sidney J. Segalowitz
Department of Psychology, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario L2S 3A1
Canada. ssegalow@brocku.ca
Abstract: The derivation of heritability from human twin studies involves
serious methodological flaws. Heritability is consistently overestimated
because of biological confounds of twinning, consistent and often gross
underestimation of the environmental variance, and nonadditive genetic
influences that can hugely exaggerate heritability values. Despite this bad
research design, behaviour geneticists continue to publish results imply-
ing that their heritability results are valid.
Genetic factors clearly influence human development. What is
contested is the nature of this influence (the focus of Lifelines) and
its extent. In theory, one can obtain a measure of the degree to
which variations in a trait across individuals are attributable to 
genetic variations in the population. Twin studies provide the
strongest support for genetic sources of this variation in traits. The
commonly used metric is heritability, which is derived from the in-
crease in correlation in the trait of interest in monozygotic twins
(MZ) compared with dizygotic twins (DZ). Rose dismisses this
methodology because the assumptions of the heritability model
are not met in human studies (pp. 188–93). There are several
good reasons for this dismissal, although he singles out primarily
statistical assumptions. Unfortunately, behavioural scientists are
in the habit of ignoring problems of statistical assumptions, and as-
sume that replication and large sample sizes will validate prob-
lematic results in the end. The research design problems of twin
studies are much more severe than this, however, being ones of
systematic bias, inflating heritability values. These overestimates
of heritability are due to at least three research design faults:
1. Biological confounds. In an MZ–DZ twin study, the only
difference between the twin types is supposedly the extent of
genotypic similarity. However, two-thirds of MZ twins also share
the same placenta and chorion whereas no DZ twins do (Phelps
et al. 1997). MZ twins who share a chorion are significantly more
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similar on a variety of personality and cognitive measures than
those that do not (Sokol et al. 1995). This should not be surpris-
ing, for by sharing a chorion, MZ twins also share blood supply, a
variety of early hormonal influences, and even infections and im-
mune status (which may account for higher concordance rates of
schizophrenia in MZ compared to DZ twins; Phelps et al. 1997).
Thus, MZ twins share other long-lasting developmental factors
besides DNA similarity. This reinforces the notion of early bio-
logical factors influencing psychological development, but the ge-
netic attribution is exaggerated.
2. Consistent underestimation of environmental variance. In
twin studies, environmental variation between the members of the
twin pairs is always an underestimate of society’s range. If every
individual were to receive exactly the same environment, then all
variation in a trait would have to be attributed to genotypic dif-
ferences (and genotype 3 environment interactions). To the ex-
tent that environmental separation of adoptive twins is less than
that between twin pairs, the heritability is higher. But adoption
agencies never give children to families in abject poverty (because
their mandate is the best interests of the child), much less sepa-
rate twins across such an advantaged/impoverished spectrum.
They have even matched adoptive home religion for twin pairs.
Thus, the cultural distance between twin members must be con-
siderably less than that available in the society as a whole. Add to
this the fact that the large twin studies (those in Minnesota and in
Sweden) follow up adopted twins in relatively homogeneous soci-
eties (where well-developed health agencies and medical records
are available). The thought experiment of separating twins at birth
to widely different settings – for example, one to urban New York,
the other to rural Sahara; one to an affluent home in London, the
other to a poor family in the third world – illustrates how heri-
tability is artificially raised by restrictions of environmental vari-
ance. Indeed, Bronfenbrenner (1975) showed that the correlation
in IQ between twins, which is normally .85, drops to .26 with twins
whose adoptive families live in different communities (e.g., min-
ing versus agricultural). Thus, potential environmental variance is
vastly underestimated and therefore heritability is necessarily
overestimated.
3. Nonadditive genetic influences. Heritability is mathemati-
cally based on the notion of additive genetic components – the
more similar genes two individuals have the more similar their
trait outcome will be. What happens, however, if genetically influ-
enced traits are nonadditive, such as when a complete pattern of
genes influences the trait rather than the genes individually? We
are used to nonadditivity in traits, such as the attractiveness of a
face. Having a nice nose and chin with the wrong mouth and eyes
does not bring the face halfway to beauty. In twin studies, when
MZ twins are so much more similar to each other than are DZ
twins that heritability comes out to over 100%, which is non-
sensical, we conclude that the genetic contribution is nonadditive
(Lykken et al. 1992). [See also Wahlsten: “Insensitivity of the
Analysis of Variance to Heredity–Environment Interaction” BBS
13(1) 1990.] In the extreme case, DZ can have a zero correlation
and MZ a 100% correlation, making heritability 200%. In such a
case, the heritability model must be rejected. Unfortunately, every
trait measured by a behaviour geneticist can be conceived as be-
ing a high-level product of many subtraits, some of which may
have nonadditive genetic aspects, others not. Nonadditive factors
will add enormously exaggerated heritability components (up to
the maximum of 200%). Since we have no independent measures
of the heritability for the subcomponents, there is no way to quan-
tify the overestimation of heritability.
For these three reasons (and others), heritability derived from
twin studies is always inflated, and replicating the twin studies will
only replicate the error. It is not surprising that composite traits
such as IQ have a high heritability–gene similarity in twin studies
is confounded with prenatal health and environment, reduced en-
vironmental variation in twin-adoptive families, and some of the
subtraits related to IQ probably have nonadditive components.
Thus, we cannot find a value for the genetic heritability of traits
from twin studies, although we clearly accept that genes influence
(in some complex way) nervous system growth. The most that twin
studies can tell us is the upper limit of true heritability, not an ab-
solute value that is to be believed.
Hierarchical approach to replication 
and selection
Alexei A. Sharov
Department of Entomology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0319.
sharov@vt.edu www.gypsymoth.ento.vt.edu/~sharov/alexei.html
Abstract: The major merit of Rose’s book is the elaboration of the idea of
multilevel causation in different explanatory languages. Yet Rose’s critique
of “ultra-Darwinism” is not convincing. Rose argues that activity and self-
replication are properties of organisms rather than genes, which contra-
dicts his idea of multilevel causation. Also, Rose fails to develop the con-
cept of multilevel selection.
Contemporary biology is essentially reductionistic in its attempt
to collapse the entire hierarchy of living systems to the molecular
level. Rose defends the idea of hierarchy. In particular, he 
criticizes the view of Dawkins (1976; 1978), labeled “ultra-
Darwinism,” that evolution occurs at the level of genes rather than
organisms.
Rose considers systems at each level as semi-independent
agents. The interaction between hierarchical levels occurs
through the process of development. Hence the title of the book,
Lifelines, which means developmental trajectories of organisms.
The novelty of Rose’s approach is that each level of the hierarchy
is viewed as a distinct language for describing things at a specific
scale. One language can be partially translated into another, but
there is always an untranslatable residual. This thesis is formulated
as “one world, many ways of knowing” (p. 304). Notions used in
one area of biology change their meaning or become useless when
applied to another area. For example, the notion of gene changes
its meaning as we change scale from organism to chromosomes
and then to DNA molecules.
Living systems do not exist in isolation from their environment.
But isolation is necessary to perform experiments. This contradic-
tion is resolved by using a hierarchy of isolations. We can isolate an
RNA molecule and determine the sequence of its nucleotides. But
in isolation from the cell we will never observe the function of this
molecule. Thus, boundaries of living systems are fuzzy.
According to Rose, ultra-Darwinism is based on the idea that
“the purpose (telos) of life is reproduction, reproduction of the
genes embedded in the ‘lumbering robots’ which constitute living
organisms” (p. 209). But Dawkins (1986) denies any purpose of
life as well as any other purposes in Nature; this is the major idea
of his “blind watchmaker” metaphor. The next statement of ultra-
Darwinism, according to Rose, is that “Every observable aspect of
the phenotype of an organism . . . is in some way adaptive”
(p. 210). As evidence of the role of chance in evolution he men-
tions neutral evolution, strange fossils found at the Burgess Shale,
and the role of developmental constraints (photoreceptors in the
eye have a backward orientation). Unfortunately, Figure 8.2 shows
Hallucinogenia (an animal from the Burgess Shale) upside down.
The second row of its legs was initially missing, and thus, first re-
constructions were misleading (Ramskold 1992). After flipping
the image, it becomes similar to Onychophora. But Dawkins never
denied the role of chance in evolution. He wrote about neutral
evolution and photoreceptors in the eye (Dawkins 1986). The only
difference is that he considers neutral evolution a “boring part”
(p. 303) of evolutionary theory.
The line of demarcation between the views of Dawkins and
Rose lies in their answer to the question: Which are active, genes
or organisms? Dawkins (1986) thinks that the real agents are genes
who collectively build an organism, which is a mechanism for gene
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duplication. In contrast, Rose thinks that organisms are active,
whereas genes are passive tools used by organisms to transfer in-
formation. He writes that DNA is not a self-replicating molecule
as claimed by Dawkins because it cannot build its copy in isolation
from the cell. Not even viruses are considered self-replicating or
active because they require a host cell to replicate.
This discussion appears pointless if we think in terms of multi-
level causation. If hierarchical levels are partially independent,
then activity can be found at various levels, including genes and
organisms. Self-replication is impossible in any isolated system,
not only in the isolated gene. Somebody might argue then that any
material thing can be considered a self-replicator simply because
it can be copied by humans. This logic is based on extreme cases
(complete isolation or no isolation) and ignores the hierarchy of
isolations.
One of Rose’s key statements is that “the individual gene is not
the only level at which selection occurs” (p. 215). It is not clear
how this is compatible with his claim that genes do not self-
replicate. Although I entirely accept the idea of multi-level selec-
tion, the arguments presented by Rose are not convincing. He
considers the fact that “any individual gene can be expressed only
against the background of the whole of the rest of the genome”
(p. 216) as evidence of selection at the level of organisms. But
Dawkins (1986) did not deny interaction between genes. He
wrote: “the whole process of embryonic development can be
looked upon as a cooperative venture, jointly run by thousands of
genes together” (p. 170). He then adds: “But from each gene’s
point of view, perhaps the most important part of its environment
is all the other genes that it encounters . . . Each gene is selected
for its capacity to cooperate successfully with the population of
other genes that it is likely to meet in bodies” (p. 170). All effects
of genes at various levels (proteins, cells, organisms, societies, and
ecosystems) are easily explained by Dawkins (1986) as coopera-
tion among genes. Thus, Rose fails to formulate the concept of
multiple levels of selection. His major mistake is that he treats se-
lection at the level of genes as something ontologically different
from selection at the level of organisms. Instead, these are differ-
ent languages for describing basically the same phenomenon.
Thus, the selection of cooperating genes is a legitimate way of de-
scribing natural selection, but it is not the only possible way. Al-
though these languages are mostly compatible, there may be a
preferred language for handling each particular case. Complete
genetic descriptions exist only for a few species of organisms such
as the fly Drosophila. To analyze the evolution of other species, we
have no choice but to remain at the organism level.
Cognitive and psychiatric science 
beyond determinism
Dan J. Stein
MRC Research Unit on Anxiety and Stress Disorders, Department of
Psychiatry, University of Stellenbosch, Tygerberg 7505, South Africa.
djs2@maties.sun.ac.za
Abstract: Many of Rose’s criticisms of determinism in biology have clear
relevance to modern cognitive and psychiatric science; too narrow a focus
on the brain as an information processing machine runs the risk of ne-
glecting the context in which information processing takes place, and too
narrow a focus on the neuroscience of psychopathology runs the risk of 
neglecting other levels of explanation for these phenomena. It should be
emphasized, however, that animal and genetic studies of phenomena of 
interest to cognitive and psychiatric science (e.g., Alzheimer’s disorder,
schizophrenia, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and violence),
while perhaps only providing a partial perspective, may be useful in un-
derstanding these phenomena and in leading to appropriate psychiatric in-
terventions.
In Lifelines, Steven Rose asserts that in contrast to physics and
chemistry, biology “is different” (p. 68). “Not only is the living
world much more complex and less predictable than the inani-
mate world studied by physicists and chemists, but biology . . . lays
claims to be in a position to tell us, as humans, who we are, where
we came from, where we are going, how we must live” (p. 68).
Thus, a central theme of the volume is the folly of reductionism in
biological science, and the importance of multiple levels of expla-
nations of biological phenomena.
Among the most “different” (most complex and least pre-
dictable) fields within biology are the study of human psychology
and, perhaps even more, of psychopathology. Indeed, as a psychi-
atrist, I could not help but relate many of Rose’s concerns to de-
velopments in this field. (Rose too uses a number of examples
from the psychiatric literature.) Modern psychiatry, particularly in
the United States, has seen the replacement of a predominantly
psychodynamic perspective with a “biological” approach, which
emphasizes the importance of neuroscience in understanding psy-
chopathology, with pharmacotherapy as an appropriate interven-
tion. Among the risks of this approach is failing to see that psychi-
atry is itself a social practice.
Many of Rose’s criticisms have bearing upon the aspirations of
biological psychiatry; too narrow a focus on the neuroscience of
psychopathology runs the risk of neglecting other levels of expla-
nation for these phenomena. Several authors, such as McHugh
and Slavney (1983), have emphasized the importance of different
kinds of explanation in psychiatry; an important strand of expla-
nation must, as Rose advises for biology in general, focus on his-
tory and development. Clearly, any philosophy of science and bi-
ology must address not only mechanism but also meaning (Stein
1991). Thus, a sudden episode of decompensation in a patient
with schizophrenia may require both a biological perspective (the
patient discontinued medication) and a more psychological one
(the decision to stop medication took place in the context of fam-
ily conflict over the expense of medical care).
Rose’s criticisms also have bearing on the aspirations of much
of cognitive science; too narrow a focus on the brain as an infor-
mation processing machine runs the risk of neglecting the context
in which information processing takes place. Several authors have
emphasized the importance of situated cognition as opposed to
simply symbolic cognition (Norman 1993); once again, the em-
phasis of situated cognitivists is, as Rose advises, on matters such
as agency, meaning, and history. As Rose succinctly puts it (p. 9),
“Not everything is capable of being captured in a mathematical
formula.” Indeed, more sophisticated approaches in cognitive sci-
ence (e.g., Lakoff 1987) go well beyond the narrow focus on Pla-
tonic essences (p. 42) and digital algorithms (p. 121) that Rose crit-
icizes. Certainly, when it comes to explaining psychopathological
phenomena, a purely algorithmic approach (for example, parry,
the digital model of paranoia; Colby 1981) would do only partial
justice to the complexity of the matter at hand.
Rose goes one step further, though, arguing that biological re-
ductionism is ascendant, and that it entails an ideology that needs
to be fought (p. 273). While genetic findings in psychology and
psychiatry have undoubtedly received a great deal of attention,
and while the pharmaceutical industry is clearly a powerful one, I
am unconvinced that neuroscientific approaches to these fields
are always very widespread (certainly laypersons continue to view
mental disorders as “different”) or necessarily very evil. Let us
consider some specific examples from psychiatry which Rose him-
self raises: Alzheimer’s disorder, schizophrenia, attention deficit/
hyperactivity disorder, and violence.
Rose notes that he himself is a neuroscientist interested in
memory. He puts forward an argument about the necessity of
(simplified) animal models of memory, and the possibility that
they may have implications for understanding human memory and
for intervening in disorders like Alzheimer’s (p. 32). He notes also
that in Alzheimer’s only 5% of cases are clearly associated with a
specific genetic dysfunction (p. 293). Similarly, any specific mech-
anism that emerges from a study of animal models may well re-
quire extension and elaboration before it can be applied to human
memory dysfunction. It hardly seems controversial to assert that
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a good explanation of Alzheimer’s is going to require an under-
standing of the interactions between multiple factors (neurosci-
entific, psychosocial) involved in the pathogenesis of this disorder;
it makes sense for a funding agency interested in Alzheimer’s to
fund studies on the genetics of Alzheimer’s and on animal models
(such as Rose’s, as well as a range of other approaches). The re-
cent introduction of specific medications for Alzheimer’s has by no
means provided a cure, but the very fact of their existence pro-
vides promise for a neuroscientific approach to the disorder.
How different is the study of schizophrenia? Rose asserts
(p. 306) that schizophrenia is a contested area where crucial de-
terminants may occur at several levels (e.g., neuroscientific, psy-
chosocial). Certainly, there is good evidence that psychosocial
variables influence the course and expression of schizophrenia.
Nevertheless, the field of schizophrenia has moved far beyond the
outdated notion of the schizophrenogenic mother. As in the study
of memory and its dsyfunctions (e.g., Alzheimer’s), genetic find-
ings and animal models may be extremely helpful in understand-
ing this disorder; an important remaining challenge is to integrate
these findings with those from research on psychosocial factors
(Portin & Alanen 1997; Weinberger 1996). Furthermore, a focus
on the neuroscience of schizophrenia does not necessarily fall 
prey to Rose’s sociopolitical criticisms of reductionism (p. 297) –
“blaming the victim” and misallocation of resources. It is notable
that families of schizophrenia patients have increasingly sup-
ported neuroscientific research on the disorder. Furthermore, the
introduction of antipsychotics (and more recently of the atypical
antipsychotics) have represented dramatic steps forward in the
treatment of this major disorder.
What about the study of attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD)? Rose (p. 56) asserts that ADHD is not appreciably
known outside the United States and that it is a disorder that may
disappear on weekends and holidays. Furthermore, he seems to
indicate that it is erroneous to think of the disorder as brain-based;
it is better explained by the relationships of the child to the out-
side world. Here his argument, which sounds similar to literature
produced by the anti-psychiatry movement, runs the risk of a re-
ductionism of a different sort (reduction to the psychosocial).
While psychiatric diagnosis is of course a particular kind of social
practice (Stein 1991), ADHD is in fact widely recognized and
treated outside of the United States (World Health Organization
1992). Furthermore, although ADHD is clearly complex, genetic
and biological studies have in fact shed important light on its
pathogenesis (Castellanos 1997). The research demonstrates
clearly that for a child with ADHD, medication and psychother-
apy interventions are extremely helpful (Shaywitz et al. 1997).
While the theoretical possibility of replacing such individual in-
terventions with universal changes in school systems no doubt ex-
ists, such a solution runs the risk of “fatuity” (cf. Rose p. 299). (This
is not of course, to deny that in some cases, where a primary un-
derlying problem is in fact simply poor parenting or poor school-
ing, children may unfortunately be misdiagnosed as having
ADHD.)
What about the study of violence? Rose appears to be scathing
about the possibility of a neuroscientific approach to human vio-
lence; he picks out Brunner’s study (p. 281) for criticism for arbi-
trarily lumping together different kinds of aggressive behavior, is
withering about Raine’s studies of PET scanning in murderers
(p. 290), criticises the extrapolation of animal studies of aggression
to humans (p. 294), and argues that biological interventions for vi-
olence would be fatuous (p. 298). Brunner (1996) himself, how-
ever, has clearly acknowledged the complexity of aggression and
violence. Similarly, Raine (1993; whose work is not listed in Life-
lines’ references), has emphasized that multiple factors con-
tribute to criminal behavior, and rather than seeing Prozac as a
panacea (cf. Rose p. 291) has argued for the importance of psy-
chosocial interventions. Rose is no doubt right in stressing the
complexity of violent behavior and in noting that interventions
need to be primarily psychosocial; and it is certainly important not
to blame the victim but to allocate funding appropriately (p. 297);
nevertheless, there is no prima facie reason to avoid animal or 
genetic studies of aggression as useless or harmful. In addition,
pharmacological interventions are useful for some impulsive and
aggressive psychiatric patients (Coccaro & Kavoussi 1997). Fi-
nally, although Rose provides a trenchant critique of the excessive
claims of some evolutionary psychology (p. 246), evolutionarily in-
formed approaches to aggression can be sophisticated and rele-
vant to human behavior (de Waal 1996).
If biology is able to succeed in being a good explanatory science,
then a “biological psychiatry” which includes multiple levels of ex-
planation is also possible, and will extend this field beyond the all
too common connotation of “biological psychiatry” as necessarily
entailing a reductionistic perspective. Rose notes (p. 302) that
much of his thesis is not new; nevertheless, his synthesis is an at-
tractive and important one. Certainly, when it comes to complex
psychopathology, there is much evidence à la Rose, that under-
standing both genetic and historical factors is crucial (Schaffner
1998); that soma and psyche are interlinked (with successful psy-
chotherapy resulting in functional brain changes; Baxter et al.
1992); that biological interventions having multiple psychological
effects (Kramer 1994); and that explanations of psychopathology
are themselves rooted in social practices (Kleinman 1988). Any
oversimplification in this area (for example, characterizing psy-
chiatric disorders solely in terms of neurotransmitter dysfunction,
or depicting psychiatric disorders as representing simply a “nor-
mal” response to an “abnormal” environment; Conrad & Schnei-
der 1980) is bound to be problematic.
Lifelines to a sinking cause
H. Dieter Steklis
Department of Anthropology, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903-
0270. steklis@rci.rutgers.edu
Abstract: Rose’s attack on ultra-Darwinists’ and evolutionary psycholo-
gists’ accounts of human behavior fails, largely because he does not offer
a viable alternative. His “lifelines” view of organismic development is es-
sentially an epigenetic one that few sociobiologists would disagree with,
Rose seeks to disempower genes where human behavior is concerned, de-
spite contrary neurogenetic evidence and at odds with the implications of
his own lifelines view. He attempts to discredit biological determinist ac-
counts by suggesting that their research program is politically motivated,
while ignoring the scientific viability and novel insights such research has
yielded.
Much of what Rose says I agree with, so why am I not in his camp,
a defender of his cause, which is to reject the current “enthusiasm
for biologically determinist accounts of the human condition”? It
is because Rose does not offer a viable alternative. I want to illus-
trate and support this point further by examining Rose’s argu-
ments concerning (1) what genes do; (2) appropriate levels of
causal analysis; and (3) science as a mirror of reality.
What genes do. A central tenet of Rose’s anti-determinist ar-
gument rests on the indeterminate nature of an organism’s genetic
instructions, be they coding for the eventual form of proteins,
neural circuitry, or behavior. In Rose’s view, the reason for the
genome’s indeterminacy lies in the dynamic, and essentially un-
predictable interaction between the developing organism and its
environment, from the cellular environment of the DNA strands
themselves to the extracellular environment of developing tissues,
to the external, postnatal environment of the developing organ-
ism. This dynamic developmental and maturational trajectory of
an organism Rose calls its “lifeline,” a process throughout which
“organisms . . . and the environment – all relevant aspects of it –
interpenetrate” (p. 140); in other words, an inextricable joining of
nature and nurture. Thus, although according to Rose, lifelines as
such are “not embedded in genes” (p. 171), an organism’s imper-
viousness to “developmental and environmental buffeting” is “in
the genes” (p. 306), ensuring normal developmental outcomes in
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the face of chance environmental perturbations. To Rose, genes
“are no more and no less than an essential part of the toolkit with
and by which organisms construct their own futures” (p. 137, em-
phasis mine). It is, then, in viewing the organism as free to self-
construct, as an active agent in building its lifeline, that Rose parts
company with those who see the organism as a passive entity (as
in Dawkins’s genetic vehicles) whose structure, form and function
are predetermined by its DNA.
Because Rose’s “lifelines” view of organismic development is es-
sentially an epigenetic one – the recognition of the fundamental
interdependence between organism and environment – I doubt
that any sociobiologist would disagree with him. Rather, disagree-
ment revolves around whether epigenesis excludes a genetic in-
fluence on behavior or how epigenesis can be said to provide
“freedom” from genetic influence. Rose’s final sentence leaves his
interpretation of epigenesis unambiguous: “And it is therefore our
biology that makes us free” (p. 309). Aside from its rhetorical in-
tent, how are we to interpret this declaration of independence?
Does he mean “free” in the sense of “unconstrained”? Surely not.
He does, after all, recognize the process of genetic canalization,
and, as mentioned earlier, the genome’s contribution to develop-
mental buffering. The argument then boils down to the meaning
of constraint.
There is nothing in Rose’s “lifelines” argument that precludes
the standard sociobiologist’s requirement for a genetic influence
(or constraint) on behavior. We need only pursue two aspects of
his “lifelines” view to make this clear. One concerns initial condi-
tions (or constraints) provided by the genome, the other concerns
the “interpenetration” between organism and environment. Re-
gardless of the “distance” between genes and behavioral expression,
genes (minimally) do specify the initial conditions for the organ-
ism’s lifeline, thereby constraining all subsequent organism-
environment interactions. I assume that Rose would agree that,
for the reliable appearance of species-typical characteristics (e.g.,
bipedality, human language, play), the initial conditions provided
by the genome (e.g., cellular components and products) must
somehow constrain all subsequent organism–environment inter-
actions. Indeed, it is precisely the departure from such canalized
development, as in the fluctuating asymmetry of normally sym-
metrical morphology, that interests evolutionary biologists, be-
cause it suggests (and in some cases has been linked to) genetic
variation – and hence fitness – in the organism’s ability to with-
stand the effects of Rose’s “developmental buffeting” (Polak &
Trivers 1994).
How the cascade of developmental events constrains develop-
mental outcomes is inherent in Rose’s own notion of “interpene-
tration” between organism and environment. I’m sure that as a bi-
ologist he would not disagree that from conception to death, each
organism defines its environment by seeking out or identifying
and responding selectively to stimuli within it. It follows that each
organism’s experience is not random (contrary to Rose), and that
its genome (by initially constraining and setting in motion the de-
velopmental trajectory) defines which stimuli are salient, and in
this sense constrains the organism’s interaction with its environ-
ment.
The field of neurogenetics, of which Rose is critical, supports
this view of developmental constraints. Myriad experimental stud-
ies show that the mammalian brain has evolved to both expect and
depend on information from the environment not only for its pre-
adult ontogeny, but also for its adaptive modification in adulthood
(Greenough 1986). The nervous system appears to “anticipate” ex-
periential events that have been reliable environmental features
of the species’ evolutionary history – its past “lifelines” (e.g., the
primate mother–infant bond is an evolutionarily reliable environ-
ment that provides “information” for the normal development of
brain structure, function, and behavior; Hofer 1981). A species’
evolutionary history thus defines which experiences are salient, at
what time, and in what manner (e.g., see Gottlieb’s 1976 useful
distinction between inductive, facilitative, and maintenance ef-
fects of experience on behavioral and neural maturation). Because
the timing and importance of experience for phenotypic expres-
sion vary among different components of the phenotype, it is
meaningless to think of entire organisms, rather than particular
phenotypic traits, as either “plastic” or “predetermined” (e.g., de-
pendent on or independent of learning). In humans, for example,
the capacity for spontaneous facial expression of emotion emerges
independent of visual experience, suggesting that its normal
emergence is highly constrained. This, however, does not rule out
the influence of other forms of experience (e.g., sensory feedback
from facial muscles) on the development of this ability.
If Rose pursued the full implications of his concept of organ-
ism–environment “interpenetration” he would not argue, for ex-
ample, that because the family environment of siblings is similar,
“similarities detected between them are inextricably the result of
both genes and environment” (p. 190); in other words, that any ge-
netic contribution to the behavioral phenotype will be masked by
the shared environment. A wealth of studies show that fraternal
twins, despite being raised in the same family environment, often
turn out to be very different in personality and behavior (Plomin
& Daniels 1987). Indeed, from a comprehensive review of the re-
search literature, Harris (1998, p. 37) concludes that “growing up
in the same home does not make siblings alike.” The likely reason
for the failure of the shared environment to produce shared traits
is that the genetically constrained lifelines of siblings lead them to
construct their “shared” household environments differently.
From the perspective of the self-constructing organism, the envi-
ronment is never truly random or homogeneous.
Appropriate levels of causal analysis. Rose unjustly condemns
“ultra-Darwinists” for choosing the wrong level of causal behav-
ioral analysis. In discussing human violence, for example, he not
only disagrees with neurogeneticists who aver that violence is
caused by “‘violent’ or ‘criminal’ genes,” but also insists that “neu-
rogenetics is the wrong level . . . at which to find answers to many
of the problems confronting us” (p. 276–77).
Like Rose’s early example of causal explanations why a frog
jumps, each level of explanation is equally valid and appropriate,
providing insight into causation at that level (biochemical,
anatomical, evolutionary).  A complete causal analysis combines
all levels, which is basically what the classical ethologists have ad-
vocated all along in recognizing the complementarity of proximate
and ultimate causes of behavior. In the case of human violence,
the sociological level of causal analysis is no more appropriate than
the genetic or biochemical one; all are equally appropriate for a
full understanding of why (to use Rose’s example) in the same sit-
uation some individuals murder while others do not. The socio-
logical level of causation would include social stimuli or triggers
(e.g., poverty or a history of marital infidelity), while the physio-
logical level could identify the responsible brain mechanisms (e.g.,
low serotonin). One cannot agree more when Rose writes that “the
phenomena of human existence and experience are always simul-
taneously biological and social” (p. 279). Does it not follow, then,
that solutions to reduce “violence in the streets” are to be sought
in both the social and biological domains?
Where the complexity of human behavior is concerned, Rose
considers the biological domain fundamentally irrelevant, because
he does not believe that genetics can usefully explain, for exam-
ple, why some individuals murder while others do not. Although
there may not be “aggression genes” per se, it is hard to deny that
genetic variation contributes to individual differences in tem-
perament, sensation seeking (Zuckerman 1984) and other per-
sonality features that predispose some individuals to act violently,
or to show impaired judgment of what is socially appropriate.
Moreover, evolutionary psychology has yielded powerful insights
into the social stimuli that reliably trigger human violence (e.g.,
Daly & Wilson 1988). Thus, while culture defines when violence
is appropriate, it does not follow, as Rose would have it, that either
the capacity or the prepotent nature of stimuli for violence are cul-
tural.
Science as a mirror of reality. Rose suggests that research in the
bio-behavioral sciences is at the mercy of political whim and
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“dominant social expectations” rather than being a “true reflect-
ing mirror” of nature” (p. 274). This allows him to dismiss as po-
litically motivated the research program of the ultra-Darwinists
and evolutionary psychologists. To be sure, science as a cultural
activity is not immune to influence from other cultural domains.
Would Rose not agree, however, that in order to succeed, science
must provide the best possible mirror of reality? Scientific pre-
dictions about how nature works either come out or they do not.
Why not let science do its work where evolutionary psychology
is concerned? If the ultra-Darwinist approach to humans turns out
to be a poor mirror of reality, it will have to be abandoned in favor
of a more productive (predictive) program. The last quarter cen-
tury of sociobiological research has not given any indication that
its premises are flawed or its predictive powers diminished.
Rather, the reason for the program’s continued success is its power
to identify novel research directions and to yield deep insights into
the human condition, whereas the traditional consideration of
purely socio-cultural factors in human behavior has stagnated.
Rather than ignoring “the historical and anthropological evidence
of variation in social practices across time and space, and instead
treat current Western norms . . . as if they were human universals”
(p. 198), many evolutionary psychologists’ accounts have fully en-
compassed “the rich diversity of human experience” (e.g., see
Buss 1994). Rose’s caricatures of the application of reciprocal al-
truism and parental investment theory to human behavior fail to
do justice to the corpus of genuine insights these theories have
provided. Regardless of our opinion of their worth, only data and
the continued predictive power of theory, rather than rhetoric or
political motivation, will decide whether sociobiology or evolu-
tionary psychology survive or fail.
Autopoiesis and Lifelines: The importance 
of origins
Evan Thompsona and Francisco J. Varelab
aDepartment of Philosophy and Centre for Vision Research, York University,
North York, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3; bLENA – Neurosciences Cognitives et
Imagerie Cérébrale, Hôpital de la Salpètriere, 75651 Paris Cedex 13, France.
evant@yorku.ca www.yorku.ca/research/vision/evant.htm
fv@ccr.jussieu.fr www.ccr.jussieu.fr/varela/welcome.html
Abstract: Lifelines provides a useful corrective to “ultra-Darwinism” but
it is marred by its failure to cite its scientific predecessors. Rose’s argument
could have been strengthened by taking greater account of the theory of
autopoiesis in biology and of enactive cognitive science.
We agree with all ten major theses of Lifelines (pp. 303–309) and
wish to congratulate Steven Rose for his useful corrective to the
excesses of “ultra-Darwinism.” Especially important is his ninth
thesis “The past is the key to the present” (p. 309), or, as he states
it at the beginning of the book: “Nothing in biology makes sense
except in the light of history . . . the history of life on Earth . . . the
history of the individual organism . . . the history of our own sub-
ject, biology” (pp. 15–16). Unfortunately, in the case of the history
of biology, Rose neglects to acknowledge the scientific origins of
one of his central concepts, that of autopoiesis, and fails to cite and
credit its originators. Furthermore, he could have strengthened
his argument had he drawn from subsequent developments in bi-
ology and cognitive science inspired by the autopoietic perspec-
tive.
The idea of autopoiesis – that living systems produce them-
selves continuously through their own activity – forms part of the
backbone of Lifelines. This is as it should be, for the idea of au-
topoiesis places the organism at the heart of biology. As Rose
writes when he first introduces the idea:
To put the organism and its lifeline back at the core of biology . . . means
replacing the static, reductive, DNA-centred view of living systems . . .
with an emphasis on the dynamics of life . . . Instead we must speak of
the dialectic . . . through which the living organism constructs itself.
The central property of all life is the capacity and necessity to build,
maintain and preserve itself, a process known as autopoiesis [Rose’s
emphasis]. (p. 18)
What he neglects to tell the reader is that the very coinage of
the word, its meaning, and the many consequences it entails, did
not arise ex nihilo, without a history, to populate the world of ideas
anonymously (“a process known as”). It has an origin that is clearly
inscribed in the scientific record of publications: the notion and
many of its consequences for biology (see below) were introduced
by Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, first in 1973
in a Spanish monograph (Maturana & Varela 1973), which ap-
peared in English in 1980 (Maturana & Varela 1980), and then in
a paper in English, complete with cellular automata modes, in
1974 (Varela, Maturana & Uribe 1974). A book treatment con-
cerning autopoiesis as an exemplar of the autonomy of living sys-
tems appeared in 1979 (Varela 1979). Why does Rose not cite the
actual origins of this idea and present its precise formulation, as
he does for metabolic complex graphs (p. 164) or autocatlytic sets
(p. 265)?
Since 1974 a large body of literature on autopoiesis has been
produced in experimental and theoretical biology. Let us mention
just two examples, both concerned with the origin of life, and
therefore of direct relevance to Rose’s discussion of “Origin
myths” (pp. 250–71). First, Lynn Margulis has explicitly acknowl-
edged (with proper citation) the importance of autopoiesis in her
work on symbiosis and the origins of sex (Margulis & Sagan 1986),
and in her popular book with Dorian Sagan What is life? (Mar-
gulis & Sagan 1995). Second, some of the most interesting exper-
imental advances in research on the origins of life have been in-
spired by the theory of autopoiesis. Thus, Bachman et al. (1992)
constructed a minimal autopoietic system using autocatalytic self-
replicating micelles. The self-replication of these micelles occurs
as a direct consequence of their autopoiesis or self-production,
and the latter occurs without DNA and proteins. Thus these
chemical systems tangibly reinforce Rose’s argument in Chapter
9 that life probably originated with autopoietic protocells rather
than naked molecular replicators. As Bachman et al. observed:
Within this framework, there is no mention of DNA or proteins, but the
present autopoietic system can be considered as a cell that metabolizes
low-molecular-weight components. A true ‘protocell’ will require DNA,
RNA and proteins to encode and transfer genetic information; but it
provides a useful new perspective to recognize that a primitive mecha-
nism for self-replication and metabolism can exist without them. (Bach-
man et al. 1992, p. 59)
If the notion of autopoiesis had originally been introduced only
to address the unitary organization of life at the cellular level, then
our point about Rose’s failure to acknowledge his predecessors
would stop there. As the original publications make clear, how-
ever, the main motivation of the theory of autopoiesis was, from
the beginning, to provide a new approach to the biology of cogni-
tion in which the organism and its space-time pathway occupy
center-stage (Maturana & Varela 1980; see also Varela 1996). In-
deed, Maturana and Varela (1987) unfold these implications for
our understanding of evolution and cognition, in terms that Rose’s
book closely follows. Other more detailed implications have been
presented for our understanding of the immune system (Varela &
Coutinho 1991), evolution (Varela et al. 1991, Ch. 9), biological in-
dividuality (Varela 1991), and artificial intelligence and artificial
life (Thompson 1997; Varela 1997; Varela & Bourgine 1992).
An especially important point concerns the consequences of au-
topoieis for reinterpreting the operation of the nervous system in
cognition. The central revision was to discard the idea that the 
nervous system encodes the external environment in an internal
representation, so as to ensure the optimal adaptation of the or-
ganism. The nervous system was instead seen as a unitary recur-
sive network, situated within an autonomous (self-governing or
“homeodynamic”) organism, itself engaged in a constant flow of
action embedded in its surroundings. Cognition via the nervous
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system is not the “picking up” of prexisting information “out
there,” but rather the bringing forth of meaning in ontogenetic
and phylogenetic “lifelines” – the laying down of a path in walk-
ing, to use our metaphor (Varela et al. 1991, Ch. 9). One of the
best illustrations of this idea, both for its biological and cognitive
scientific detail, and for its philosophical wealth, comes from com-
parative color vision and ecological perception: colors do not exist
out there, waiting to be represented internally; they are brought
forth in ecologically situated, perceptually guided action (Thomp-
son 1995; Thompson et al. 1992). In cognitive science, this non-
adaptationist and non-representationist perspective on life and
cognition is now known as the enactive approach (Chiel & Beer
1997; Clark 1997; Varela et al. 1991).
Rose refers to none of this work. Perhaps we should feel pleased
that a distinguished biologist weaves as a central part of his argu-
ment ideas that others have toiled to develop: it must mean that
these ideas have become part of our shared intellectual heritage,
for all to use and enjoy. Nevertheless, citing one’s sources for key
concepts and ideas is an essential part of scientific practice. Had
Rose done so, his book would have been more accurate; had he
made use of the literature mentioned above, his argument would
have been stronger. And we would have been able to give his ar-
guments the attention they deserve, rather than voice this call for
fairness.
High purpose, low execution
Nicholas S. Thompson
Departments of Ethology and Psychology, Clark University, Worcester, MA
01610. nthompson@clarku.edu
Abstract: In reasserting the primacy of the individual in biological analy-
sis, Rose directs attention away from the crucial insights of the develop-
mental/structuralist perspective that he advocates. In presenting his ad-
vocacy as a diatribe, he brings disrespect down upon that very tradition.
On Steven Rose’s own account, his goal in writing Lifelines is to
“offer a coherent alternative frame work [to contemporary Dar-
winism] within which to interpret living processes.” The promise
of such a framework was enticing because of recent works that
suggest that the Darwinian paradigm may be due for at least a
thorough overhaul. The works I have in mind include Waldrop’s
(1993) Complexity, Goodwin’s (1994) How the leopard changed
his spots, Sapp’s (1994) Evolution by association, Sober and Wil-
son’s (1998) Unto others, and Depew and Weber’s (1997) Dar-
winism evolving. Rose’s Lifelines falls far short of its high purpose
in both substantive and rhetorical ways.
Substance. Metaphors are essential to science, but every sci-
entific metaphor incurs costs as well as benefits. The costs of us-
ing a metaphor arise from disanalogies between the metaphor and
its object. These costs are weighed against the power of the
metaphor to bring order to what we know and to suggest other dis-
coveries we might make. The useful life of a scientific metaphor
is brought to a close when the discoveries it stimulates reveal too
many disanalogies.
The metaphor of natural selection is rooted in Darwin’s corre-
spondence with breeders, who taught him that the composition of
a flock can be changed by selecting desirable individuals for mat-
ing. The metaphor thus focuses attention on the differential re-
production of individuals. But many of the findings described in
the works cited above seem to suggest that in focussing on the in-
dividual, we miss much of what is essential in biology that is going
on at levels of organization above and below the level of the indi-
vidual.
These problems with the metaphor of selection are not going to
be solved by frame shifting the metaphor to levels above or below
the individual because at whatever level we care to look, objects
seen as good entities from higher levels of organization appear as
diaphanous webs of interaction when examined closely at the next
level down. Thus, my hope for Lifelines was that it would provide
a way of looking at biological organization that would broaden our
focus beyond the individual as a privileged level of organization.
Regrettably, Rose grabs the other end of the stick.
Rhetoric. Not only is Rose’s vision of the future of biology dis-
appointing, his arguments for that vision often seem incomplete,
ill-founded, and even mean-spirited. Consider, for example, the
passage that opens the Preface.
The rise of the present enthusiasms for biologically determinist ac-
counts of the human condition date to the late 1960s. They were not
initiated by any specific advance in biological science, or powerful new
theory, but harked back instead to an earlier tradition of eugenic think-
ing which . . . had been eclipsed and driven into intellectual and politi-
cal disrepute in the aftermath of the war against Nazi Germany and its
racially inspired Holocaust.
The passage is a good example of a rhetorical technique known as
the Big Lie. Big Lies work for two reasons. First, they are so vague
and all-encompassing that the evidence necessary to refute them
is difficult to conceptualize, let alone marshal. Second, they sup-
press rebuttal by pre-stigmatizing it. Let us examine each of its
components in detail:
The rise of the present enthusiasms for biologically determinist ac-
counts of the human condition date to the late 1960s.
If what the author is talking about here is what he later identifies
as “ultra-Darwinism,” then that movement dates from the publi-
cation of Wynne-Edwards (1962) voluminous, Animal dispersion
in relation to social behavior, which asserts that much social be-
havior has been selected at the level of the population. At the core
of this influential work was a dramatic analogy between animal so-
cial systems and the conventions that limited fishing fleets in the
North Atlantic. This vivid concretization of the population-
selection argument, which had been immanent in the literature
for many years, prompted immediate individual-level responses
from William Hamilton, George Williams, and Robert Trivers, fol-
lowed only belatedly by E. O. Wilson and Richard Dawkins. In
short, the intellectual developments that Rose ascribes to the late
sixties actually evolved over a 20-year period from the early sixties
to the late 70s.
They were not initiated by any specific advance in biological science, or
powerful new theory.
By any objective standard the period of which Rose speaks here
was a time of breathtaking theoretical development and empirical
achievement in the study of behavior and evolution. All over the
U.S.A. and Europe, new graduate programs in behavior and evo-
lution were started, and the deluge of new information about an-
imal behavior was overwhelming. Two theoretical innovations that
distinguish this period are often confused. The first might be
called “biological individualism”; the interpretation of animal so-
cial organizations in terms of the interests of individuals. The sec-
ond might be called “biological genism”; the interpretation of an-
imal social organizations in terms of the interests of abstract units
of inheritance called genes. Although the failure to discriminate
these two positions has led to some important confusions (Sober
& Wilson 1997; Thompson 1998; Thompson & Derr 1995; Wilson
& Sober 1994), the general paradigm has proven to be extraordi-
narily productive, leading literally to thousands of investigations of
the details of animal communication, reproduction, and social life.
. . . but harked back instead to an earlier tradition of eugenic thinking.
The words “harked back” are the giveaway here. How can one ever
hope to refute a “harking back”? I can only say, speaking as some-
body who lived through that time and knew many of the partici-
pants, that I and my colleagues were interested in explanation, not
in ideology.
. . . had been eclipsed and driven into intellectual and political disre-
pute in the aftermath of the war against Nazi Germany and its racially
inspired Holocaust.
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Here, is a reduction, indeed: a generation of field and laboratory
investigations by hundreds of hard-working people reduced to a
political epithet! My colleagues and I thought we were exploring
the strengths and limitations of the Darwinian paradigm through
experiment, observation, modeling and theory. As a consequence
of Rose’s perceptive socio-reductive analysis we now see that we
were only engaged in a revanchist plot to restore the Third Reich!
How silly of us not to have seen it before!
Were I wrapping up this review in Professor Rose’s rhetorical
style, I would dismiss his work as just another manifestation of the
Cult of the Individual that has thrived in Post Cold War Britain.
But such socio-cultural reductios have no place in responsible sci-
entific writing.
How to alienate your natural allies 
and attract your enemies
J. Richard Udry
Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
Chapel Hill, NC 27516-3997. udry@unc.edu
Abstract: Rose erroneously believes that the sciences of human behavior
are being swept with a wave of genetic determinism. Actually, sociologists
and psychologists remain predominantly hostile to any genetic influence
on behavior. They will love Rose. The few behavior geneticists and socio-
biologists in these disciplines are marginalized and looking for a little re-
spect. Rose impugns their motives and ridicules their science.
Rose proclaims that his purpose is to promote “a vision which rec-
ognizes the power and role of genes without subscribing to genetic
determinism” (p. 7). From his reading of Dawkins and the Sun-
day newspapers, he sees ultra-Darwinism (sociobiology) sweeping
the sciences of human behavior. Rose and the “radical science
movement” (as he calls it) have been fighting this battle for a long
time. He sees it as a continuation of the battle against eugenics.
Implicit racism, Rose charges, is the fundamental motivation of
those who hold for either the evolutionary foundations of human
nature or for the genetic explanation of individual variance in be-
havior (behavior genetics).
How big is the sweep of this takeover of the sciences by genetic
determinism? As a biologist looking at the social and behavioral
sciences, Rose seems to believe genetic determinism has carried
the day. I live and work as a sociologist among other social scien-
tists. From here the view is less clouded by the perceptions of jour-
nalists about the big science news. In sociology, sociobiologists are
pariahs trying to claw a little toehold in the discipline. In psychol-
ogy, what is now called evolutionary psychology may be big with
the newspapers, but in the discipline as a whole it is a speck on the
public image.
So it is humorous to think that sociology and psychology are be-
ing swept by a wave of genetic determinism. Generally we social
scientists, like Rose, hold very strong views against it. But this is
not because we want to be politically correct. We can’t help our-
selves. Our shared disciplinary immune systems recognize biolog-
ical explanation of behavior as an infection, and reject it. (This is
a metaphor, not a homology.) Rose would immediately recognize
that our arguments against any biological explanation of behavior
are his against genetic determinism. His arguments even contain
the same innocent mistakes as ours do (for example, confusing the
causes of secular trends with the causes of variance among indi-
viduals).
Rose says he wants us all to recognize the power of genes while
rejecting genetic determinism. Maybe, because he says Lifelines
is written to be a within-biology argument, his battle is with other
biologists (he says it is mainly with those who don’t do biological
science, or at least not any more). His argument with the social sci-
ence disciplines today does not need to focus on fighting genetic
determinism so much as to help us accord any power to the genes
at all when it comes to behavior. The only genetic determinists I
can find are the rhetorical bogymen conjured up by Rose. Even
the most radical behavior geneticists are theorizing (and finding)
environmental effects on genetic process, and genetic influence
on social processes.
In the real world of scholars today, let us concede to Rose (who
must know) that there are genetic determinists among biologists.
Perhaps he will reach them with his message that the organism
shapes its own development. In the world outside biology there
are scholars who believe human behavior in part evolved geneti-
cally (that is, that there is a human nature), and those who do not
(that is, that there is no human nature). No one believes that hu-
man behavior is completely controlled by evolution. No one be-
lieves that variance in (any) human behavior is determined com-
pletely by genetic differences; but many believe that there is no
genetic influence. From the social/behavioral sciences, Lifelines
will appeal to those who reject evolutionary and genetic influence.
How will this help Rose achieve his goal?
Rose’s homeodynamic perspective is not 
an alternative to neo-Darwinism
A. J. Wells
Department of Social Psychology, The London School of Economics and
Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. a.j.wells@lse.ac.uk
Abstract: Lifelines discusses two approaches to biology, “ultra-Darwinism”
which Rose criticises, and the “homeodynamic perspective,” which he of-
fers as an alternative. This review suggests that ultra-Darwinism is a cari-
cature of the theoretical positions Rose wishes to oppose and that the
homeodynamic perspective is not an alternative, but is complementary to
so-called ultra-Darwinism.
Lifelines discusses two approaches to biology. Rose calls one “ultra-
Darwinism,” and the other the “homeodynamic” perspective. 
Ultra-Darwinism, says Rose, has, among others, the following flaws:
1. It is biologically and “neurogenetically” determinist (pp. viii,
ix).
2. It uses misleading information theoretic metaphors (pp. 121,
137).
3. It claims that the individual gene is the “unit of life” (p. 209).
4. It uses a “billiard-ball” model of the gene (p. 210).
5. It claims that every observable aspect of the phenotype of an
organism is adaptive (pp. 210, 230).
6. It is preformationist (p. 212).
7. It entails mind-body dualism (p. 214).
8. It assumes a direct, unmodifiable link between gene and
adult phenotype (pp. 215, 221).
9. It excludes processes of development and “the internal phys-
iological processes which constitute the organism” (p. 215).
10. It claims that organisms are inherently passive (p. 244).
The homeodynamic perspective, by contrast, is said to be free of
these major flaws and is offered as “a coherent alternative frame-
work” (p. ix) which transcends genetic reductionism and places
the organism at the centre of life.
Looking at the list of shortcomings above, one might be for-
given for thinking that ultra-Darwinism, as Rose presents it, is in-
tended to portray an extreme view that no one actually holds. Thus
its purpose would be essentially heuristic. But although in places
Rose writes as though this were so (e.g., pp. x 209), he also assures
the reader that there are many real ultra-Darwinists. In the 
last decade, he claims, “the stream of ultra-Darwinist and biolog-
ically determinist claims has become a torrent” (p. viii). Richard
Dawkins and Dan Dennett are singled out early on as arch 
ultra-Darwinists, and E. O. Wilson merits a number of specific
mentions. Moreover, there is a suggestion (p. 176) that ultra-
Darwinism is just another name for neo-Darwinism, in which case
one ought, presumably, to count among the ultra-Darwinists peo-
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ple like George Williams, Bob Trivers, Bill Hamilton, and John
Maynard-Smith.
It is manifestly incorrect to attribute to neo-Darwinian theorists
the catalogue of errors of which Rose wishes to convict them. His
case does not stand up even to a cursory reading of the works of
those he criticises. Nor are his arguments compelling. (See, for ex-
ample, the clumsy attempt to justify the charge that Dawkins im-
ports dualism into his explanatory framework, pp. 213–14.) One
possible explanation for his claims is that Rose has simply failed to
make a key distinction between the capacity to change behaviour
and the capacity to change genetic structure.
It is a central tenet of neo-Darwinism that acquired character-
istics are not passed on from one generation to the next by the bi-
ological process of reproduction. This understanding is encapsu-
lated in the so-called “central dogma,” originally expounded by
August Weismann, who argued that information flow goes one
way only from germ plasm to soma, or, in molecular terminology,
from DNA to protein. Bodies cannot modify their genomes by
practice or effort. The blacksmith cannot bequeath to his offspring
the effects of his craft on his biceps. There are exceptions to the
central dogma, but they are few in number and their significance
is hard to assess. Exceptions are rare because most phenotypic
changes are not adaptive. A hereditary mechanism that allowed
the transmission of such changes would not be favoured by nat-
ural selection. Thus, in general, we do not have the capacity to
change our genetic structure.
It does not follow from this that neo-Darwinists believe behav-
iour to be unmodifiable or that they think developmental pro-
cesses are unimportant and can be ignored. If genes were only
able to build reflex mechanisms then the human behavioural
repertoire would indeed consist of nothing more than a set of fixed
action patterns. But there is no reason at all to suppose that genes
are limited in this way and every reason to suppose that they struc-
ture decision making mechanisms which are highly sensitive to en-
vironmental contingencies of many kinds. As Rose rightly says, an
individual lifetime involves complex interactions between genes
and environments. Neo-Darwinists are in full agreement with this
proposition.
Rose’s apparent inability to understand that “genes for” psy-
chological mechanisms do not preclude behavioural flexibility
may be related to his evident distaste for computational thinking.
The significant point about computational thinking is that it has
banished the last vestiges of dualism from contemporary psychol-
ogy and shows precisely how to avoid the infinite regress of rep-
resentational systems that plagued early attempts to achieve a sat-
isfactory materialist basis for mental processing. It is just because
information can be encoded in physically realisable structures that
behavioural flexibility is possible and explicable in a non-circular
way.
It is regrettable that Rose chose to present the homeodynamic
perspective as an alternative to the neo-Darwinian perspective
when in fact they are complementary. There are, for example,
many evolutionary psychologists and behavioural ecologists who
count themselves as neo-Darwinists, whose interests emphasise
development and other ontogenetic issues which Rose claims are
precluded by neo-Darwinism. Rose’s treatment of sexual selection
and kin selection theory (pp. 197–203) is an instance of this false
opposition. He claims without argument that sexual selection the-
ory “simply cannot encompass the rich diversity of human experi-
ence” (p. 198) and that kin selection theory suffers from a “rela-
tive lack of experimental support” (p. 202). To argue thus is to
ignore a large and growing body of empirical evidence that illus-
trates the fruitfulness of both of these theories for the framing of
testable hypotheses in psychology and behavioural ecology. Par-
ent–offspring conflict, familial violence, and the nature of mate
choice are all aspects of individual lifelines which are being illu-
minated by neo-Darwinist thinking.
Rose suggests (p. viii) that the views of those he criticises are
based on shaky empirical evidence and unexamined ideological
presuppositions. There is a certain irony in this claim because it is
hard to avoid the conclusion that the ultra-Darwinism which Rose
excoriates throughout Lifelines is essentially a product of his own
theoretical proclivities and ideological assumptions. As a result,
Lifelines fails as a critique of contemporary neo-Darwinian think-
ing in biology and also in psychology because there is no one out
there who thinks as he claims they do.
Author’s Response
Biological determinism lives and needs
refutation  despite denials
Steven Rose
Biology Department, Brain and Behaviour Research Group, Open University,
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, United Kingdom. s.p.r.rose@open.ac.uk
Abstract: Commentators are divided between those who wel-
come and creatively extend the agenda of Lifelines and those who
defend what it criticises. My response covers style; history, poli-
tics, and ethics; concepts of freedom, active organisms, and de-
terminism; the uses of metaphor; reductionism and levels of analy-
sis; Darwin and Darwinists; heritability and intelligence; human
universals and biological determinism.
Reading reviews of one’s book is always an interesting ex-
perience, and where the reviews are multiple as in the BBS
format it can be particularly challenging. This mixed set of
reactions has been instructive, and I have been forcefully
reminded that the attempt to communicate by writing, a
sort of contract between author and reader, requires mu-
tual effort. The book a reader reads may very well not be
that the author believes he has written. Indeed, in the case
of some of the reviews of Lifelines, I have had a strong sense
of dejà vu that the reviewers really felt they were reviewing
the book I co-authored some 15 years ago with Richard
Lewontin and Leo Kamin, Not in our genes (Rose, Lewon-
tin & Kamin 1984). This is notably the case with Alcock,
who even bolsters his rather adjective-laden argument by
quoting, substantially out of context, a review of that book
written by my colleague Pat Bateson. So I make no apology
for restating here what Lifelines was intended, from this
writer’s perspective, to be about, and then replying in more
detail to the specific points raised. In doing so I will also 
refer to two books which had not appeared when Lifelines
was written but which illustrate some of its points rather
clearly: Steven Pinker’s How the mind works (1997) and 
E. O. Wilson’s Consilience (1998) (see also the comments
by Hirsch – whose defence of Loeb, by contrast, encour-
ages me to re-evaluate that early mechanist).
Before even doing that, however, I owe one unreserved
apology. Thompson & Varela, whilst generously com-
mending the theses of the book concerning autopoiesis,
rightly charge me with failing to credit the term to its orig-
inators, Maturana and Varela (1980). I was shocked to 
discover on rereading my own text that I had omitted this
elementary scholarly responsibility, especially as I have al-
ways been conscious of the intellectual debt I owe to their
work, and agree with them entirely that an appreciation of
the origins of a concept is essential for a full grasp of its 
significance. I’ll come back to the defence of autopoiesis
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against some of its other critics among the reviews later, but
want to make it clear up front that the omission of credit, in
every sense of the term, has now been fully rectified in any
more recent edition of the book.
R1. What Lifelines is about
Contrary to the impression that one might get from read-
ing some of the reviews of the book, Lifelines is not a polit-
ical tract, nor a detailed discussion of the social origins or
implications of biological determinism, least of all an affir-
mation of “Marxist philosophy,” if indeed that protean epi-
thet has any single meaning. The ideological and sociopo-
litical framework of the debate occupies only the preface
and Chapter 10. Nor is it primarily a critique of sociobiol-
ogy, although many of the presuppositions of sociobiology
(these days rebranded as evolutionary psychology) are in-
deed discussed. The book is addressed to that mythical lay
audience for which those of us concerned with the public
understanding of science see ourselves as writing. It follows
my previous book The making of memory, (1992) in at-
tempting to lay out how my sort of biologist tries to extract
scientific meaning from the world, the problems of objec-
tivity in science, and of designing experiments. Some re-
viewers dismiss the need to do this on the grounds that
everyone knows about such issues already. I wish that were
true, but in my experience it just isn’t, and even where it is,
it is considered slightly indecent to mention it outside the
charmed circle of active researchers. To appreciate the
problem, one need only read books by distinguished biolo-
gists explaining their subjects with sublime indifference to
such questions.
Having set out these themes, I turn my attention to the
nature of explanation in biology, and confront the question
of why many (including reviewers I will respond to more
specifically below) seem to regard reductionist explanations
as the only ultimately legitimate ones. At the core of the
book are five chapters discussing genetics, development,
evolutionary mechanisms, and life’s origins and developing
the framework within which I believe these need to be con-
ceptualised: homeodynamics, autopoiesis, and complexity.
These chapters argue for placing cells and organisms rather
than nucleic acids at the centre of living processes. There is
little enough about ecology and population dynamics in the
book, which is to be regretted, as some reviewers point out,
but this reflects my own perspective and limitations as a
biochemist turned neuroscientist (pace Cornish-Bowden
I don’t just “claim” to be a biochemist). I confess to some
surprise to discover that these core themes occupied so few
of the reviewers, who preferred to respond to the periph-
ery rather than the centre. Indeed almost the only person
who did address them was indeed Cornish-Bowden, who
sadly totally misunderstands the argument. He claims that
I first provide a simplistic account of rate-limiting reactions
in biochemistry, then correct that account, and finally argue
that this means that genes are irrelevant to behaviour. In
fact I do nothing of the sort; the discussion of rate-limiting
reactions is, as my text makes very clear, a self-critical com-
ment on early editions of a teaching text of mine, The chem-
istry of life (1991). The second is a description of the
Kacser-Kauffman approach to metabolic complexity, which
forms part of the explanation of why gene function and ac-
tion can only be understood in the context of the metabolic
web within which they are enmeshed; it is only remotely
connected with the discussion of genes and behaviour, and
nowhere in Lifelines or anywhere else have I ever made the
absurd statement that genes have nothing to do with be-
haviour. Cornish-Bowden must read more carefully. But so
be it: let me turn to the themes that did concern most of
those who responded.
R2. On style
Some reviewers (Economos, Charlton, and Crusio
amongst them) take exception to a certain robust style of
writing, and my specific choice of Dawkins and Dennett as
foils for some of my arguments. This is perhaps an excuse
for the ad hominem approach of some of the reviews, but I
make no apologies. The reasons for my choice are that these
are amongst the most clear-cut defenders of the positions I
criticise (Pinker [1997] and Wilson [1998] would also have
served in this regard) and my use of them could almost be
taken as a compliment. However, I have a strong feeling of
double standards being applied. All four authors have been
responsible for some pretty cheap shots aimed at, for in-
stance Gould and Lewontin (and me) personally, and as-
sorted but unspecified “leftists and feminists” in general,
and I cannot recall their ever being rebuked – indeed,
rather the reverse – for this.
R3. On history, politics, and ethics
Several reviewers assume that my criticism of biological de-
terminism and excessively reductive, gene centred thinking
is based on either political or ethical principles, rather than
being grounded in a within-biology critique, and they take
me to task accordingly. Thus Charlton states, without evi-
dence, that I conflate ethical with pragmatic thinking, and
that I regard oversimplification as a sin. Au contraire, I re-
gard it as poor science, though I recognise that simplifica-
tion is often a useful heuristic device, whether, to use his
term, it is “accidental” or not. For instance, both Mendel’s
laws and the Central Dogma are, as we now know, simpli-
fications, but they were both enormously potent and useful
in their time. Both, however, have long outlived their use-
fulness, and to continue to claim them as “truth” is a sort of
wickedness – though only to science and the scientific
ethic, not to morality in general. I can’t think for one mo-
ment why Charlton goes on to suggest that Lifelines at-
tempts to provide a way of determining in advance whether
a biological theory is oversimplified and therefore produces
a general purpose short cut; I can’t recall ever thinking such
a thing, let alone writing it.
N. S. Thompson disputes the brief history of the rise of
biological determinist thought that forms the Preface. I
trace the recent history through the late 1960s to a eugenic
past which I am sure all the reviewers regard as being as
shameful as do I. My reference to the late 1960s relates
specifically to the publication by Jensen (1969) on race and
IQ and its aftermath. As this history has often been re-
counted (e.g., Rose et al. 1984), I didn’t feel it was neces-
sary to spell it out in detail. I certainly was not referring to
Wynne-Edwards, group selection, and the debates within
evolutionary theory which were going on, as Thompson
notes, both before and after 1969. I am quite astonished
that anyone could misread me as doing so, especially as later
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in the book and in a historically internalist contest I refer
specifically and in detail to the history of the group selec-
tionist/kin selectionist debate! If there is a Big Lie here it is
certainly not mine. And it is absurd to suggest that I – or in-
deed any practicing biologist – could regard evolutionary
biology as in some sense evil. If Lifelines says nothing else,
it over and over again quotes Dobzhansky (1973) on the
centrality of evolutionary thinking to understanding the liv-
ing present. However, anyone amongst the commentators
who doubts that these internal debates have political reso-
nance need only refer to, amongst other things, the use 
of sociobiological claims by conservative writers (Ridley
1997), racist groups (Brunn 1978; Verrall 1980), anti-
feminists (Goldberg 1975; Wright 1994) and many other 
examples too tedious to list. This doesn’t mean, pace
Schooler and Economos, that I see a simple link between
racism, genetics, and psychometry – although too often in
the quite recent history of these sciences such links have in-
deed been present and painfully documented (e.g., Gould
1997). To claim that these issues are above “mere human
politics” as Dawkins (1981) once did in an exchange with
me in Nature is to bury one’s head in the sand.
R4. On freedom, active organisms,
and determinism
Lifelines uses the concepts of freedom and of determinism
in a number of ways, and my failure to spell them out and
distinguish between them more clearly is one of the weak
points in my account; I have learned from all the reviewers
who focus on this theme. The commentary by Freeman
(see also Freeman 1999) is particularly helpful in empha-
sising intentionality and agency. It is the active part played
by all organisms in shaping their own futures which I un-
derstand by the wonderful term autopoiesis. E. Thompson
& Varela explicate (and cite) this term more adequately
than I did in the book, and also point out that its utility ex-
tends to the cognitive sphere as well, and I am grateful to
them. Alcock’s suggestion that I – or Varela and his col-
leagues – avoid a “detailed test” of autopoiesis merely con-
founds an empirical method with a theoretical framework.
Both Fuller and Midgley usefully clarify some of these
issues, though from rather different perspectives. Fuller
emphasises the distinction between subjective and objec-
tive senses of the term freedom – I may act in a way that
“feels” free, for instance to buy this or that product, or to
have or not have sex, but “objectively” I am serving the
needs of capitalism or striving to propagate my selfish
genes. This use of “objectively” parrots (I suspect Fuller’s
usage is deliberate, as he is no innocent in such matters) the
ways that both vulgar Marxists and evolutionary psycholo-
gists talk. My point is much closer to Midgley’s that the ex-
istence of explanations and actions at multiple levels means
that there are many different forms of such “objectivity,”
and that freedom in part depends on the existence of this
multiplicity. Fuller explicates the concept of “the freedom
of necessity,” commonly if crudely exemplified by the ob-
servation that we are all free to dine at the Ritz – provided
we have the money to do so. Yet I mean more than just this.
Of course we are all, as Economos points out, subject to
the laws of gravity and chemistry (I won’t dispute here the
use of the concept of law) – an aspect of the argument about
human “universals” to which I will return below. But I wish
to argue that the processes of development and of evolu-
tionary change are radically underdetermined in quite a dif-
ferent way (as I believe Steklis appreciates in his review).
This isn’t, let me assure Leslie, in his disappointment at the
coda to the book, because I wish to sneak in vitalism or
mentalism. It is rather because historical change comes at
the meeting point of many “determinisms,” physical, bio-
logical, social, and technological. Evolutionary mechanisms
– natural selection amongst them – can only respond to the
here and now; they cannot predict the future, and hence are
constantly tracking moving targets – targets that move pre-
cisely because all living forms are constantly modifying
them as well as themselves. This is the radical indetermi-
nacy of evolution.
R5. On metaphors
Hull, Bradie, and N. S. Thompson comment on my con-
cern over the power of metaphors in biology. They (and in-
deed others who had reviewed the first edition of the book)
point out that metaphors are an essential scientific tool; we
all do try to explain otherwise un-understandable phenom-
ena by analogising them to things or processes we do un-
derstand – or at least that we believe we understand. I ac-
cept this – and indeed have tried to clarify my views in the
preface to the paperback edition of the book. But I continue
to maintain that metaphors are dangerous devices which
must be handled with care and responsibility, because they
seduce one into thinking that the phenomenon one is
metaphorising is indeed in some way the same as that to
which it has been likened. Dawkins in particular has a gift
for metaphor which contributes to the brilliance of his writ-
ing but is often totally misleading, as in examples I quote in
Lifelines. Furthermore, we seem to draw our metaphors 
in biology either from the behaviour of humans (“rape” in
mallard ducks or “harems” amongst baboons, for instance)
or from human technologies (e.g., brain memory as the
same as computer memory). Similarly, the Darwinian
metaphor has spread into realms in which it has no busi-
ness, in my view – for instance, Hull’s use of it to discuss the
ways in which theories in science “compete” or Dennett’s
view of natural selection as a “universal acid.” This is haz-
ardous, not only because of the ideological and conceptual
baggage that such transfers from one domain to another in-
evitably carry with them.
Of course Steklis is right that we do as scientists try to
hold a mirror to reality, but it can never be a plane mirror;
it is always shaped by – distorted by – our framing as-
sumptions, metaphors, expectations. If the last three
decades of debate amongst sociologists and philosophers of
knowledge has taught us nothing else, it has certainly made
clear that this is the best we can hope for – and there are
many who would not even allow us that. I agree entirely
therefore with Bradie’s points that science can never be
free of ideology – noting that neither he nor I have paused
to unpack the multiple meanings that that word itself has –
and that metaphors serve useful heuristic and epistemic
purposes along with their rhetorical function. Miller wor-
ries that, by pointing out that metaphors drawn from physics
and technology may do disservice to biology, I appear to re-
duce Galileo’s achievements to mere historico-social prod-
ucts. Nothing could be further from my intentions. They
are indeed historico-social products, but not merely this;
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they also told us something important and at least partially
transcendent about the way nature is. I’m not with the so-
cial constructionists in this debate.
Hull goes on to distinguish between homologies and ho-
moplasies – a term I am not familiar with, but in his exam-
ple of torpedo shapes for efficient swimming it sounds like
a description which might relate either to my reference to
constraints of structure and/or to convergent evolution. In
any event I am happy with it. I am less happy with his as-
sertion that no one still takes seriously the conflict between
ovists and spermists originally discussed in Needham’s clas-
sical history of embryology (for an up-to-date history of this
episode, see Pinto-Correia 1997). Incidentally. Hull also
calls attention usefully to the doubts over the “classic” nat-
ural selection story of industrial melanism and its reversal
in peppered moths – doubts which strengthen rather than
weaken my arguments. A further important point he raises
concerns my critique of the concept of “natural kind” in bi-
ology (one of several in which I part company from, for in-
stance, Webster & Goodwin [1997]). Agreeing with my
doubts over whether species, organisms, or macromole-
cules can be regarded as natural kinds, he nonetheless
claims that carnivores or founder populations can be so re-
garded. I disagree, though I don’t feel strongly on the point;
the functional definition is, it seems to me, even more in the
eye of the researcher than the structural one. What is the
logic of grouping together dogs and wasps on the grounds
that they both feed on flesh? But whether after so much
agreement Hull’s final sentence follows, others must judge.
R6. On reductionism and levels of analysis
In Lifelines I distinguished between several meanings of
the term reductionism, including theory reductionism
(which did not concern me), methodological reductionism
(which I regard as an essential aspect of science as it has de-
veloped historically in the West), philosophical, and ideo-
logical reductionism. These distinctions have not always
been recognised by the reviewers. I ask why reductionism
should be regarded as the explanatory goal. Michel re-
sponds by emphasising, rightly I think, that research prag-
matics supports reductionism because it is easy, whereas
what he calls “developmental research” is difficult to do
and, because its results are often not simple, harder to get
supported and published.
However, as in my fable of the frog, I insist that in biol-
ogy there are multiple legitimate ways to describe phe-
nomena, of which the reductionist way is but one, and any
of these may be appropriate, depending on the purposes for
which it is intended. Miller, whilst sharing my concern,
suggests that reductionism is merely a “temporary aberra-
tion” which will in due course be transcended. I would like
to think he is right, but I respond in the shadow of Wilson’s
Consilience (1998), which is an unblinking claim not merely
for the necessity but also for the ultimate triumph of phys-
ical reductionism in eventually bringing even art and ethics
into line (see my review, Rose 1999 and Hirsch). The doyen
of philosophy of science, Thomas Nagel, insists that
whereas a non-reductive account – for instance of the phys-
iology of nerve transmission – merely “describes” the phe-
nomenon, a reductive one – presumably in this case in
terms of ions and membrane properties – “really explains”
it (Nagel 1998, pp. 3–14). In my view, the reverse is often
the case. I suspect that Palm, with his courteously ex-
pressed search for simplicity in scientific explanation,
would share Nagel’s view, which is the bedrock to the work
of many distinguished mathematical modellers and indeed
mirrors the criticism that nineteenth century physicists laid
at Darwin’s door when they called his proposed evolution-
ary mechanism “the law of higgledy-piggledy.” If I dissent
from it, it is because to an experimental biologist – as Palm
himself reflects – the world is indeed inherently messy and
contingent. Miller suggests that neurodynamics may be a
more dangerous form of reductionism in what he sees as an
assault on the concept of the person, because, presumably,
it may “explain away” intentionality. I’m not sure I agree
with him here. Freeman (1999) has made a substantial con-
tribution to our understanding of the way that “meanings”
and “intentions” may be translated into neurodynamic
terms, but I don’t think he would see this type of language
as “explaining” rather than “describing,” to use Nagel’s
terms. Think of the phrase “I am in love” and then consider
reducing it to statements about neurodynamics, nerve im-
pulses, hormonal pulses, and so on. Most of us, I suggest,
would find the former a satisfying explanation of my be-
haviour (despite the disparagement of “folk psychology” by
some computational neurophilosophers), the latter merely
a description.
Economos argues the that denying reductionism means
believing in the supernatural or denying any laws or adding
“new primitive terms” to “quarks.” I am, she says, an emer-
gentist (though apparently not “a scholar and a gentleman”
– but then I’ve never laid claim to the second of these
terms). What I do argue is that terms and concepts relevant
to one level of organisation of the world are often not mean-
ingfully translatable into others. To take some examples
from Midgley (1998), how would Economos translate
“money” or “justice” into chemical or even biological
terms? It is in this context that I understand Rowell’s un-
picking of the complexities of mate selection and her refer-
ence to cooperative phenomena in troops of social animals.
I appreciate the reference to the need to consider hierar-
chies in space and time; this is surely right and not at all fully
dealt with in Lifelines.
My discussion of reductionism also raises issues about
levels of description and introduces the term translation
rather than causality to describe their relationships. Sharov
agrees, but then goes on to claim that I am mistaken to ar-
gue that “selection at the level of genes [presumably he
means genomic not individual genes] as something onto-
logically different from selection at the level of organisms”
– these, he says, using my own metaphor, are different lan-
guages for describing the same thing. I don’t think he is
right; we are dealing here with a nested hierarchy of selec-
tion processes, not a mere translation.
Several commentators point to the dangers of replacing
genic or physical reductionism with sociological reduction-
ism, and I entirely agree. Stein is an example, and although
he expresses important worries about the dominance of
neuroscientific explanations in psychology and psychiatry,
he goes on to argue that there are nonetheless important 
insights to be gained from such an approach. He cites
Alzheimer’s as an example, and I am especially pleased to
concur, as our own lab is heavily involved in such research
at present (Lancashire et al. 1999; Mileusnic et al. 1999).
He points out too that Brunner (1996) has dissociated him-
self from some of the uses made of his study of a Dutch
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pedigree with an apparent linkage between MAOA and “vi-
olence.” Indeed he has, and very helpfully too, though as I
point out below, this hasn’t prevented others from inter-
preting it very crudely indeed.
I must emphasise again, as I do repeatedly in the book,
that the point is not to deny that there are likely to be par-
ticular features of the brain of a person who repeatedly kills
or is violent to others in a civilian rather than a military con-
text, and indeed that there may be specific genes associated
with the development of such features, but that this reduc-
tionist description may not help us in trying to understand
or limit the level of violence in society. The task of good 
science and of effective social policy is to try to identify de-
termining levels of causation and potential sites of inter-
vention. In this context, Fuller argues for the need to dis-
tinguish “genuinely efficacious” interventions from merely
“convenient” ones. I couldn’t agree more, but would point
out that these very terms are not neutral. Efficacious for
whom? Convenient to whom? What might be socially both
convenient and efficacious, for instance, transportation for
sheep stealing to British landowners in the eighteenth cen-
tury, might not be either for the transportees.
It is precisely here that I argue, contra Schooler, that the
use of ritalin to treat children given an ADHD diagnosis is
– to put it no more strongly – frequently misguided: effi-
cacious and convenient perhaps for schools authorities, but
distinctly less so for the child given the drug, granted its
many less than desirable pharmacological effects (Breggin
1999). In this context I am quite puzzled by Schooler’s claim
that I am disrespectful of sociology and want to colonise it
for biology. Anderson makes a similar claim: that I want bi-
ology to have a veto over psychology. Some mistake here
surely. Wilson (1998) explicitly and Pinker (1997) certainly
implicitly make such claims, but nothing could be further
from my intentions or my arguments; one of the points of
Lifelines is to argue (contra Wilson, Pinker, and evolution-
ary psychologists in general) for the relative autonomy of
both psychological and sociological levels of description.
Anderson goes on to claim an even more damaging veto, in
asserting that behaviour genetics can determine the general
phenomena that a psychological theory must accommo-
date. Indeed, other reviewers, such as Economos, criticise
me for apparently going too far in this direction. My at-
tempt to resist such biological colonisation could scarcely
be otherwise, as I have lived and co-written with a sociolo-
gist for the best part of forty years! Perhaps Anderson and
Schooler misinterpret me because I am as unhappy about
the psychometrising of sociology as I am about psychome-
try’s reductive approach to psychology, and because I have
an (outsider’s) preference for these disciplines’ more 
dynamic and qualitative rather than quantitative and func-
tionalist traditions. Despite Schooler, the antithesis of “rig-
orous psychometric measures of such psychological char-
acteristics as job satisfaction” is not necessarily “armchair
speculation,” as a multitude of sociologists and psycholo-
gists of less reductive schools would speedily attest.
R7. On Darwin and Darwinists
In their anxiety to stamp out what they see as heresy, a num-
ber of reviewers imply that my critique of ultra- or funda-
mentalist Darwinism is equally a critique of the neo-
Darwinian synthesis of the 1930s, or of Darwin himself.
Thus Wells claims that Darwin’s central tenet is Weiss-
manism. Is it? Darwin himself knew better, as later editions
of The origin attest, and Weissmanian dogma is itself, and
always has been, under challenge from a number of
sources, especially biochemical, developmental and micro-
biological, several of which are cited in Lifelines, notably
Bonner (see also Dover 1992; 2000). And consider the re-
cent flurry of interest in prions, or in protein splicing (e.g.,
Cooper & Stevens 1995). I’m afraid Wells’s review illus-
trates the mess that nonbiologists often get into in their en-
thusiasm for over-simple philosophically rather than data-
driven inputs into this debate. Charlton claims that I
ignore good work done by evolutionary biologists and cites
in particular Szathmary and Maynard Smith’s (Maynard
Smith & Szathmary 1995) work on major transitions in evo-
lution to defend Maynard Smith from a charge I never make:
that he is himself an ultra-Darwinist in the Dawkins/Pinker
sense. There are many interesting themes in that book, es-
pecially in its early chapters, and Maynard Smith is far too
subtle a thinker ever to be so branded, despite his associa-
tion with the “fundis.” As I point out in Lifelines, his mod-
els of evolutionary stable strategies are quite consonant
with population level selection.
R8. On heritability and intelligence
Crusio asks what grounds I have for believing that intelli-
gence is a more complex phenotype than milk yield, where
I agree that heritability measures may be of relevance. I dis-
pute two points. The first is that “intelligence” is definable
in a way that makes it a phenotype at all, unless it is reduced
to a fixed lump in the head called IQ. For a review of why
intelligence is not reducible to IQ, see Richardson (1998;
1999). Here I agree with Anderson, who states that
whether intelligence is quantifiable or not depends on
whether we have a theory that allows for the quantification
of its constructs. I deny that such a theory could be valid,
but claim that intelligent behaviour, thought, and action are
emergent interactions, socially defined for the most part,
between individuals and their social and physical environ-
ment. They are only partially “embedded” within the brain
and body of the person concerned. Of course there are
brain processes, of many sorts, involved in this interaction,
as Martindale points out; it would be highly surprising to
any neuroscientist if there were not. “Speed of processing”
or some EEG parameters may be among them. But before
we get too carried away with such relatively crude correla-
tions, let me point to the difficulties that 40 years of good
neuroscientific work have encountered in attempting to de-
fine the molecular, cellular, and physiological correlates of
even such a seemingly tractable problem as simple associa-
tion learning in animal models (see, e.g., Rose 1993, for a
review).
I appreciate the richer discussion of these issues by
Depue and the attempt to ground such measures as extra-
version in neurobiological parameters. His discussion of the
capacity – surely a relevant biological process – by which
stability may be generated through plasticity is important,
though I feel as queasy about these psychometric con-
structs as I do about IQ. More fundamentally, for all the
reasons specified in Lifelines, I challenge the obsession that
psychometricians and behaviour geneticists have with the
fundamentally meaningless statistic called heritability. I
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thank Hirsch for his further development of this point (and
for pointing to several minor errors in the text of the hard-
back, most of which have been caught and corrected in the
paperback). But even if one grants behaviour geneticists
their use of the term, its application in twin and related
studies is highly problematic, as Segalowitz, following in a
long tradition, points out. For Anderson to suggest that
“measuring two identical twins [reared apart] is just about
indistinguishable from measuring the same twin twice” sug-
gests to me that he has never spoken to twins, even those
reared together. Martindale also refers to my regret that
Bouchard was unwilling to provide access to his primary
data – an unwillingness that he has also shown to date in 
response to requests from researchers undertaking meta-
analyses of published twin studies – on the grounds of con-
fidentiality. There are, of course, easy ways to protect such
confidentiality via coding, and I remain unconvinced.
R9. On human universals 
and biological determinism
Unsurprisingly, granted the readership of BBS, these are
the themes which have attracted mostly hostile responses.
Broude sets the issue up by providing an entire paragraph
of apparent human universals, derived from a bizarre list 
attributed to the ancestral positivist anthropologist G. P.
Murdock (1945), long abandoned in the anthropological
community, though clearly still an influence amongst some
psychologists. Of course there are such universals; the soci-
eties we create are profoundly shaped by the length of the
human lifespan and the neoteny of our offspring, to say
nothing of our size (as Haldane [1985] pointed out many
years ago in the marvellous sentence which forms the epi-
gram to one of my chapters [Ch. 8], or the fact that we
breathe air not water, and are omnivorous. As Ahouse (per-
sonal communication) points out in a comment on Wilson’s
view about human art, expressed in Consilience, no one
would expect dogs to paint in colour, or I would add, hu-
mans in infra-red or ultra-violet – until the arrival of tech-
nologies that made these wavelengths “visible” to us. But to
say that gestures, cooking, tool-making, trade, or ethics are
human universals is to say absolutely nothing other than
that humans are social animals who have developed tech-
nologies for living, and it entirely ignores the diversity of
forms that these assumed Platonic natural kinds may take.
To add kin groups to these might imply that the social def-
inition of kin is coterminous with the biological one used in
definitions of inclusive fitness, yet of course it is nothing of
the sort; social definitions of kin are remarkably complex
and varied (the reductio ad absurdum being to discover that
young children often include their pets within their defini-
tions of their family!).
The serious theoretical issue lies in our understanding of
how such commonalities as there are emerge. The argu-
ment of evolutionary psychologists is that they are geneti-
cally built into our behaviour as a result of evolutionary se-
lection pressures. This is the line taken by Pinker (1997)
following for instance, Cosmides and Tooby (Barkow et al.
1992). For them, behaviour and the mind are constructed
from genetically fixed modules – Cosmides and Tooby’s fa-
mous Swiss army knife analogy. Of course this doesn’t mean
– and pace Alcock, Wells, and several other reviewers, I
never for one moment imply that it does – that such be-
haviour is unmodifiable; clearly the “modules” are sup-
posed to permit flexibility. (Incidentally, I did not invent the
story of pink-feathered flamingos – it first surfaced in an ac-
count by Thayer in 1909! I am grateful to Bateson (Bateson
& Martin 1999) for the account of this piece of proto-
adaptationism). There is no space to deal with this argu-
ment at length here (see Rose & Rose 2000). Suffice it to
say first that the innate modular argument (whose history
stretches back to Plato) ignores both development
(Karmiloff-Smith 1992) and the constructivist alternatives
offered by Oyama (1986) and Ingold (1986; 2000; see also
Bateson 2000 for a clarification of the multiplicity of mean-
ings given to the term instinct), or even the connectionist
approach of Elman et al. (1996). It is precisely the crudity
of this view of innate modularity that the concept of au-
topoiesis counters.
It is the evolutionary psychologist’s sense of biological 
determinism, not some fantasy of Alcock’s imagining, that
Lifelines is concerned to counter, on both empirical and
theoretical grounds. Udry believes that there isn’t enough
biological determinism about, though this claim to be a per-
secuted minority is clearly belied by the evidence of the
continuing mass sales of many of the authors I have men-
tioned. But the defenders of biological determinism want
to have it both ways. Thus even though he, Steklis, Alcock,
and others maintain that insofar as they do exist, evolution-
ary psychologists do not make the determinist claims I at-
tribute to them, one only has to read Broude’s shopping list
to get a contradictory sense, though even she doesn’t go so
far as offering, as some contemporary Murdockians have,
children’s alleged dislike and adults’ liking for spinach, or
early morning sickness or “food cravings” in pregnancy, as
evolutionarily honed adaptations. Consider too Pinker’s
(1997) and Wilson’s (1998) rooting of an alleged human
preference for green landscapes to our evolutionary origins
in the savannah. Their accounts often read like a scientific
version of The Flintstones – a projection of idealised US
suburban life circa 1955 back into the neolithic.
The empirical evidence for such claims is often ex-
tremely shaky, and where it exists it is often much better ex-
plained on proximate rather than distally causal grounds.
Wells refers to familial violence as a parent–offspring con-
flict. But what is an evolutionary psychologist to make of the
(empirical) fact that violence by men against their female
partners is particularly high during pregnancy, when the
women are carrying their partner’s child-to-be? Yet evo-
lutionary psychologists, ignoring the huge differences in
scale, prefer instead to dwell on the tiny number of mur-
ders by step-fathers of their offspring. I believe, along with
anyone familiar with such evidence and not constrained by
a fundamentalist need to shoehorn all aspects of human ex-
istence into a rigidly defined adaptationist framework, that
proximal explanations at the social, economic, and personal
life-history level are likely to give us much more purchase
on understanding such phenomena than half-baked pseudo-
Darwinism.
I cite many examples of such biological determinist
claims in Lifelines, but here are some more for good mea-
sure (and see also Brown 1999): “our belief in morality is
merely an adaptation put in place to further our reproduc-
tive ends” (Wilson 1975, quoted by Dennett 1995); “[the
human mind is] equipped with a body of genetically deter-
mined information specific to universal grammar” (Smith &
Tsimpli 1995); “the mind is likely to contain blueprints for
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grammatical rules . . . and a special set of genes that help
wire it in place” (Pinker 1995); “From pregnancy compli-
cations, to the stress response, to the beauty in symmetry,
to the attraction of money, to the historical tendency of the
rich to favor firstborn sons, everything we think, feel and do
might be better understood as a means to the spread of our
own – or of our ancestor’s – genes” (Betzig 1997).
Or consider Hamilton’s romantically racist eugenicism,
expressed in a paper delivered to a recent conference at the
Vatican Academy (Pontifical Academy 1998), where he ex-
plained, to the distress of most of the other participants,
that he would willingly sacrifice “a hundred unknown Chi-
nese” to save a panda from destruction. Claiming as Max-
son and Steklis do, that such biological determinists allow
for epistasis and epigenetics scarcely addresses the point:
any genetic effect has to work via epigenetic processes.
When I turn to the question of behaviour genetics and neu-
rogenetic determinism, I am not suggesting either that
genes are irrelevant to an understanding of human behav-
iour or that determinists believe their effects are unmedi-
ated. Nor has Maxson any grounds for claiming that I “be-
lieve that most if not all [adaptations] involve selection at
the group rather than the individual level” or that I believe
that heritability estimates are only suitable for nonhumans
(but see Sober & Wilson, 1998, for an extremely useful
reevaluation of the dogmatic anti-group selectionist ap-
proach of many neo- as well as ultra-Darwinists; see also
Wilson & Sober: “Reintroducing Group Selection to the
Human Behavioral Sciences” BBS 17(4) 1994). Maxson is
of course right when he points out that Lifelines makes no
reference to C. Elegans – however he misquotes and there-
fore makes a nonsense of my statement on p. 4 that “bio-
chemical and genetic generalisations are still derived from
just three organisms” by omitting the two words italicised.
This distortion comes poorly from someone who claims that
I quote out of context.
The reductive sequence I describe in Chapter 10 of Life-
lines begins with questioning the validity of reifying and ob-
jectifying the “behaviour” (in my major example, “violence”
or “aggression”) and ends with a critique of the assumption
of a genetic explanation as “the” determining cause. As both
Fuller and Midgley recognise, the search for causal ex-
planations is also a search for efficacious sites of interven-
tion, and it is in this sense that the attempts to explain “vi-
olence” in society in terms of genes or MAOA inhibitors is
at best irrelevant and at worst positively harmful, for the
reasons that chapter set out. Crusio defends the conclu-
sions of the Cases et al. (1995) paper against my critique be-
fore describing an interesting experiment of his own with
whose modest interpretation I have no major problems. My
objection to the highlighting of “aggression” in the Cases et
al. paper is that the genetically modified mice the authors
describe as aggressive also had so many other phenotypic
abnormalities as to make this particular feature a rather
trivial aspect of their profoundly disabled lives, and the in-
souciance of the authors’ response, described in Lifelines,
emphasising this particular aspect of their mice’s behaviour
as a deliberate attempt to draw attention to their findings.
Well indeed it has, and hence the rhetorical transmogrifi-
cation to which Crusio refers must be seen as an interpre-
tation (albeit metaphorical) of the authors’ intentions.
In sum, I thank those many reviewers of Lifelines who
have reflected so thoughtfully on the issues it raises, and in
doing so have pushed me to think further and harder about
several of its themes. As for the hornet’s nest of behaviour
geneticists, I cannot say that I am surprised that I have
stirred them up, but conclude that despite their buzzing,
my book has remained largely immune to their stings.
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